COMPOSITIONAL AND CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ACROSS POLITICAL LANDSCAPES: CASE STUDIES OF MIGRATION AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of three papers that explore the geographic context of elections. Through case studies of migration and same-sex marriage, this research demonstrates how elections are the products of stratified social, economic, and political environments that area highly variable across space. This dissertation also details the implications for local, state, and national elections.

The first two papers of this dissertation explore how compositional effects of migration fundamentally alter political landscapes. In addressing this research question, Appendix A tackles the primary obstacle of compositional migration research—collecting migration data containing individual party identification. This paper makes a significant contribution by serving as the first study to pioneer a methodological approach that predicts individual partisanship of migrants according to socioeconomic characteristics with logistic regression state models. The results underscore the importance of migrant origins and destinations in considering the political effectiveness of migration flows.

Relying on the methodological framework in Appendix A, Appendix B calls attention to the oversimplified, undertheorized, and highly problematic definitions of migration responsible for the cursory understanding of migration's compositional effects. Specifically, the paper suggests what recent U.S. migration trends portend for compositional changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship at the state level through a concept of 'political effectiveness'. This research makes several important

contributions to the existing literature, including clearly illustrating the complexity of migration through the different ways it produces partisan gains.

Approaching electoral analysis through a contextual perspective, Appendix C examines the interrelationship of political strategies used by gay rights advocates in campaigns against constitutional bans of same-sex marriage. Through a comparative analysis of Arizona Propositions 107 and 102, this research examines the interrelationship and basis of political strategies between voters' rejection of Proposition 107 (2006) and passage of Proposition 102 (2008). Additionally, considering that vote choice is largely influenced by discursive political cues, including messaging, it is imperative to examine the basis of political strategies and assess how local context influences political strategies and voting constituencies. Findings from this research also provide important considerations for both gay rights and political strategy literatures.

INTRODUCTION

Individuals and organized constituencies seek political recognition through various means, including parades, boycotts, and other political strategies, but elections are distinct in their ability to provide an immediate connection between citizens and the state (Campbell et al. 1960). Furthermore, elections wield an unparalleled level of power in determining who counts, who wins, and establishing the frame of debate around critical cultural issues in the American political landscape. Consequently, elections have long captivated many political and electoral geographers interested in examining the dialectical relationship between the social and physical environment and voting patterns.

The combined importance of elections, and their inherent geographic context, constitutes the basis of this dissertation research. Using a mixed-methods approach, this research employs two case studies in electoral geography, migration and same-sex marriage, to illustrate the importance and utility of different approaches for examining the spatial situatedness of politics. Rooted in the intellectual tradition of electoral geography, which involves examining the "geographical aspects of the organization, conduct, and results of elections," (Johnston et al. 2000, p. 204) this research broadly demonstrates how compositional effects of migration and underlying contextual factors of campaign political strategies are inherently geographic phenomena—products of stratified social, economic, and political environments that are highly variable across space and reflect the 'spatial organization of society' (Taylor and Johnston 1979).

Increasing mobility levels across the U.S. electorate has heightened the importance of migration. The Current Population Survey (CPS) reports that over 7.8 million Americans moved across state lines between 2004 and 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). What is more, migration streams are highly unidirectional as continued Sun-Belt migration from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West continues to produce highly uneven political effects. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2030, 30% of the U.S. population may reside in California, Texas, and Florida; Florida could have more electoral votes than New York and Massachusetts combined, Arizona could equal Michigan's electoral importance, and North Carolina will be equal to Pennsylvania (U.S. Census Bureau 2005, Frey 2005). Therefore, the first case study considers how recent U.S. migration trends manifest politically by examining the highly uneven effects across political landscapes through compositional changes in partisanship.

The salience of migration's impact on politics has produced an extensive literature examining migration, but scholars have largely focused on migration's effects on migrants and not on migration's effects on place. Consequently, the disproportionate focus on individual migrants had resulted in an oversimplified, undertheorized and highly problematic definition of migration that provides a cursory understanding of its compositional effects across political landscapes. In fact, political scientist Thad A. Brown noted "migration is a demographic phenomenon not well known in political science" (Brown 1988, p. 146).

In addition to a significant intellectual disconnect across political science, electoral geography, and demography, the primary obstacle for compositional effects research is the nonexistence of reliable migration data containing individual-level partisanship. In *Paper A*, entitled, "A Methodological Framework for Assessing Compositional Effects of Migration on Political Landscapes" (Appendix A), I make a significant contribution in advancing compositional effects scholarship by proposing an innovative methodological panacea to the perennial obstacle of collecting migration data containing individual party identification. Additionally, this research develops and applies a comprehensive analytical framework based on a well-established body of migration theory to address the highly complex nature of compositional effects, including the highly selective nature of migration and the importance of migrant origins and destinations. In *Paper B*, entitled, "Voters on the Move: The Political Effectiveness of Migration and Its Effects on State Partisan Composition" (Appendix B), I rely on the methodological framework from *Paper A* to address three key theoretical and definitional misconceptions of migration that have seriously hampered compositional migration research. Moreover, I call attention to and provide detailed insight on the complex nature of migration by developing the concept of 'political effectiveness'.

While migration and same-sex marriage are distinctly different topics, the unified theme of this dissertation research involves examining how both migration and campaign political strategies produce varied effects across political landscapes. Considering voice choice is not naturally determined and is strongly shaped through discursive cues, media framing, and political messaging of campaigns, the underlying

context of political strategies is an increasingly important explanatory factor for varied voting patterns across political constituencies (Smith 2005, Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000). Therefore, in order to provide a situated framework for comprehensively understanding political geography, *Paper C* demonstrates the importance of local context and its ability to influence processes that construct and shape campaign political strategies (O'Loughlin 2003, Johnston et al. 1990, Agnew 1990).

Recently, a proliferating cultural debate over same-sex marriage has dominated political discourse in the U.S. as voters in 29 states have approved constitutional amendments defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman. With voters increasingly serving as the arbiters of civil rights for gay and lesbian Americans, it is critically important to consider the underlying context of arguments presented by campaigns of both sides organized in support or opposed to state ballot initiatives.

Arizona's battle over same-sex marriage serves as a compelling case study. In 2006, Arizona voters rejected Proposition 107, which attempted to ban both same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships, making Arizona the only U.S. state to defeat a same-sex marriage proposition. Then, just two years later in 2008, voters reversed themselves and passed Proposition 102, which banned only same-sex marriage. Many political observers credited a highly unorthodox political strategy implemented by Arizona Together, the largest gay rights organization opposing Proposition 107, which emphasized the potential effects for heterosexual domestic partners instead of framing the proposition as a gay civil rights issue (Geis 2006). This strategy led to considerable

dissension among gay rights advocates and the formation of a separate organization called No on Proposition 107/102 to pursue fundamentally different political strategies.

In addition to same-sex marriage becoming an increasingly salient issue, evidence from Arizona and across the U.S. demonstrates a highly nuanced and fragmented patchwork of political strategies among gay rights campaigns largely resulting from differences in political/theoretical perspectives (Adam 2003, Hull 2001). Yet, few electoral studies have specifically examined political strategies employed in the battle over same-sex marriage propositions (Brown et al. 2005). Consequently, in *Paper C*, entitled, "Arizona United or Divided? Political Strategies Used by Gay Rights Advocates in Arizona's Same-Sex Marriage Propositions 107 and 102" (Appendix C), I explore the interrelationship and underlying context of political strategies used by gay rights advocates in Propositions 107 and 102 to determine if and how political strategies changed between the voters' rejection of Proposition 107 (2006) and the passage of Proposition 102 (2008).

While this dissertation research employs considerably different approaches in addressing migration and same-sex marriage, results from both case studies underscore the importance of geographic context and present direct implications for local, state, and national elections. The following section provides a broad literature review of electoral geography detailing the origin of the subfield and addressing major scholarly debates relevant to this dissertation research. Moreover, the summary situates where this dissertation research fits in within electoral geography.

Literature Review

Geography of Electoral Behavior

Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, Andre Siegfried (1913, 1949) was the first electoral geographer to recognize the inherent spatial nature of elections and suggest that voting patterns were the result of a distinct social and physical environment, which reflected the 'spatial organization of society' (Taylor and Johnston 1979). Siegfried's seminal ideas led subsequent electoral geography scholars to advance the newly established subfield of political geography by concluding that political attitudes, voting behavior, and elections are inherently geographic phenomena—products of stratified social and economic environments that are highly variable across space (Johnston 2005, Agnew 1990).

By considering the spatial situatedness of politics through case studies of migration and political strategies of same-sex marriage campaigns, this dissertation research is rooted in the intellectual framework of electoral geography. Consequently, it is important to consider the historical trajectory of the field, nuances of individual research subfields, and examine major debates within the field.

The foundation of electoral geography and its research is classified into three broad categories: 1) geography of electoral behavior, 2) geographical influences of the voting decision, and 3) geography of electoral systems (Agnew 1990, Reynolds 1990, Taylor and Johnston 1979). The oldest branch of electoral geography, often referred to as 'traditional electoral geography', is the geography of electoral behavior, which analyzes and explains the geography of voting patterns through broad interpretive mechanisms called sections. In addition to Siegfried's seminal research, Frederick

Jackson Turner (1932) was equally important in establishing traditional electoral geography, in arguing that the 'section' could be used to explain the geography of voting patterns. Specifically, Turner (1932, p. 183) described sections as:

> The outcome of the deeper-seated geographical conditions interacting with the stock which settled the region. Sections are more important than states in shaping the underlying forces of American history. The economic, political, and social life of the United States, even its literature, psychology, and its religious organizations, must be described by sections; there is a geography of public opinion.

Turner also argued that because sections were homogenous in terms of race, religion, class, culture, and political goals, they could be used to succinctly explain the consistency of voting patterns.

Turner described the North-South division as the most defined section in American politics, which he attributed to the sectionalization of economic interests (Archer 1988, Turner 1932). Turner's (1932) research also established an early theoretical foundation for traditional electoral geography, which explained patterns of electoral behavior in terms of sections, economics, and the eventual development of regionally, socially defined, and other broad political cleavages. This regional theoretical framework dominated geography during the early 20th century (Wade 1989, Webster 1989). Following Turner's (1932) work, Daniel J. Elazar (1984) developed a broad cleavage model of political cultures, which explained regional variation in citizen preferences for government, attitudes towards politics, and voting patterns through regionally distinct European settlement patterns and corresponding differences in 'culture' (Shelley et al. 1996).

Turner, Elazar, and other scholars of traditional electoral geography often approach political research by explaining geographic and socio-demographic variability in voting patterns through macro cartographic and statistical analyses. Relying almost exclusively on a quantitative methodological framework, scholars explain spatial differences in voting behavior through broad macro-level variables, including: social, economic, sectional, partisan identification, and regional variables [e.g. Mellow and Trubowitz 2005, Heppen 2003, Webster 2002, Shelley 2002, Warf and Waddell 2002, Archer 2002, Pattie et al. 1997, Shelley et al. 1996, Webster 1989, Wade 1989, Archer 1988, Shelley 1988].

Traditional electoral geography still enjoys some widespread scholarly engagement, but many scholars argue that the subfield is increasingly irrelevant. The primary reason for its waning importance is that many in the academe see the subfield as obtuse and theoretically entrenched because of its inability to adapt and account for fundamental societal changes within the electorate. Beginning with the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, many political scientists and electoral geographers observed that increasing urbanization, industrialization, and immigration during the World War II period was leading to fundamental changes within the American electorate. Specifically, voting patterns were no longer linked to sectionalism and were increasingly associated with social class cleavages (Wade 1989, Archer 1988). What is more, social, cultural, economic period effects, and generational replacement during the 1950s to 1970s led to further structural changes within the voting electorate.

Critical changes taking place over this four-decade period had a profound impact on the American electorate, forcing many geographers and political scientists to reconceptualize party identification and cleavage models. Citing the need for a theoretical framework that could account for these changes, many scholars in both fields adapted a Behavioralist theoretical perspective (Shelley et al. 1996). And even though sectional, regional, and cultural determinist frameworks of traditional electoral geography were becoming increasingly replaced by Behavioralist and other epistemologies, many scholars of traditional electoral geography remained steadfastly opposed to the epistemological shift. Agnew notes, "unfortunately, the way many of us think has not adjusted to the changed conditions which both the American economy and American politics must now operate," (Agnew 1988, p. 128).

Geographical Influences on the Voting Decision

Traditional electoral geography's reliance on an aggregate-level geographic approach to study electoral behavior served as a primary impetus for the second branch of electoral research, which emphasizes social context and its influence on the individual voting decision (Shelley et al. 1996). Agnew (1996, 1990), Johnston (2005), Johnston et al. (1990), Shin (1997), and other contemporary electoral geographers argued that the geographic constitution of elections not only requires a compositional approach, but also demands a contextual approach that is increasingly sensitive to the importance of local context in understanding the nuances of electoral behavior.

Specifically, contemporary electoral geographers assert that mapping voting results and providing general explanations leads to 'epiphenomenal' and 'residual'

analyses, characterized with two prevailing attributes: 1) a greater interest in mapping voting results compared to explaining the underlying factors precipitating the voting decision and 2) explanation of the spatial pattern of voting as generalized and non-specific. In fact, Johnston and Pattie (2008) contend that many traditional electoral geographers approach electoral analysis through a 'contextual vacuum' by relying a methodological approach that implicitly assumes the individual makes the voting decision alone. Therefore, Johnston (2005, p. 580) implores electoral scholars to recognize the 'pervasive geographical constitution to the social, economic, and political processes that are the foundations for electoral behavior' by increasing attention to context and consider the spatial situatedness of human action, which Agnew (1996, p. 131) notes, is inherently linked to place and space.

Considering the importance of compositional and contextual approaches to this dissertation research, a precise definition of context is most essential. O'Loughlin (2003) notes, "context focuses on the local environment where political behavior is shaped and expressed," (O'Loughlin 2003, p. 30). Therefore, a contextual approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of elections by examining issues at a micro-scale in order to address the highly nuanced aspects of people, ideas, and social and economic influences on the voting decision. Consequently, compositional and contextual approaches are not mutually exclusive and in fact, this research argues for, and employs both compositional and contextual approaches in order to further electoral understanding of migration and same-sex marriage propositions, respectively.

One of the earliest contextual scholars is Kevin Cox, who asserted, "the patterns identified thus far in electoral geography can only be understood if we are able to identify the spatial sources of variation in the voting of individuals," (Cox 1969, p. 83). Cox's argument suggests that voting patterns cannot be thoroughly understood without an individual-focused voting model that identifies and explains how place, or local context, drives variability in individual vote choice. Cox concluded that in many instances, voters tend to be spatially clustered because individual voting behavior is linked to cues prevalent in the voter's neighborhood or personal network, which Cox refers to as the 'neighborhood effect' (Cox 1969).

Similar to Cox's aforementioned 'neighborhood effect', Pattie and Johnston's (2000) study finds empirical support for a 'conversion through conversation' model. In addition to finding a local context variable statistically significant for voters switching political parties, the authors also found that English Conservative voters whose primary discussant was a Labor voter were 3.5 times more likely to desert the party than voters who did not talk to anyone about politics (Pattie and Johnston 2000). And in a separate study using individual-level data, Johnston (1987) notes that in addition to England having a distinct geographical pattern to its class structure, residents of the 'Labor North' who were trade union members were twenty times more likely to vote for the Labor Party than Southwestern residents, and working class individuals in large cities were four times more likely to vote for the Labor Party compared to counterparts in rural areas. In conclusion, this evidence underscores the need to consider context since the propensity to vote varies by region, type of place, and the social context of the

individual. Lastly, while earlier aggregate-level research found increasing spatial polarization of political parties in England both interregionally and within an urban-rural context, compositional studies provided little explanation of the underlying reasons for the polarization.

The call for increased attention to context is not without debate as critics have leveled three main criticisms. First, McAllister (1987) defends aggregate-level compositional analysis by arguing that research emphasizing the importance of context is "greatly overestimated and fails to control for a sufficiently wide range of variables," (McAllister 1987, p. 17). Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, McAllister (1987) argues that when adequate controls of socioeconomic status (SES), personal characteristics, and family background are controlled for, contextual effects have no effect. Secondly, Bowler (1991) notes that many context-based studies rely on aggregate data to find individual related effects, thereby creating an issue of ecological fallacy. And finally, the major criticism involves the idea of 'self-selection'—residents of similar economic or social classes tend to live near one another thereby discounting the role of contextual influences (Bower 1991).

Agnew (1996) keenly points out that much of the debate between geography and political science, illustrated by Johnston and McAllister's research, respectively, is the protection of values important to each discipline though research design. Political scientists have long viewed context as a separate effect rather than an individual-group interaction effect, which allows scholars to view context merely as a residual effect not fully accounted for in a regression model. In fact, Agnew (1990) criticizes one of

McAllister's earlier studies where he regresses social, religious, and region variables against partisan attitudes only to find no statistical significance, leading him to conclude that political differences are not rooted in social, religious, or regional factors. Agnew suggests that McAllister's study is representative of some studies within electoral geography and political science that fail to consider their quantitative methodological approach, which in Agnew's opinion, cannot fully account for context-based individual interaction since scholars are unable to make inferences at the individual level due to ecological inference and Modifiable Area Unit Problem (MAUP) issues. Yet, many scholars continue to use aggregate socioeconomic predictors of political behavior in a regression framework, which fails to consider issues like spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity, leading O'Loughlin (2003) to comment, "the misuse of classical statistical methods continues in geography, including political geography, despite two decades of evidence that these models produce erroneous results," (O'Loughlin 2003, p. 30). Therefore, O'Loughlin calls on scholars to employ spatial regressive models, including geographically weighted regression and expansion regression, which are better suited to address geographical issues.

In summary, the preceding review of electoral geography literature not only situates this dissertation research, but also underscores the fact that compositional and contextual approaches to electoral research are not mutually exclusive and their suitability depends on the nature of the research question. Through case studies of migration and proposed constitutional bans on same-sex marriage, this dissertation research broadly examines and demonstrates how compositional effects of migration

and the underlying context of campaign political strategies are critical for understanding variability of political behavior across space. The following sections briefly summarize relevant migration and same-sex marriage literature to provide background for the research conducted in Appendices A through C.

Political Science and Migration

Following the Depression of 1929, the working-class, Jews, the urban poor, Catholics, and the South formed a New Deal coalition, largely based on social class, that gave the Democrats a significant partisan identification advantage over Republicans and allowed Democrats to dominate American politics from the 1930s through the late 1960s (Sorauf and Beck 1988, Sundquist 1983). However, beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1970s, a number of momentous changes occurred in the electorate forcing political scientists to reconceptualize notions of traditional partisanship theory in order to establish a clearer picture for the political impacts in the near future. First, a significant narrowing in Democratic identification advantage occurred as a 20% advantage in 1954 dropped to 13% by the end of the 1970s (Petrocik 1987). Secondly, this period also showed a significant drop in the number of 'strong' party identifiers and a corresponding increase in the number of self-identified Independents (23% in 1952 to 35% in 1972) (Carmines et al. 1987). Thirdly, the extreme salience of social and cultural issues, including civil rights, abortion, Vietnam, and women's rights caused an unprecedented level of issue-based conversion in the electorate, meaning the electorate relied less on party identification and more on individual issues for their voting decision. Lastly, regional realignment, largely

resulting from the civil rights legislation of the early 1960s, shifted the American South from a Democratic to Republican stronghold by the early 1970s (Stanley 1988).

These historic changes produced a rich literature with many political scientists committed to identify underlying reasons for partisan change [e.g. Bowler et al. 2006, Carsey and Layman 2006, Niemi and Jennings 1991, Bartels 2000, Miller 2000, Miller and Shanks 1996, Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Beck and Jennings 1991 Luskin et al. 1989, Fiorina 1981, Abramson 1979, Converse 1976]. The relevance and importance of this literature to this dissertation research is that with political scientists explaining partisan change through three components: 1) conversion, 2) mobilization, and 3) migration (Brodsky 1988), results from this research established foundational principles within political science that endured for decades.

While realignment and partisan change had widespread national implications, nowhere in the U.S. has realignment been more gradual, yet unequivocal, than in the American South. In 1952, 80% of white Southerners identified as Democrats and by 1984, only 46% identified with the Democratic Party (Carmines and Stanley 1990). With national Democratic Party leaders championing the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, many conservative white Southerners left the Democratic Party for the Republican Party.

Consequently, political science scholars used the transformation of the American South from a largely Democratic to Republican region as *the* litmus test for identifying and measuring which of the three underlying factors of partisan change, conversion, mobilization, and migration, was primarily responsible for Southern realignment. The

general consensus was that issue-based conversion (Vietnam, abortion, civil rights, and women's rights) and generational replacement of the 'New Deal' social class-based cleavage was largely responsible, and mobilization and migration played insignificant roles (Valentino and Sears 2005, Stanley 1988, Petrocik 1987). These findings were extremely influential in leading many political scientists to discount the importance of migration as a factor of partisan change. More importantly, however, this lead to a dearth of migration scholarship for two decades, until recent examination of compositional and contextual effects of migration by Brown (1988), Gimpel (1999), Gimpel and Schuknecht (2001), and others.

The underestimation of migration as a factor of political change by political science caused Brown (1988) to conclude, "migration is a demographic phenomenon that is not well known in political science," (Brown 1988, p. 146). In fact, the wholly inadequate literature of migration, both in political science and electoral geography, has largely forced scholars to rely on oversimplified, undertheorized, and highly problematic conceptions of migration. Therefore, Appendices A and B rectify this issue by clearly demonstrating *how* migration is able to create instantaneous and long-lasting impressions across political landscapes through complex, multi-faceted, and highly nuanced ways.

Gay and Lesbian Political Activism in the U.S.

Research approaches for examining social movements are often as diverse as the movements themselves, but an underlying epistemological assumption prevalent in the broad social movement literature is rationalism, which largely assumes unified

identities, beliefs, and practices (Rucht 1996). With much of the dissension in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement attributed to sharp differences according to ideology, sexual politics, and individual identity, this research relies on conclusions specific to the gay and lesbian social movement literature as the basis for establishing a theoretical foundation (de la Dehesa 2007). Further, in order to thoroughly understand the underlying processes giving rise to different political strategies, it is necessary to operate within a theoretical framework that addresses the basis of ideological differences.

Beginning with the founding of the Mattachine Society in 1950 and the social activism initiated by the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) during the Stonewall era of the late 1960s and 1970s, the fight for gay and lesbian civil rights has actually been the product of several social movements with considerably different organizational politics. Epstein (1999, p. 75) addresses the differences:

> The multiplicity of voices and goals within U.S. gay and lesbian movements, in combination with specific features of U.S. society, therefore structures not only the familiar dilemmas of social movement politics—gradualism versus provocation, assimilationism versus separatism, single-issue groups versus coalitions, centralization versus grassroots localism, but also the less commonly found tension between the politics of stable identity and the politics of instability and difference.

In addition to identifying underlying causes of disagreement, the preceding quote also underscores the multi-faceted nature of ideological differences. While there is an extensive literature addressing the incredible complexity of this disagreement, Epstein (1999) notes that the pervasive ideological chasm across gay rights groups can be summarized as differences in assimilationist versus liberationist ideological politics. The assimilationist approach of the Mattachine Society contrasted with the liberationist

approach of the GLF is multifaceted, complex, and dynamic, but discord can be delineated along three main axes: 1) contrasting perceptions of sexual identity politics, 2) public/private expression of sexuality, and 3) difference of tactical operations (Epstein 1999).

With unprecedented violence, harassment, and raids by New York police officers towards homosexuals leading to the Stonewall riots in July 1969, the modern-day liberationist movement commenced by responding with the founding of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) and Gay Activists' Alliance (GAA). Operating under a militant framework and closely aligned with the civil rights, feminist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-war movements of the 1960s, the GLF, GAA, and other liberationists argued that "gay civil rights must be seen as a broader focus of human rights, sexual and gender equality, social and economic justice, and faith in a multiracial society," (Vaid 1995, p. 180). The theoretical framework of the liberationist movement is closely aligned with the development of queer theory in the early 1990s, which is a postmodern and poststructuralist view of sexual identity that attempts to erase rigid categorical definitions associated with 'gay' and 'lesbian' in order to reshape sexual identity into a "radical, utopian, nonidentitarian politics of difference" (Epstein 1999, p. 32). While liberationists and queer politics both seek to subvert traditional categories of sexual identities, queer politics renounces any form of identity politics and argues that sexual identity is dynamic, unstable, and often non-descript. Alternatively, liberationists tended to embrace gay and lesbian identities (Epstein 1999).

Specifically, liberationists rejected heteronormativity because they sought complete cultural liberation in order to provide a dissident social space for bisexuals, transgendered, and other sexually excluded groups (Adam 1995). As a result, liberationists participated in demonstrations, protests, boycotts, and often engaged in public displays of affection in an attempt to destabilize heteronormativity and as a "defiant affirmation of identity" (Bell and Binnie 2000, p. 40). These tactics were largely mechanisms for protesting against mainstream political processes used by assimilationists. Liberationists were highly skeptical of assimilation into society because they argued that "access to the system becomes far more important than the actual treatment of gays and lesbians within the system," (Rimmerman 2000, p. 51) and that the boundaries of acceptance "can be expanded and contracted at political whim" (Bell and Binnie 2000, p. 39).

The tenuous relationship between liberationists and assimilationists intensified during the 1970s with a strengthening assimilationist movement. Assimilationists credited newly founded national gay organizations, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), as largely influential in decriminalizing crimes against nature and passing protections for gay and lesbian individuals across several states. Additionally, gays and lesbians made political inroads into the Democratic Party during this period. Assimilationists contended that improved political access would continue to lead to electoral, legal, and legislative victories expanding gay rights, reducing discrimination, and ameliorating social equality. As a result, assimilationists argued for social, political, and legal assimilation within the gay

community and attempted to change the social identity of the movement by making it slightly more conservative, mainstream "communal, middle-class character" (Epstein 1999, p. 43). Assimilationists felt these successes were critical to achieving an important goal, which was to improve the social environment so that more gays could emerge from the shadows of the closet leading to greater visibility, acknowledgment, and eventually acceptance with changing cultural norms (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000). The theoretical basis of assimilationist and liberationist ideologies constitutes and important part of this dissertation and the related political strategies implemented by both groups are fully addressed in Appendix C.

As the preceding literature demonstrates, ideological differences are an extremely important factor explaining much of the dissension among gay rights advocates since the dawn of the gay civil rights movement. With the increasing importance and prevalence of proposed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage and gay rights advocates' pursuance of considerably different political strategies (see Hull 2001, Levin 1997), it is critically important to consider how assimilationist and liberationist ideologies explain gay rights advocates' pursuance difference political strategies. Moreover, the fundamentally different strategies employed by Arizona gay rights organizations, Arizona Together and No on Propositions 107/102, further elevates the importance of underlying context for understanding the basis of differences in political strategies.

However, most research focusing on gay political issues (Smith et al. 2006, Lewis 2005, Soule 2004, Barclay and Fisher 2003, Adam 2003) has generally favored a

compositional analytical approach, which involves using a macro-level or national scale (Haider-Markel 1996) to explore the passage of state ballot initiatives with quantitative regression analyses and explaining voting behavior as a result of regional or sectional variations in social, economic, or settlement factors (O'Reilly and Webster 1998, Ormond and Cole 1996). Only a handful of studies (e.g. Brown et al. 2005, Hull 2001, and Levin 1997) specifically consider the underlying processes giving rise to different political strategies within gay rights campaigns. Consequently, by specifically considering the interrelationship and basis of political strategies used by Arizona gay rights advocates against Propositions 107 and 102, the research in Appendix C not only provides key insight into the unique electoral outcome in Arizona, but also contributes much-needed investigation to a wholly inadequate literature addressing underlying factors responsible for difference in gay rights political strategies.

PRESENT STUDY

Each of the papers appended to this dissertation fully detail the research problem, methodology, findings, and principal conclusions germane to the larger literature. This section provides a succinct summary of the methodological framework for each paper, key findings, and suggestions for future research.

Appendix A—'A Methodological Framework for Assessing Compositional Effects of Migration on Political Landscapes'

In response to the perennial obstacle of collecting migration data containing individual party identification, this paper develops a pioneering methodological approach for predicting individual party identification according to individual socioeconomic characteristics. While U.S. Census data provide the most comprehensive dataset for detailed analysis of state-to-state migration flows, a key limitation is that the data only contain individual social and economic characteristics and not individual partisanship. Therefore, the study relies on social and economic variables from state-based Presidential election exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service and National Election Pool to test the statistical robustness of predicting individual partisanship (Republican or Democrat) according to four socioeconomic variables: gender, age, race, and income.

Statistical results suggest that when employed at state levels, age, gender, race, and income are significant, robust, and reliable predictors of individual party identification. Each major diagnostic statistic of binary logistic regression showed statistical significance, including: log likelihood, chi-square, classification results, Nagelkerke values, Hosmer-Lemeshow, and logit coefficients. Consequently, these

results allowed for using Exp (b) coefficient values to generate probability statistics for predicting individual partisanship from U.S. Census data.

Initial partisanship estimates of out-migrants and non-migrants suggested model bias towards overestimating Democrats and underscored the significant differences between party identification, voter registration, and mobilization. By inferring individual party identification from interstate migrants of voting age population, the initial model provided numeric estimates of *potential* Republicans and Democrats. To address the selectivity of voter registration and provide an estimate of *likely* partisans, a statistic called 'likely yield' was developed.

With the dearth of migration data containing individual partisanship being a significant underlying reason for a cursory understanding of migration's compositional effects, this research makes a significant contribution in addressing this issue by providing a methodological panacea. Moreover, this research should serve as a launching point for future research, including research conducted in Appendix B, for comprehensively addressing the complexity of compositional effects. In addition to results underscoring the potential for logistic regression, the statistical robustness of socioeconomic variables, and the importance of states in predicting individual partisanship, this research highlights an important next step for migration scholars, which involves addressing the selectivity of voter registration in order to provide realistic estimates of compositional changes as a result of migration.

Appendix B—'Voters on the Move: The Political Effectiveness of Migration and Its Effects on State Partisan Composition'

This paper suggests what current U.S. migration trends portend for changes in Republican and Democratic partisanship. Relying on much of the methodological framework established in Appendix A, this research develops a concept of 'political effectiveness' in order to address the highly complex nature of migration and address three key issues overlooked in the current literature: 1) the ability of migration to both reinforce and dilute party strength, 2) changes in partisanship at the origin and destination of migration streams through processes called 'packing' and 'cracking', and 3) the importance of migration selectivity.

After implementing the 'likely yield' statistic for providing a more realistic estimate of *likely* compared to *potential* partisans, results demonstrate apparent compositional effects of migration. First, the unidirectional nature of regional flows out of the Midwest and Northeast to the South and West is leading to an increased 'purpleness' of the electorate at both origins and destinations. Secondly, this analysis provides matrices summarizing and underscoring different ways that partisans can achieve gains. Thirdly, after considering that political competitiveness of origin and destination states, we produce a 'political effectiveness' measure for illustrating the effectiveness of migration streams in diluting (cracking) or reinforcing (packing) party strength. This analysis succinctly demonstrates the complexity and multi-faceted nature of migration to produce uneven effects across political landscapes.

In addition to illustrating the complexity of migration, results from this study provide important theoretical implications for migration literature. First, results suggest

that migration streams contain more partisan heterogeneity than previously thought (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Brown 1988), which underscores the importance of considering individual migrant characteristics. Secondly, a prevailing notion in the literature is that for migration to create political change, the volume of the migration stream must be sizable and migrant must be different from the residents at the destination and/or those remaining at the origin. As this research illustrates through a political effectiveness measure, migration operates under a more nuanced and complex framework, as migration can be highly effective *without* high volume streams. And lastly, depending on the relative partisan competitiveness at migrant origins and destinations, migration streams can be inefficient, strategic, or electoral gambles at packing and cracking. Consequently, future research must address the selectivity of voter registration in order to examine whether migration streams are becoming increasingly diverse in terms of partisanship.

Appendix C—'Arizona United or Divided? Political Strategies Used by Gay Rights Advocates in Arizona's Same-Sex Marriage Bans of Propositions 107 and 102

Through a comparative analysis of Arizona Propositions 107 (2006) and 102 (2008), this research relies on 30 semi-structured interviews with gay rights advocates from across Arizona and archival analysis of political media to examine the interrelationship of political strategies used by gay rights advocates in both campaigns. The purpose of the research is to determine if and how political strategies changed between the rejection of Proposition 107 and the passage of Proposition 102. Relying on semi-structured interviews provides insight not otherwise gleaned through vote totals

and allows for examining the interrelationship and basis for political strategies between election periods.

Results from this research mirrors previous findings, which attributes dissension in gay campaigns to assembling broad coalitions of organizations with considerably different political perspectives. The main contribution of this research is that it identifies and explains the political-structural factors responsible for the schism—organizational practice and messaging. In addition to divergent opinions over 'hierarchical' and 'grassroots' methods of organizational practice, the interrelationship between messaging strategies is also clear—in 2006, the AT messaging strategy framed Proposition 107 largely as a referendum on heterosexual domestic partnerships and avoided recognizing gay and lesbians. While the messaging strategy proved highly effective and was responsible for the rejection Proposition 107, it was irrelevant in the fight against Proposition 102 in 2008, which focused exclusively on banning same-sex marriage leading the campaign to again avoid incorporating gays and lesbians into messaging strategy.

While identifying and explaining differences in organizational structure and messaging within the campaigns is important, so too are the underlying factors responsible for campaign dissension. Results clearly illustrate that different stakeholder groups held sharply different campaign goals and different perspectives best suited to achieve campaign goals. This finding contradicts previous research (Eagan and Sherrill 2005, Hull 2001), which explains disparate strategies through binary assimilationist/liberationist and elite/non-elite lenses. Therefore, this research

concludes that explaining discordance in gay advocates' political strategies through non-descript binaries is often too simplistic.

For political geography, results from this study underscore the importance of local context in explaining how social, cultural, and political processes determine campaign strategies. With political campaigns in Tucson, Phoenix, Prescott, and Flagstaff pursuing considerably different methods of organizational practice and messaging, these results further reinforce a major limitation of traditional electoral geography and many quantitative analyses, which involves the erasure of variability at small/local scales by operating at macro scales. Therefore, this research argues that contextual analysis, combined with compositional analysis, provides a more comprehensive understanding of voting behavior not otherwise gained through compositional analysis alone.

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APPENDIX A

A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING COMPOSITIONAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON POLITICAL LANDSCAPES

Jason R. Jurjevich

Abstract
Migration has the potential to fundamentally alter the U.S. political landscape through compositional and contextual effects. Compositional effects refer to the changing balance of party identifiers at both the origin and destination, while contextual effects refer to the impact of changing social and political environments, as a result of migration, on an individual's party identification (Brown 1988). While many scholars provide an extensive analysis of contextual effects on the political landscape, compositional effects scholarship has wallowed in stagnant backwater. The dearth of migration data containing individual party identification, combined with an over-simplified and largely undertheorized definition of migration, has hindered compositional effects research. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that by 2030 Sunbelt migration could relocate two-thirds of all Americans to the South and West, meaning that 30% of all Americans would be living in California, Texas, and Florida (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). An increasingly mobile U.S. electorate leads to the question: What do recent U.S. migration trends portend for compositional changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship at the state level? To answer this question, this research first examines underlying reasons for the dearth of migration and individual party identification data and proposes an innovative methodological framework suitable for comprehensively assessing compositional effects.

Introduction

The importance of the intersection between migration and politics has long been recognized because of migration's ability to significantly alter the political environment; James G. Gimpel succinctly summarizes the complex relationship:

> The politics of place are obviously determined by the people who live there—who they are and how their interests are defined. Because people make demands of the political system in a democracy, significant political change occurs in a place when its population changes. Populations change in a myriad of ways and at various places. The pace of change is uneven across space, leading to the social, economic, and political stratification of neighborhoods, towns, and cities. Because politics and population are linked through political participation in a democratic

> society, population changes produce consequential, but rather uneven political changes across places (Gimpel 1999, p. 3).

The highly nuanced nature of migration underscored by Gimpel (1999) is largely the result of migration transforming the political landscape through compositional and contextual effects. Compositional effects, often the most direct and transparent consequence of migration, represent the changing balance of party identifiers at the origin and destination, while contextual effects refer to the social, psychological, and cultural impact of migrants on place, or place on migrants. While compositional and contextual effects are both important for assessing migration's impact on political landscapes, I argue that the cursory understanding of compositional effects is largely due an absence of migration data containing individual party identification, combined with an over-simplified and under-theorized conception of migration. This paper makes a significant contribution in advancing compositional effects scholarship by serving as the first study to pioneer a methodological approach that overcomes the perennial obstacle of collecting migration data containing individual party identification.

An increasingly mobile U.S. population underscores the importance of compositional effects. The Current Population Survey (CPS) reports that between 2004 and 2005, over 7.8 million Americans moved across state lines with almost two-thirds of gross migration streams being largely from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West (U.S. Census Bureau 2009B). In fact, the U.S. Census projects that by 2030 continued Sunbelt migration may result in 30% of the U.S. population residing in California, Texas, and Florida; Florida could have more electoral votes than New York and Massachusetts combined, Arizona could equal Michigan's electoral might, and

North Carolina's influence could equal Pennsylvania's (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Unlike most all other democratic systems that elect presidents through popular vote, the U.S. Electoral College system allocates electoral votes according to state populations. Therefore, the Electoral College makes migration particularly salient and relevant for two primary reasons: 1) the ability to immediately shift state electoral power (Campbell et al. 1960) and 2) the ability to produce asymmetrical political effects at both the origin and destination.

An increasingly mobile electorate, combined with highly uneven migration streams suggests current migration trends could produce significant compositional changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship at the state level. One of the primary obstacles in pursuing compositional effects research is that while the American National Election Survey (ANES) and certain other sources provide individual-level data containing party identification, they have small sample sizes and imprecise questions conflating mobility and migration, making impossible any comprehensive analysis of the political composition of migration flows. The nonexistence of reliable migration data containing measures of individual-level partisanship is a significant limitation. This study provides a pioneering methodological approach that redresses the inattention to compositional effects in the current literature.

In addition to inadequate data sources and improper methodological techniques, another key issue for compositional effects research is the academic fragmentation of migration research across political science, electoral geography, and demography, which has caused a disciplinary disconnect among some scholars. The lack of scholarly

engagement has not only produced a tangential assessment of compositional effects, but definitional and theoretical misconceptions of migration are rooted in three key areas: 1) ignorance of migration selectivity and non-consideration of individual characteristics, 2) failure to consider migrant origins and destinations, and 3) improper use and interpretation of migration statistics. Because imprecise conceptions of migration have direct analytical implications, this paper addresses migration selectivity, individual migrant characteristics, and migrant origins and destinations in order to more fully address the research question at hand. After establishing a methodological framework adequate to the task, the next stage of research [see Jurjevich and Plane (In Preparation)] provides a quantitative assessment of changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship changes at the state level based on recent U.S. migration trends.

Literature Review

Beginning with the conclusion of World War II in 1945, a burgeoning industrialized economy led to an increasingly urban and mobile society. Post-war development precipitated social, cultural, and economic changes during the tumultuous 1960s that would lead to exceptional changes within the U.S. electorate. Starting with the seminal work of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), political scientists resolved to determine which of the three factors of partisan change—conversion, mobilization, and migration—was primarily responsible for fundamental changes in the American electorate. In their considerations of migration, political scientists generally did not examine migration's effects on the political landscape. Instead they focused on understanding the impact of migration on the party affiliation of migrants (Gimpel

1999). Consequently, migration's contextual effects literature is quite extensive, whereas the compositional effects literature is wholly inadequate.

Contextual Effects of Migration

A foundational theory of political science, and more specifically partisanship, is political socialization, a concept advanced by Campbell et al. (1960). This perspective posits that early familial political socialization is largely responsible for explaining why voters identify with the party of their parents around 80% of the time. With increasing numbers of voters on the move, political scientists were interested in determining the most likely outcome for individuals entering a new social and political environment. Do migrants seek political information that is consonant with their party identity leading to distinct political enclaves within the migrant's new destination community? This is known as the pluralism hypothesis. Or, do migrants assimilate in their destination surroundings by either consciously modifying their party ideology or unconsciously realigning their politics leading to an unraveling of party loyalty? This is referred to as the assimilation hypothesis. Examining regional flows to the South and West during the 1960s, Campbell et al. (1960) found that while both regions were experiencing compositional shifts, no significant changes in partisanship occurred for migrants. Therefore, they concluded that the stability of individual party identification reinforced the political socialization theory of partisanship. Moreover, they concluded that migration was largely insignificant, compared to conversion and mobilization, in creating partisan change. While they do not completely discount the potential of

migration, Campbell et al. (1960) felt that migration flows were generally not large enough to produce major realigning partisan shifts.

Given its seminal status, *The American Voter's* authors' conclusion that migration was an insignificant factor of partisan change reverberated throughout the discipline and caused many scholars to disregard political impacts of migration. Not until the 1980s did scholars begin to substantively address migration by first advancing the understanding of contextual effects. Generally more complex than compositional effects, scholars recognized that contextual effects require a psychological and social analytic for considering the party identification of the migrant in order to determine the impact on existing residents, or vice versa (Burbank 1995 and Frendreis 1989). One of the most prominent contextual effects studies is Brown (1988). Using 1980 ANES data to compare congressional and presidential voting between migrants and non-migrants, he identified three political environments that individuals can experience when they migrate: 1) congruent partisanship, 2) incongruent partisanship, and 3) mixed partisanship (middle of congruent and incongruent). Brown (1988) concluded that non-migrants in a Republican environment voted 23% and 31% for Democratic congressional and presidential candidates, respectively, whereas migrants from a Republican to Democratic environment voted 58% and 52% for Democrats, respectively. Non-migrants in a Democratic environment voted 79% and 51% for Democratic congressional and presidential candidates, respectively, whereas migrants from a Democrat to Republican environment voted similarly with long-time Republicans.

In a British context, McMahon et al. (1992) and Denver and Halfacree (1992) reported evidence suggesting that migration may be fueling an urban-rural and North-South political polarization. Northern migrants moving south were more likely to shift away from the Labor party, and southern migrants moving north were more likely to move towards the Labor party when compared to non-migrant counterparts. Combined with Brown's (1988) results, this suggests that individuals who make incongruent party moves appear to be more influenced compared to congruent migrants. More recent contextual studies continue to stress the importance of political environment at both origin and destination to help understand how the contextual influence of the social environment 'structures' political information and ultimately, party identification (Burbank 1995, Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993, McMahon et al. 1992, Denver and Halfacree 1992, Brown 1988).

The richness and relevancy of contextual effects scholarship is situated within an on-going debate between political geographers and political scientists over the importance of context (Agnew 1996, King 1996). While the details of the debate are outside the focus of this paper, the empirical results of Burbank (1995), McMahon et al. (1992), Denver and Halfacree (1992), Brown (1988), Frendreis (1989), and Campbell et al. (1960) echo Agnew's (1996) suggestion that geographical context, or the political environment of the migrant's origin and destination, is linked to 'spatial situatedness' and is important because human action and patterns of activity are dependent on place (Agnew 1996, p. 131). The conclusions drawn by contextual effects scholars are critically important for this research because the findings underscore the importance of both

individual migrant characteristics and the political environment of the migrant's origin and destination as principal factors influencing individual party identification. Unfortunately, compositional research has generally disregarded individual migrant characteristics and origins/destinations. These analyses have also used improper migration statistics, which has led to serious definitional and theoretical misconceptions of migration.

Problems for Compositional Effects Research

The thorough nature of the contextual scholarship highlights the paucity of studies and inadequacy of those in the compositional effects literature. Part of the problem with this scholarship is that a relatively small group of scholars have engaged with the topic. Where some attribute the dearth of scholarship to political scientists' fixation on the socialization theory of partisanship, Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985, p. 470) argue it is "not theoretical, but practical":

> The study of state politics has lagged behind research on national political processes and institutions. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the areas of public opinion and electoral behavior. Whereas analysis of the individual voter in presidential elections is arguably among most of the advanced areas of empirical research in political science, studies of opinion and electoral behavior on the state level are still in their infancy. In fact, the states are generally ignored in electoral behavior research, as though the political context and cultures of the states are irrelevant to how voters make their decisions.

The absence of state-level data has greatly hindered individual party and ideological identification research. Erikson, McIver, and Wright (1987, p. 812) find that 'state of residence produces at least as much variation in partisanship and ideology' as a demographic variable—further emphasizing the importance of migrant origins and

destinations. With political scientists focusing on factors influencing the voting decision at the national level, state-level data are generally not practical to use. Exit polls tend to ask basic questions poorly suited to address complex research questions. Moreover, state exit poll data are often based on relatively small sample sizes, which forces researchers to rely on nationally based surveys. One of the most heavily cited data sources in political science is the ANES, a national comprehensive pre- and post-election survey conducted for every national election by the Institute for Social Research at University of Michigan. The ANES contains an exhaustive collection of variables, including geographic identifiers, socioeconomic characteristics, candidate preferences, issue positions, political media knowledge, registration and voting records, and thousands of other variables, making it an exceptionally reliable and valuable data source. However, as with other nationally based datasets, the relatively small sample size of the ANES does not allow for an accurate assessment of state-to-state migration flows.

Frendreis (1989) suggests that the Democratic-to-Republican realignment of suburban Dallas, Texas (Denton County) during the 1970s and 1980s was the result of Republican Sunbelt migrants. Presenting a table detailing the two-party vote by geographical region in Denton County from 1960 to 1986, this compositional study argues that the southeastern part of Denton County not only had the highest levels of growth during the 1970s and 1980s, but that voters in the southeast part of the county were more likely to vote Republican. With non-native Texans more likely to vote Republican in the 1982 and 1986 gubernatorial, U.S. House and Senate, and county races,

Frendreis (1989) argues that high levels of in-migrants from origins outside of Texas to the southeast part of Denton County explain the burgeoning Republican support. In a similar study, Lyons and Durant (1980) focus on political effects of migration into Tennessee. Using data from a random sample of 830 Tennessee adults the authors disaggregated non-native and native Tennesseans to examine ideological responses to various policy attitudes and voting behavior. They conclude that the movement of non-native citizens brought significant changes to the Tennessee electorate.

The above-cited studies commit and ecological inference fallacy. By using aggregate-level data to make individual-level inferences about migrant partisanship, both contain gross generalizations about the partisanship of individual migrants and potentially inaccurate statements about compositional effects. For example, Frendreis (1989, p. 218) states that, "The compositional effects are obvious—the presence of these new residents translated into more Republican votes. At the same time, these new voters have altered the context of Denton County politics." While areas with an explosion of population growth may have disproportionately benefited Republicans, the inability of Frendreis (1989) and Lyons and Durant (1980) to address migrant origins and destinations, migrant partisanship, and individual migrant characteristics with actual migration data, provides little understanding of compositional effects. As such, these investigations are representative of most compositional analyses.

Some of the most substantive compositional work has been conducted by political scientist James G. Gimpel. Gimpel's (1999) study used ANES data to draw important conclusions about Republicans reporting shorter periods of permanent

residence, and subsequently higher levels of mobility. Gimpel and Schuknecht's (2001) study is one of the most methodologically rigorous and comprehensive analyses to date. Again, using ANES data, these authors deploy King's (1997) ecological inference maximum likelihood technique to estimate the party identification of migrants and non-migrants from aggregate state-level data. Comparing estimates for selected states, the authors conclude that places with large migrant populations generally favor Republicans. They further note:

> Migration streams are sometimes more plural and heterogeneous than migration theory suggests. We also learned from our comparative analysis that large numbers of migrants do not always produce political realignment. Vast waves of migration may change the demographic and social landscape of a state without having much political impact. Conversely, small migration streams may hardly be noticeable in many respects, but can make a decisive difference on the scale of politics if those migrants vote differently from natives (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, p. 228).

The above quote succinctly summarizes the multi-faceted complexity of migration, but it also illustrates limitations of the study's research design. Though the ecological inference maximum likelihood technique provides advantages over other methodologies, relying on aggregate-level data does not allow for consideration of individual migrant characteristics or migrant origins and destinations, and it prevents the use of advanced migration statistics[1]. While the ecological inference maximum likelihood technique allows for individual state models, it is unable to control for the effects of a migrant's origin state as it treats all interstate migrants uniformly with respect to party identification.

[1] Advanced migration statistics are further explained and illustrated in Jurjevich and Plane (In Preparation).

Reliance on ANES data is commonplace and is found throughout the literature, however. Kodras and Jones (1988) and Kenney and Rice (1985) have used alternate data sources to attempt to measure the political effects of migration. Both studies use the change in the number of congressional representatives for each state over time as a proxy measure for the political impact of migration. However, this approach is rife with issues, most prominently the fact that the increase or decrease in representatives reflects all aspects of demographic change—births, deaths, migration, and immigration—not simply migration alone.

The lack of comprehensive migration data with individual party identification has forced scholars to use problematic data sources or develop alternate methodologies teeming with underlying issues and unfortunately, is the primary issue responsible for definitional and theoretical misconceptions of migration. Therefore, developing a methodology to provide migration and individual party identification data is innovative in doing what no other study has been able to do—estimating changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship as a result of migration and simultaneously addressing the previous definitional and theoretical limitations of migration.

A New Methodology

To tackle the methodological challenges posed for a study of compositional effects, we developed an initial exploratory study (Jurjevich and Plane 2006) that did not disaggregate migrants according to age, gender, income, and educational status. Instead we used state-level percentages voting for the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates in the 2000 election to generalize the partisanship of out-migrants from their

origin states. This methodology was based on Erikson, McIver, and Wright's (1987, p. 810) contention that "state-level Presidential voting is probably the most visible manifestation of state public opinion." Using state-to-state Census 2000 flows for 1995-2000, along with inferred party identification, we constructed a 51x51 partisan migration matrix showing estimated numbers of Republicans and Democrats moving between states. Our interest was in which interstate migration streams might be most politically effective at redistributing Republicans and Democrats. By political effectiveness, we meant whether origin-destination streams were likely to have an impact or not on tipping the balance of partisanship at either the origin or destination, or both, the origin and destination, or both, or neither. Under this perspective, not only is the partisan composition of the interstate stream of significance, but critical, too, are the existing political compositions of the electorates in the states from which the migrants leave and those into which they move.

While our initial broad-based study provided important conceptual insight, the methodological approach of inferring out-migrant partisanship for each state's 2000 Presidential election voting percentage was problematic for many reasons. Primary among those was that the method did not account for migration selectivity as it failed to consider individual migrant characteristics. Migrants were assumed to vote in identical proportions as non-migrants for the Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates. Although substantive shortcomings prevented us from making reliable conclusions regarding the actual political impacts of migration flows, the pilot study provided us

with an underlying foundation to design a more advanced and rigorous methodological framework.

To overcome limitations of the introductory study, we searched for a data source containing state-to-state migration data giving individual party identification. While the General Social Survey (GSS) and the ANES are among surveys asking respondents for both party identification and migration history, these data sources contain significant disadvantages. The ANES is illustrative of the problems characteristic to these sources. First, the ANES research sampling design represents a cross-section of U.S. citizens of voting age. In the 2000 election survey the sample totaled approximately 2,000 (ANES 2000). Compared to Census 2000, where 1 in 6 households (14,000,000 of 84,000,000) received the long-form questionnaire asking respondents their county of residence in 1995 and 2000, the ANES sample is simply not large enough to accurately represent U.S. migration trends. Secondly, the ANES mobility question is too broad, asking participants only if they experienced a change in residence during the past year. Thus, it commingles residential mobility with migration, and prevents the data user from disaggregating the two important, but fundamentally distinct concepts.

Inferring Party Identification

Given the serious limitations of ANES data and the robust sample size of U.S. Census data for examining individual state-to-state migration streams, the next objective involved designing a method for inferring individual party identification based on socioeconomic characteristics provided in census data. Gauging party identification from social, economic, and political variables has, to date, proven exceptionally

problematic. Cassel (1982, p. 265) notes, "Despite the importance of party identification for understanding election outcomes, social scientists has not been very successful at predicting people's party identification." The earliest research to statistically examine individual partisanship was Arthur S. Goldberg's (1966) study, in which he uses social, economic, familial, geographic, and political variables to predict individual party identification. Goldberg finds that party identification of the individual's father was the most statistically significant variable. Paternal party affiliation explains more variance in individual partisanship than all socioeconomic variables combined. The study thus provides further empirical support for the dominant political socialization theory of the period (Goldberg 1966, Campbell et al. 1960).

Knoke and Hout (1974) corroborate Goldberg's (1966) results. Age, social class, education, race, and other socioeconomic variables are found to be highly correlated with party identification, but familial party identification—particularly father's party identification—continues to have the largest effect on party identification. Father's party has a standardized regression coefficient of 0.41, compared to other variables in the model with values near 0.06 (Knoke and Hout 1974). Declercq, Hurley, and Luttbeg (1975) also find that the strongest influence on an individual's party identification is parental party identification, with father's party identification explaining 27% of the variance in individual party identification compared to less than 5% for social and economic variables (see also Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987).

In her 1982 research, Cassel argues that multivariate predictors of party identification have historically been overly reliant on social, economic, demographic,

and parental party identification, thus overlooking the potential of other influencing factors, most notably individual policy attitudes. Using seven socioeconomic, one family-socialization, and two policy opinion variables, Cassel (1982) demonstrates that parents' party identification is the strongest predictor for party identification closely followed by policy attitudes towards social welfare (Cassel 1982). Moreover, little is gained from social, economic, and geographic variables if parental party identification is known along with an individual's opinion on policy issues. Similar to Knoke and Hout's (1974) research, the effect of the father's party has a standardized regression coefficient ranging near 0.45, compared to sociodemographic variables with values near 0.08. Sociodemographic variables explain only around 5% of the variance in party identification, leading Cassel to conclude:

> From these studies, it seems clear that a person's party identification is surprisingly unpredictable. Although party identification is supposedly inherited from one's parents, and supposedly follows predictably from one's background characteristics, these variables together account for only one-third of the variance, at best (1982, p. 266).

While predicting individual partisanship is undoubtedly difficult, explaining nearly half the variance in individual party identification with social, economic, demographic, political, geographic, parental socialization, and policy attitude variables is significant. Yet, most of the explanatory significance is found in just two variables: 1) parental party identification, and 2) individual policy attitudes. The explanatory significance of parental party identification and individual policy attitudes is well-established and empirically supported in the literature. For our purposes, these findings are unfortunate. The U.S. Census data we need to analyze interstate migration streams

only contains sociodemographic variables. Therefore, before predicting individual party identification of migrants from the census, we first evaluated the statistical strength of sociodemographic variables by state of residence for predicting individual party identification. To do so, we made use of state exit poll data.

Assessing the Statistical Robustness of Sociodemographic Variables

In the search for a data source containing sociodemographic variables, state of residence, and individual party identification, we discovered a series of state-based Presidential election exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service and National Election Pool. These exit poll data are based on interviews conducted with a sample of voters determined in two stages: 1) probability samples of voting precincts across each state were calculated to ensure proper geographic representation, and 2) voters were systematically sampled throughout the day to ensure that all voters in a precinct have the same chance of being sampled (Voter News Service Election Day Exit Polls 2000). Although sampling rates differ slightly for each state in order to ensure proper representation of the national voting population, the surveys are reasonably uniform in the questions asked of the respondents and allow for comparability between states.

The primary variable of interest, and the study's dependent variable, is self-identified individual party identification. Exit poll respondents were able to identify as Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else. To predict voters as either likely Democrats or likely Republicans, we made three primary assumptions:

1) While voters can choose to identify as Independent or non-partisan, voters are most always often restricted to Democrat or Republican candidates at national, state,

and local races. Given the focus of the investigation is on state-level effects on national elections, we wanted a method to bifurcate all voters into Democratic-leaning or Republican-leaning categories.

2) Very few respondents identified as 'something else' for their party affiliation. This allowed us to exclude these respondents from our analysis.

3) After running descriptive statistics, we found respondents identifying as Independent had traits similar with Republicans in western states and Democrats in eastern states. Therefore, we excluded Independents from the analysis.

Next, we selected a statistical technique best suited for predicting individual party identification according to sociodemographic variables in conjunction with state of residence. The binary nature of the dependent variable, Democratic or Republican Party identification, suggested two statistical techniques: discriminant analysis or logistic regression. Discriminant analysis is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that minimizes the sum of the squared distances between observed and predicted values of a "discriminating" function (Hair et al. 2005). With its ability to accurately predict membership in two possible outcomes classes, discriminant analysis has historically been widely used from medical to locational analysis research (e.g. Badri et al. 1995 and Rasmussen et al. 1985). However, like most forms of OLS regression, discriminant analysis requires several restrictive assumptions, including, among others, multivariate normality, a categorical dependent variable, and continuous independent variables. Because a number of the independent variables we wished to include in the model are

categorical variables (e.g. gender and income classes), discriminant analysis is not optimally suited for this research.

Logistic regression is becoming the preferred statistical method for categorical research (Simonoff 2003, Le 1998, Long 1997). Logistic regression is capable of generating statistics comparable to OLS techniques without many of the required assumptions. Logistic regression provides log likelihood and Cox and Snell's R2 statistics that correspond to R2, logit coefficients comparable to b coefficient values in the OLS regression equation, and standardized logit coefficients correspond similarly to beta weights (Garson 2009). More importantly, however, there is no assumption of a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables, homoscedasticity is not assumed, nor are normally distributed values required, and the independent variables need not be continuous (Garson 2009, Simonoff 2003, Press and Wilson 1978).

In preliminary research, we generated separate logistic regression models for each U.S. state (including Washington, D.C.). The decision to run separate models was determined by three key factors: 1) the importance of considering migrant origins, 2) availability of Voter News Service and Census 2000 migration data at the state level, and 3) Erikson, McIver, and Wright's (1987) conclusion that state of residence is as significant as any demographic variable in explaining individual partisanship. Analyzing descriptive statistics for each state model, we found education and income to be highly correlated. To avoid colinearity between the variables, we limited sociodemographic independent predictors to race, gender, age, and income. Table 1 shows the levels of measurement for the four sociodemographic independent variables included in the

model. While gender is normally measured as a categorical nominal variable, we also classify race as categorical nominal because preliminary descriptive statistics showed that the statistical power of race was largely based on a white and non-white binary classification. The Voter News Service measures income and age as ordinal variables and, therefore, we are prevented from measuring income and age at the ratio level. Lastly, party identification, the dependent variable, is measured as nominal because the Voter News Service asks respondents to self-identify as Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else (coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4) and we wish to classify individuals as likely Democrats and Republicans.

Ideally, we might have liked to have embedded a more nuanced measure of party identification. Cassel (1982), Declercq, Hurley, and Luttbeg (1975), and Knoke and Hout (1974) and other party identification research uses data from the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan, which asks respondents to self-identify their party affiliation on a five point scale: 1) strong Democrat, 2) not strong Democrat or Independent leaning towards Democrat, 3) Independent, 4) not strong Republican or Independent leaning towards Republican, and 4) strong Republican. The five-point scale for party identification provides researchers with interval level data and allows researchers to use probit regression models.

Results

2000 State Presidential Election Poll Results

Unlike OLS regression, where Y (Dependent) is predicted from observed X (Independent) variables through an assumed linear relationship, logistic regression predicts the *probability* of Y occurring given known X values using maximum likelihood

estimation (MLE). Logistic regression "selects coefficients that make the observed values most likely to have occurred" (Field 2005, p. 221) in order to minimize log likelihood. Log likelihood is analogous to the residual sum of squares in multiple regression and indicates the remainder of unexplained variance in the dependent variable after including all independent variables (Field 2005, Pohlmann and Leitner 2003, Le 1998). With log likelihood being one of the preferred indicators of model fit, statisticians usually assess the statistic by comparing the 'baseline' log likelihood to the 'logistic' log likelihood value—the baseline statistic is generated with no independent variables in the model and the logistic statistic includes all independent variables in the model. A strong model will typically result in a significant decrease from the baseline to logistic log likelihood value and the statistical significance of the reduction of log likelihood is represented with a significant chi-square statistic. Table 2 provides the chi-square statistics for each state model. At the 95% confidence level, all states except South Dakota and Vermont, had statistically significant reductions in log likelihood values and at the 99% confidence level, all states except South Dakota, Vermont, and Oregon, had statistically significant reductions. These results suggest that sociodemographic variables can be moderately strong predictors of individual party identification when estimated at the state level.

Another important output statistic of logistic regression is the classification table, which summarizes how well model prediction compares to actual group membership (Field 2005). Generally, classification results are analyzed similarly to log likelihood values by comparing baseline and logistic classification matrices. Table 2 also presents

the percentage of cases correctly classified for baseline and logistic models. In the Alabama baseline model, 52.4% of partisans were correctly predicted simply by classifying all individuals as partisans of the party with the majority percentage in the state, compared to 75.5% correctly predicted when age, gender, income, and race were included in the logistic model. Table 3 presents the ten states with the highest percentage improvement between baseline and logistic models. At first glance, all five states are southern states, which may lead some to infer a regionality bias in the models. In fact, however, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, Florida, Nevada, and Georgia are some of the most racially diverse states in the U.S. with high income disparities. Such socioeconomic diversity is likely responsible for not only the statistical significance of race and income, but also the high degree of explanation for individual party identification. Overall, the logistic models show significant improvement over the baseline models in their ability to correctly predict individual party identification.

Since binary logistic regression predicts the likelihood of a dichotomous event occurring and does not assess the difference between predicted and observed values of Y (as in OLS), it is somewhat difficult to assess the 'amount of variance explained' as provided by the OLS R2 statistic (Garson 2009). Logistic regression provides the Cox and Snell R2 value, which attempts to mimic the OLS R2 statistic, but this measure has a maximum value greater than 1 that makes it difficult to interpret. Therefore, one of the most preferred logistic regression measures is the Nagelkerke R2 statistic, which relies on the Cox and Snell value to provide a pseudo R2 value ranging from 0-1.

The literature on predicting party identification has suggested that sociodemographic variables often explain less than five percent of total variance in the absence of parental party identification (Cassel 1982). Thus, we believe the results of Table 4 are remarkable. Table 4 discloses that 27 of 51 observations have Nagelkerke values greater than 10% and 10 state models explain over 20% of total variance in party identification. Additionally, Table 4 reveals the statistical significance for gender, race income, and age at the 95% confidence level for each state model. The two variables most often statistically significant are gender and race for 41 observations, with income and age being statistically significant for 32 and 21 observations, respectively. Considering log likelihood chi-square and Nagelkerke values, percentage of cases properly predicted in classification matrices, and the statistical significance of age, race, income, and gender, the sociodemographic logistic models seem fairly robust in their ability to correctly predict individual party identification.

One of the most widely recommended diagnostic tests for overall fit of logistic regression models is Hosmer-Lemeshow (Garson 2009, Field 2005). This statistic tests the hypothesis that the observed data are significantly different from predicted values. For 'good- fitting' models, the statistic should be non-significant; non-significance directs researchers "to fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and model-predicted values, implying that the model's estimates fit the data at an acceptable level," (Garson 2009, p. 3). As Table 4 shows, only 7 of 51 models tested significant for the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic, signaling that the overwhelming majority of state exit polls are good fitting models, and further

substantiating earlier reported diagnostic tests suggesting that when employed at state levels, age, gender, income, and race are significant, robust, and reliable predictors of individual party identification in the absence of parental party identification and individual policy attitudes. We therefore conclude that the combined statistical significance and predictive accuracy of age, gender, race, and income on individual state-level party identification provides reasonable assurance for accurately predicting migrants from non-migrants from Census 2000 data.

Each state logistic regression model provides an Exp (b) coefficient for each independent predictor and when values for each observation are entered into the equation shown below, the equation generates probability statistics predicting the individual's likely partisanship. Probability values range between 0 and 1—values less than 0.50 indicate the person is likely a Democrat, while values greater than 0.50 indicate the person is likely a Republican (Field 2005).

$$P = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(a+bX)}}$$

Table 5 provides the Exp (b) coefficient values for each independent variable in the 2000 Alabama model. Using the Exp (b) coefficient values for each variable, along with individual characteristics, party identification probability statistics for each individual were manually calculated from the probability equation not only to corroborate probability statistics generated by SPSS, but also to lay the groundwork for calculating individual party identification for interstate migrants. For example, the variable coding for participant #190 identifies the individual as a white male over 60

years of age with a 1999 average family income between $15,000-29,999. Based on these characteristics, SPSS calculates a probability of .362, meaning that participant #190 has a 36.2% chance of being a Republican, and conversely a 63.8% chance of being a Democrat. Therefore, the model predicts participant #190 as a Democrat.

Census 2000 Migration Data

One of the primary drawbacks of Census 2000 data is that it may not represent current migration trends. Since 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau has administered an annual sample survey called the American Community Survey (ACS), which gathers social, demographic, economic, and migration data previously collected on the long-form of the decennial censuses. By replacing the decennial long-form questionnaire with the annual ACS, ACS data offers timelier and more readily available information[2]. However, ACS data have definite limitations. Because the ACS migration question asks respondents their place of residence one year ago, ACS migration data can underestimate migration flows compared to census data, which asks residence five years ago. Therefore, in order to examine compositional effects of state migration patterns, we use 2000 U.S. Census migration data, along with 2000 Voter News Service exit polls, and maintain data consistency in time periods.

A significant amount of detailed migration data from the 2000 U.S. Census was released on a special migration DVD, which contained cross-tabulated migration flow files by age, gender, educational status, and other sociodemographic variables at various geographic scales. The migration DVD was targeted for migration researchers and

[2] The ACS samples approximately 3 million households annually (U.S. Census Bureau 2009A).

contains detailed data not available on the Census website. Its pre-established cross-tabulations, however, do not allow for individual-level analysis. Because our research requires individual-level migrant records, we relied on microdata from the Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) available on-line through the Minnesota Population Center (MPC) at the University of Minnesota. The MPC provides an on-line data extraction tool called, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), which allows web users to create tailored data extracts of PUMS data according to their research needs, for multiple years and from various data sources, including the U.S. Census, ACS, Current Population Survey (CPS), and others.

Using IPUMS, we created a PUMS data extract from the 2000 Census with individual detail on migration, age, income, gender, and race (see Appendix 1 for a summary of the IPUMS data extract). Starting with over 14 million individual household respondents, we excluded households without income data and individuals under age 18 in order to include households reporting different counties of residence between 1995 and 2000—leaving slightly more than 4 million migrant households. After subtracting immigration, we classified the remaining migrant pool as interstate and intrastate migrants, which left 787,743 households (16,771,599 Americans) as interstate migrants between 1995 and 2000.

Democratic and Republican Estimates

Figures 1 and 2 represent the number of estimated Democratic and Republican out-migrants by state, respectively[3]. Figure 1 shows that the model estimates 36 of 51 observations with more Democratic than Republican out-migration leaving only 15 observations with more Republicans out-migrating than Democrats. While it is reasonable that reliably Democratic states such as California, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts would be estimated as sources of Democratic out-migration, predicting higher Democratic than Republican out-migration for Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and similar strongly Republican states is at first perplexing. The significant majority of states estimated with greater Democratic than Republican out-migration suggests the model could be slightly skewed in overestimating Democratic migrants. To further explore the matter, we predicted individual party identification for non-migrants and intrastate migrants for each state to assess the overall reasonableness of model estimates of state partisanship. As Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, not only did the logistic model estimate 41 of 51 observations with net Democratic identification, but included Texas, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arizona, North Dakota, and other states that have majority Republican Party identification[4]. For example, in 2000, Arizona Republicans had a 120,000 registration advantage over Democrats (Leip 2009). Therefore, the model's overestimation of Democrats, for both migrants and non-migrants, indicates that migration streams are not necessarily more Democratic than

[3] See Jurjevich and Plane (In Preparation) for more substantive analysis examining the political effectiveness of the migration flows.

[4] See also Appendices 2 and 3 for detailed estimates of Non-Migrants, Migrants, Net Migration, and related rates by party affiliation

Republican, but rather, the model design appears to be skewed overall towards over-estimating Democrats.

The model bias towards Democrats may reflect the significant differences between party identification, voter registration, and mobilization. During the past seventy years, Democrats have held a large party identification advantage over Republicans. The Democratic dominance of the New Deal cleavage during the 1930s-1950s was based on a twenty-to-thirty point identification advantage lasting until the late 1960s and 1970s, when a significant narrowing in Democratic identification advantage occurred, dropping to 13% by the end of the 1970s (Sorauf and Beck 1988, Petrocik 1987, Sundquist 1983). Historically, the general population has social and demographic characteristics more often associated with the Democratic Party leading to higher levels of Democratic compared to Republican identifiers. However, association, registration, and voting are distinctly different levels of individual party attachment.

Figure 5 illustrates the methodological estimates provided by this research. By inferring individual party identification from interstate migrants of voting age population, the model as currently designed provides numeric estimates of *potential* Republicans and Democrats based on sociodemographic characteristics. Therefore, the reason that the model seems to bias Democrats is because the methodological design does not factor in the highly selective processes of registration and voter turnout.

The probability of registering to vote varies widely across various social and demographic characteristics. Voter registration rates are higher for whites compared to racial minorities, and the rates are positively correlated with educational attainment,

nativity status, marital status, income, duration of residence, and age (Holder 2006). The sharpest differences are for age and education. Citizens age 18-24 and those over 55 registered to vote in 2004 at rates of 58% and 79%, respectively; and citizens with less than a high school education compared to those with an advanced degree registered in 2004 at rates of 53% and 87%, respectively (Holder 2006). Registration rates also differ considerably by region, and, more specifically, by state due to the vagaries of registration methods and cutoff dates (Holder 2006). Therefore, while the general population has socioeconomic characteristics more associated with the Democratic Party, the selectivity of registration tends to benefit Republicans. The model's seeming tendency to overestimate migrants and non-migrants as Democrats provides a 'registered partisan potential' when the selectivity of registration is not accounted for.

In order to illustrate the disparity between the number of potential registered partisans and the actual number of votes cast, this research relies on a statistic called 'likely yield'. The numerator is calculated by adding the model's estimated non-migrant population (1995 population) to the number of net migrants (between 1995-2000), resulting in the estimated potential registered partisan population (2000 population). Next, total votes cast for each 2000 Presidential candidate are compared to the 2000 potential registered partisan population. Appendices 4 and 5 illustrate the difference between registered partisans and actual votes cast is highly variable across states. More importantly, the mean likely yield is 0.67 and 0.48 for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. These statistics underscore that while Democrats have a party

identification advantage, the higher percentage vote yield among Republicans results in the need for fewer registered Republicans in competing against Democrats.

Using individual-level voter registration data from the ANES and Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter and Registration supplement, the last step of this research involved attempting to provide a more refined estimate of likely registered Republicans and Democrats by accounting for the selectivity of registration. The ANES and CPS were the primary data sources for developing logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of voter registration based on age, gender, race, and income. In addition to the small sample size (N of 318), ANES model statistics were largely insignificant—the Nagelkerke value was 4.3%, income was the only statistically significant variable, and there was a minimal increase in the percentage properly classified by the logistic classification table compared to the baseline model. While the CPS sample size of over 20,000 provided greater representation, its model statistics were similarly weak with a Nagelkerke value of 0.8% and no increase between the logistic and baseline model classification tables. Considering the highly selective nature of voter registration according to socioeconomic characteristics (Crissey and File 2008, Holder 2006, Bass and Casper 2001), the statistical insignificance of these models is puzzling. Furthermore, the results underscore the importance of designing a registration model that allows scholars to move beyond estimating likely potential registered voters, and instead estimate likely voters.

Discussion and Conclusion

Compositional and contextual effects of migration are efficacious in creating immediate and enduring political impacts. Yet, research continues to focus on contextual effects of migration while compositional effects are largely under analyzed and poorly understood (Brown 1988). This research draws attention to the highly complex and multifaceted nature of migration and its potential to fundamentally alter the U.S. political landscape. Recent U.S. Census projections citing unprecedented mobility and unidirectional migration flows to the South and West (U.S. Census Bureau 2005) should serve a call for scholars to examine and more clearly understand compositional effects with substantive scholarship.

While party identification is critically important for understanding election outcomes, the dearth of individual party identification in many migration datasets has been a significant obstacle for compositional migration research. Additionally, many studies have had considerable difficulty predicting individual party identification (Cassel 1982). Examining the statistical significance of social, economic, familial, geographic, parental party affiliation, and policy issue variables on individual party identification, scholars confirm paternal party identification as the most important explanatory variable. While paternal party identification accounts for over one-quarter of the variance in individual party identification, social and economic variables explain less than 5% (Erikson et al. 1987, Declercq et al. 1975, Knoke and Hout 1974).

In order to avoid small sample sizes, commingling of residential mobility and migration, and other shortcomings associated with GSS and ANES data, this research

uses census migration data to comprehensively measure U.S. migration trends. The primary advantage of census migration data is its ability to address definitional and theoretical pitfalls common in compositional research. However, a potential disadvantage of using census data is that it does not contain paternal party identification and only includes socioeconomic variables. Considering the findings of earlier studies (Erikson et al. 1987, Declercq et al. 1975, Knoke and Hout 1974), this was particularly unfortunate.

Unlike findings from earlier research, logistic regression state models are statistically robust for estimating individual partisanship according to socioeconomic characteristics. Gender and race are the two most statistically significant variables for 41 models, while income and age are statistically significant for 31 and 21 models, respectively. Additionally, 27 of 51 models have Nagelkerke values greater than 10%, and 10 state models explain more than 20% of total variance in party identification. Combined with significant log-likelihood chi-square values and percentage of cases properly predicted in classification matrices, sociodemographic variables are reasonably powerful for predicting individual party identification.

A consequence of the pervasive disciplinary disconnect between scholars has been the ignorance of migration selectivity and non-consideration of individual migrant characteristics. In previous studies, compositional effects scholars reported shorter periods of permanent residence and higher levels of mobility for Republicans (Gimpel 1999, Frendreis 1989, Brown 1988). However, empirical results have contradicted subsequent hypotheses that places with high in-migration levels equal stronger

Republican areas (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Brown 1988). The reason that the Republican bias of out-migration says nothing about the partisan composition in areas with high levels of in-migration is because of the highly selective nature of migration. In order to understand and forecast the varied nature of compositional effects, individual migrant characteristics must be considered.

By using individual socioeconomic characteristics from census microdata to predict individual partisanship, this study addresses a key limitation in current compositional research. Earlier research posited that selectivity of migration produced a Republican bias in migration. But when individual characteristics are considered, this study reports considerably different results. Partisanship estimates by state are highly diverse and registered partisan potential is biased towards Democrats, which confirms Gimpel and Schuknecht's (2001, p. 228) suggestion that 'migration streams are sometimes more plural and heterogeneous than migration theory suggests'. However, these results suggest something more profound; migration streams are not *sometimes* more plural and heterogeneous than the literature suggests, but seemingly *often* and *considerably* more diverse. This statement is not merely an issue of semantics, but rather the result of important findings that raise an important question for migration scholars: Is the diverse partisan heterogeneity of migration streams due to an outdated view of migration being exclusively positively selective?

Another consequence of the academic disconnect between scholars is the non-consideration of migrant origins and destinations. Erikson et al. (1987), Declercq et al. (1975), Knoke and Hout (1974), and other studies find socioeconomic variables only

explain around 5% of variance in individual party identification. Using socioeconomic independent variables, but also controlling for state of origin, approximately half of the state models accounted for at least 10-15% of total variance explained in individual party identification. These results confirm the equal importance between state of residence and socioeconomic variables (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987) and further underscore the importance of state residence for predicting individual partisanship. By using separate logistic regression models for each state, this study partially accounts for local context and milieu influential in the partisan formation process. Moreover, these results provide further support for Agnew's (1996) suggestion that the political environment of the origin and destination is important because human action is dependent on place.

This primary research objective of this study was to propose a methodological framework suitable for portending changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship at the state level. However, as detailed in Figure 5, by inferring individual party identification from voting age population, this model's estimates are for *potential* and not *actual* registered Republicans and Democrats. Moreover, this study found little statistical support for developing a logistic regression model to account for registration selectivity. The importance of a realistic estimate should not be understated. We challenge future research to design a methodological framework addressing the selectivity of voter registration in order to provide a more 'realistic' estimate of partisan composition changes as a result of migration. The findings from the innovative methodology articulated in this study provide the critical foundation necessary for future studies to address this issue and substantively address and advance compositional scholarship.

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Table 1. Independent Variable Levels of Measurement and Data Categories

	Age	Gender	Race	Income
Level of Measurement	Ordinal	Nominal	Nominal	Ordinal
Categories	18-24	Male	White	Less than 15,000
	30-44	Female	Minority	15,000-29,999
	45-59			30,000-49,999
	60+			50,000-74,999
				75,000-99,999
				100,000+

Table 2. Baseline and Logistic Model Classification Percentages and Chi-Square Values

		Baseline Model Classification %	Logistic Model Classification %	Increase in % Explained	Chi-Square
1	Alabama	52.4	75.5	23.1	201.9**
2	Alaska	58.3	67.2	8.9	44.0**
3	Arizona	52.8	65.6	12.8	105.6**
4	Arkansas	61.1	68.3	7.2	111.1**
5	California	57.0	61.0	4.0	131.0**
6	Colorado	50.3	63.5	13.2	67.4**
7	Connecticut	57.5	57.7	0.2	20.3**
8	Delaware	57.5	63.5	6.0	67.2**
9	Wash., DC	89.9	89.9	0.0	48.5**
10	Florida	50.5	64.3	13.8	169.0**
11	Georgia	51.8	71.4	19.6	258.1**
12	Hawaii	70.7	71.9	1.2	34.9**
13	Idaho	65.2	66.1	0.9	32.2**
14	Illinois	58.7	65.4	6.7	139.8**
15	Indiana	53.4	61.3	7.9	76.0**
16	Iowa	51.5	55.5	4.0	19.4**
17	Kansas	57.2	62.6	5.4	31.5**
18	Kentucky	53.4	59.7	6.3	45.5**
19	Louisiana	57.5	75.9	18.4	324.6**
20	Maine	54.2	60.1	5.9	14.5**
21	Maryland	64.1	72.5	8.4	136.5**
22	Massachusetts	70.1	70.1	0.0	27.6**
23	Michigan	53.7	59.6	5.9	133.0**
24	Minnesota	54.5	56.8	2.3	13.4**
25	Mississippi	52.1	84.8	32.7	360.3**
26	Missouri	50.0	59.7	9.7	68.6**
27	Montana	56.2	56.2	0.0	14.4**
28	Nebraska	62.0	64.8	2.8	20.3**
29	Nevada	50.7	65.0	14.3	83.4**
30	N. Hampshire	58.2	60.4	2.2	39.2**
31	New Jersey	58.1	63.6	5.5	78.3**
32	New Mexico	57.0	64.8	7.8	62.1**
33	New York	61.8	65.4	3.6	194.4**
34	North Carolina	52.6	69.1	16.5	229.0**
35	North Dakota	56.1	62.3	6.2	29.5**
36	Ohio	50.8	61.7	10.9	151.5**
37	Oklahoma	50.0	61.1	11.1	29.1**
38	Oregon	54.5	58.9	4.4	10.5*
39	Pennsylvania	51.0	59.0	8.0	86.7**
40	Rhode Island	70.8	71.3	0.5	32.6**
41	S. Carolina	53.9	78.0	24.1	196.4**
42	South Dakota	60.9	61.3	0.4	6.0
43	Tennessee	51.0	68.0	17.0	179.0**
44	Texas	53.9	76.6	22.7	180.3**
45	Utah	72.0	74.1	2.1	58.5**
46	Vermont	52.2	55.6	3.4	8.0
47	Virginia	50.7	62.9	12.2	130.4**
48	Washington	55.9	61.9	6.0	53.5**
49	West Virginia	58.7	62.3	3.6	16.8**
50	Wisconsin	53.8	61.9	8.1	46.7**
51	Wyoming	66.6	67.9	1.3	67.7**

Statistically significant at the 95%(*) and 99%(**) confidence levels

Source: Computed by author.

Table 3. Top 10 States with Largest Increase in Percentage Explained Between Baseline and Logistic Models

		Baseline Model Classification %	Logistic Model Classification %	Increase in % Explained
1	Mississippi	52.1	84.8	32.7
2	South Carolina	53.9	78	24.1
3	Alabama	52.4	75.5	23.1
4	Texas	53.9	76.6	22.7
5	Georgia	51.8	71.4	19.6
6	Louisiana	57.5	75.9	18.4
7	Tennessee	51	68	17
8	North Carolina	52.6	69.1	16.5
9	Nevada	50.7	65	14.3
10	Florida	50.5	64.3	13.8

Table 4. Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 Values, Variable Statistical Significance, and Hosmer and Lemeshow Values

				Logit Coefficients			
		Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 %	Hosmer and Lemeshow	Gender	Race	Age	Income
1	Alabama	40.2	.540	.005	-3.096**	-.511**	299**
2	Alaska	14.1	.077	-.792**	-1.223**	-.168	.163*
3	Arizona	17.2	.035*	-.467**	-1.420**	-.224**	.217**
4	Arkansas	22.2	.014*	-.391*	-2.770**	-.222**	.316**
5	California	9.2	.070	-.455**	-.773**	.035	.187**
6	Colorado	14.5	.497	-.252	-1.608**	.023	.256**
7	Connecticut	4.5	.323	-.396*	-1.002**	.028	.022
8	Delaware	14	.822	-.505**	-1.666**	-.123	.114
9	Wash., DC	19.6	.061	-.541	-1.831**	.153	.094
10	Florida	17.8	.435	-.448**	-1.416**	-.030	.241**
11	Georgia	34.2	.142	-.670**	-2.603**	-.182*	.245**
12	Hawaii	9.2	.481	-.402*	-.396	.135	.321**
13	Idaho	8	.237	-.901**	-1.238**	-.141	-.122
14	Illinois	19.8	.296	-.514**	-1.687**	-.056	.288**
15	Indiana	12.6	.545	-.333*	-2.095**	-.248**	.138*
16	Iowa	4.2	.081	-.379*	-.922	-.162	.152*
17	Kansas	8.6	.317	.007	-1.600**	-.259**	-.056
18	Kentucky	7.4	.115	-.386**	-1.420**	-.199**	.146**
19	Louisiana	42.5	.126	-.454**	-2.870**	-.559**	.415**
20	Maine	3.9	.309	-.461*	-.424	-.179	.112
21	Maryland	28.1	.484	-.885**	-2.448**	-.385**	.150*
22	Massachusetts	8.1	.330	-.813**	-1.269**	.038	.044
23	Michigan	16.6	.008**	-.309*	-2.412**	-.021	.098*
24	Minnesota	2.5	.343	-.390*	-.843	-.066	.075
25	Mississippi	64.6	.769	-1.037**	-4.707**	.104	.502**
26	Missouri	9.2	.312	-.243	-1.137**	.019	.187
27	Montana	3.7	.006**	-.512**	-.976*	-.119	.015
28	Nebraska	4.6	.891	-.080	-1.407**	-.033	.070
29	Nevada	15.9	.130	.057	-1.446**	-.231**	.312**
30	N. Hampshire	8.5	.052	-.763**	-1.685**	-.056	.165**
31	New Jersey	10.5	.807	-.703**	-1.310**	-.100	-.025
32	New Mexico	13.9	.284	-.432*	-1.302**	-.015	.024
33	New York	17.6	.424	-.463**	-1.941**	.100	.068
34	N. Carolina	32.2	.070	-.436**	-3.250**	-.291**	.081
35	North Dakota	7.6	.447	-.173	-.695	-.258**	.324**
36	Ohio	15.1	.703	-.525**	-1.926**	-.172**	.120**
37	Oklahoma	7.1	.898	-.115	-.944**	-.266**	.220**
38	Oregon	3.4	.519	-.512*	-.141	-.117	.097
39	Pennsylvania	8.9	.064	-.408**	-1.294**	-.131*	.205**
40	Rhode Island	8	.764	-.778**	-.723*	-.043	.169*
41	S. Carolina	41.8	.509	-.305	-3.074**	-.191	.237**
42	South Dakota	1.9	.366	-.300	.386	-.022	.132
43	Tennessee	31.1	.215	-.388*	-3.134**	-.107	.182**
44	Texas	35.1	.120	-.414*	-2.542**	-.459**	.288**
45	Utah	14	.178	-.807**	-1.753**	-.426**	.130
46	Vermont	1.7	.874	-.433**	.093	.021	.032
47	Virginia	16.4	.411	-.609**	-1.591**	-.172*	.107*
48	Washington	6.7	.001**	-.275*	-1.006**	-.240**	.182**
49	West Virginia	4.2	.471	-.476**	-.156	-.200*	.105
50	Wisconsin	8.8	.030*	-.727**	-1.265**	-.199*	.173**
51	Wyoming	16.9	.038*	-.849**	-1.348**	-.430**	.265**

Statistically significant at the 95% (*) and 99% (**) confidence levels

Source: Computed by author.

Table 5. Illustrative Example of the 2000 Alabama Model with Corresponding Exp (b) Values

Alabama	Case #	Majority	Sex	Age	Income	PredictedSPSS
	190	0	1	4	2	0.362 Democrat
Exp(b)	0.874	-3.096	0.005	-0.511	0.299	

Source: Computed by author.

Figure 1. States with Net Potential Democratic Out-Migration



Figure 2. States with Net Potential Republican Out-Migration



Figure 3. States with Majority Potential Democratic Identification



Figure 4. States with Majority Potential Republican Identification



Figure 5. Conceptual Model Flowchart



Appendix 1. IPUMS File Summary Statistics

	Individual Records	**Weighted Records (# of Persons)**
Total IPUMS File	14,081,466	281,421,906
Less: Income N/A	(4,447,454)	(88,375,808)
Subtotal	9,634,012	193,046,098
Less: Indv. < Age 18	(247,008)	(4,776,141)
	9,387,004	188,269,957
Migrants	4,084,869	85,102,462
Non-Migrants	5,302,135	103,167,495
	9,387,004	188,269,957
Migrants	4,084,869	85,102,462
Less: International Immigration	(194,880)	(4,327,671)
	3,889,989	80,774,791
Interstate Migrants	787,743	16,771,599
Intrastate Migrants	3,102,246	64,003,192
	3,889,989	80,774,791

Appendix 2. Republican Migrant and Non-Migrant Estimates by State

		Republicans						
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Out-Migrants	Net Migration	IMR	OMR	NMR
1	Alabama	1,129,657	103,304	106,993	-3,689	91.4	94.7	-3.3
2	Alaska	174,502	31,895	50,373	-18,478	182.8	288.7	-105.9
3	Arizona	1,258,689	274,111	174,168	99,943	217.8	138.4	79.4
4	Arkansas	495,809	80,915	51,372	29,543	163.2	103.6	59.6
5	California	7,158,686	510,623	599,495	-88,872	71.3	83.7	-12.4
6	Colorado	1,080,863	238,018	161,297	76,721	220.2	149.2	71.0
7	Connecticut	879,289	83,879	104,326	-20,447	95.4	118.6	-23.3
8	Delaware	177,194	32,397	27,080	5,317	182.8	152.8	30.0
9	Wash, D.C.	27,618	35,384	15,171	20,213	1,281.2	549.3	731.9
10	Florida	4,246,869	631,104	445,284	185,820	148.6	104.8	43.8
11	Georgia	1,888,050	292,063	212,960	79,103	154.7	112.8	41.9
12	Hawaii	150,007	39,509	32,653	6,856	263.4	217.7	45.7
13	Idaho	481,179	63,826	75,235	-11,409	132.6	156.4	-23.7
14	Illinois	2,627,629	231,587	273,446	-41,859	88.1	104.1	-15.9
15	Indiana	1,893,036	142,771	171,137	-28,366	75.4	90.4	-15.0
16	Iowa	814,495	74,765	91,283	-16,518	91.8	112.1	-20.3
17	Kansas	961,503	91,574	129,278	-37,704	95.2	134.5	-39.2
18	Kentucky	1,049,819	109,320	92,506	16,814	104.1	88.1	16.0
19	Louisiana	844,457	79,545	96,938	-17,393	94.2	114.8	-20.6
20	Maine	349,891	37,940	38,924	-984	108.4	111.2	-2.8
21	Maryland	993,949	143,290	146,409	-3,119	144.2	147.3	-3.1
22	Massachusetts	1,166,025	157,696	116,363	41,333	135.2	99.8	35.4
23	Michigan	2,700,211	155,793	188,607	-32,814	57.7	69.8	-12.2
24	Minnesota	1,332,878	125,025	114,152	10,873	93.8	85.6	8.2
25	Mississippi	724,372	67,245	66,606	639	92.8	91.9	0.9
26	Missouri	1,540,326	164,463	143,998	20,465	106.8	93.5	13.3
27	Montana	298,582	39,890	51,422	-11,532	133.6	172.2	-38.6
28	Nebraska	636,568	53,111	77,245	-24,134	83.4	121.3	-37.9
29	Nevada	394,061	146,656	72,699	73,957	372.2	184.5	187.7
30	N. Hampshire	383,823	51,123	55,474	-4,351	133.2	144.5	-11.3
31	New Jersey	2,200,148	160,533	243,246	-82,713	73.0	110.6	-37.6
32	New Mexico	462,678	68,310	83,701	-15,391	147.6	180.9	-33.3
33	New York	4,129,055	254,044	420,314	-166,270	61.5	101.8	-40.3
34	N. Carolina	2,086,649	307,589	215,514	92,075	147.4	103.3	44.1
35	North Dakota	195,838	22,291	35,528	-13,237	113.8	181.4	-67.6
36	Ohio	3,352,175	199,918	258,835	-58,917	59.6	77.2	-17.6
37	Oklahoma	870,793	100,595	103,281	-2,686	115.5	118.6	-3.1
38	Oregon	869,370	136,648	112,291	24,357	157.2	129.2	28.0
39	Pennsylvania	3,499,151	219,098	292,754	-73,656	62.6	83.7	-21.0
40	Rhode Island	163,241	29,524	19,862	9,662	180.9	121.7	59.2
41	S. Carolina	1,114,052	146,304	126,736	19,568	131.3	113.8	17.6
42	South Dakota	261,074	25,810	39,212	-13,402	98.9	150.2	-51.3
43	Tennessee	1,593,730	190,530	153,278	37,252	119.5	96.2	23.4
44	Texas	5,509,612	430,874	465,158	-34,284	78.2	84.4	-6.2
45	Utah	804,869	82,307	110,331	-28,024	102.3	137.1	-34.8
46	Vermont	177,611	24,159	26,788	-2,629	136.0	150.8	-14.8
47	Virginia	1,952,692	263,515	288,359	-24,844	134.9	147.7	-12.7
48	Washington	1,337,476	214,571	165,052	49,519	160.4	123.4	37.0
49	West Virginia	437,101	47,034	48,155	-1,121	107.6	110.2	-2.6
50	Wisconsin	1,432,504	110,680	113,627	-2,947	77.3	79.3	-2.1
51	Wyoming	179,812	27,352	45,576	-18,224	152.1	253.5	-101.4

Source: Calculated by author.

Appendix 3. Democratic Migrant and Non-Migrant Estimates by State

		Democrats						
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Out-Migrants	Net Migration	IMR	OMR	NMR
1	Alabama	1,543,404	127,946	111,683	16,263	82.9	72.4	10.5
2	Alaska	164,379	38,351	41,222	-2,871	233.3	250.8	-17.5
3	Arizona	1,367,903	336,163	166,374	169,789	245.8	121.6	124.1
4	Arkansas	1,101,503	94,344	104,587	-10,243	85.7	94.9	-9.3
5	California	12,373,381	671,657	1,025,898	-354,241	54.3	82.9	-28.6
6	Colorado	1,306,733	250,617	204,291	46,326	191.8	156.3	35.5
7	Connecticut	1,211,778	120,932	147,480	-26,548	99.8	121.7	-21.9
8	Delaware	275,546	46,190	38,321	7,869	167.6	139.1	28.6
9	Wash, D.C.	263,933	61,299	109,936	-48,637	232.3	416.5	-184.3
10	Florida	4,993,572	811,491	509,579	301,912	162.5	102.0	60.5
11	Georgia	2,631,249	415,756	248,515	167,241	158.0	94.4	63.6
12	Hawaii	552,577	57,348	111,772	-54,424	103.8	202.3	-98.5
13	Idaho	224,029	67,464	33,311	34,153	301.1	148.7	152.4
14	Illinois	4,918,568	285,615	495,253	-209,638	58.1	100.7	-42.6
15	Indiana	1,885,403	183,154	159,157	23,997	97.1	84.4	12.7
16	Iowa	1,063,634	86,748	109,767	-23,019	81.6	103.2	-21.6
17	Kansas	635,928	107,817	82,493	25,324	169.5	129.7	39.8
18	Kentucky	1,432,555	121,985	120,458	1,527	85.2	84.1	1.1
19	Louisiana	1,764,252	103,473	145,937	-42,464	58.6	82.7	-24.1
20	Maine	472,534	46,678	46,511	167	98.8	98.4	0.4
21	Maryland	2,144,692	241,518	243,669	-2,151	112.6	113.6	-1.0
22	Massachusetts	2,809,199	209,834	294,017	-84,183	74.7	104.7	-30.0
23	Michigan	3,543,923	198,933	253,136	-54,203	56.1	71.4	-15.3
24	Minnesota	1,768,509	147,788	153,268	-5,480	83.6	86.7	-3.1
25	Mississippi	909,903	91,234	79,038	12,196	100.3	86.9	13.4
26	Missouri	1,909,277	187,691	181,094	6,597	98.3	94.8	3.5
27	Montana	232,812	42,411	36,850	5,561	182.2	158.3	23.9
28	Nebraska	415,693	59,717	52,923	6,794	143.7	127.3	16.3
29	Nevada	549,922	199,115	98,739	100,376	362.1	179.6	182.5
30	N. Hampshire	351,110	73,102	52,322	20,780	208.2	149.0	59.2
31	New Jersey	2,872,312	248,431	307,000	-58,569	86.5	106.9	-20.4
32	New Mexico	524,725	83,470	85,574	-2,104	159.1	163.1	-4.0
33	New York	7,452,088	349,918	809,309	-459,391	47.0	108.6	-61.6
34	N. Carolina	2,633,239	386,869	222,806	164,063	146.9	84.6	62.3
35	North Dakota	205,433	24,930	29,878	-4,948	121.4	145.4	-24.1
36	Ohio	3,907,680	242,645	282,155	-39,510	62.1	72.2	-10.1
37	Oklahoma	1,164,355	122,926	116,679	6,247	105.6	100.2	5.4
38	Oregon	1,128,784	169,948	137,963	31,985	150.6	122.2	28.3
39	Pennsylvania	4,429,671	287,262	346,914	-59,652	64.8	78.3	-13.5
40	Rhode Island	487,320	47,381	58,462	-11,081	97.2	120.0	-22.7
41	S. Carolina	1,220,569	181,139	108,919	72,220	148.4	89.2	59.2
42	South Dakota	195,033	27,391	25,115	2,276	140.4	128.8	11.7
43	Tennessee	1,816,112	222,920	159,160	63,760	122.7	87.6	35.1
44	Texas	6,161,925	566,149	430,251	135,898	91.9	69.8	22.1
45	Utah	353,100	90,388	42,988	47,400	256.0	121.7	134.2
46	Vermont	198,881	30,231	30,103	128	152.0	151.4	0.6
47	Virginia	2,203,427	358,496	278,967	79,529	162.7	126.6	36.1
48	Washington	2,085,081	261,880	244,808	17,072	125.6	117.4	8.2
49	West Virginia	691,905	51,633	65,700	-14,067	74.6	95.0	-20.3
50	Wisconsin	2,029,967	142,501	149,897	-7,396	70.2	73.8	-3.6
51	Wyoming	101,509	26,380	20,409	5,971	259.9	201.1	58.8

Source: Calculated by author.

Appendix 4. Estimated Republican Non-Migrants and Net Migrants and Related Likely Yield

		Republicans				
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Total	George W. Bush 2000 Votes*	Likely Yield
1	Alabama	1,129,657	103,304	1,232,961	941,173	0.76
2	Alaska	174,502	31,895	206,397	167,398	0.81
3	Arizona	1,258,689	274,111	1,532,800	781,652	0.51
4	Arkansas	495,809	80,915	576,724	472,940	0.82
5	California	7,158,686	510,623	7,669,309	4,567,429	0.60
6	Colorado	1,080,863	238,018	1,318,881	883,748	0.67
7	Connecticut	879,289	83,879	963,168	561,094	0.58
8	Delaware	177,194	32,397	209,591	137,288	0.66
9	Wash, D.C.	27,618	35,384	63,002	18,073	0.29
10	Florida	4,246,869	631,104	4,877,973	2,912,790	0.60
11	Georgia	1,888,050	292,063	2,180,113	1,419,720	0.65
12	Hawaii	150,007	39,509	189,516	137,845	0.73
13	Idaho	481,179	63,826	545,005	336,937	0.62
14	Illinois	2,627,629	231,587	2,859,216	2,019,421	0.71
15	Indiana	1,893,036	142,771	2,035,807	1,245,836	0.61
16	Iowa	814,495	74,765	889,260	634,373	0.71
17	Kansas	961,503	91,574	1,053,077	622,332	0.59
18	Kentucky	1,049,819	109,320	1,159,139	872,492	0.75
19	Louisiana	844,457	79,545	924,002	927,871	1.00
20	Maine	349,891	37,940	387,831	286,616	0.74
21	Maryland	993,949	143,290	1,137,239	813,797	0.72
22	Massachusetts	1,166,025	157,696	1,323,721	878,502	0.66
23	Michigan	2,700,211	155,793	2,856,004	1,953,139	0.68
24	Minnesota	1,332,878	125,025	1,457,903	1,109,659	0.76
25	Mississippi	724,372	67,245	791,617	572,844	0.72
26	Missouri	1,540,326	164,463	1,704,789	1,189,924	0.70
27	Montana	298,582	39,890	338,472	240,178	0.71
28	Nebraska	636,568	53,111	689,679	433,862	0.63
29	Nevada	394,061	146,656	540,717	301,575	0.56
30	N. Hampshire	383,823	51,123	434,946	273,559	0.63
31	New Jersey	2,200,148	160,533	2,360,681	1,284,173	0.54
32	New Mexico	462,678	68,310	530,988	286,417	0.54
33	New York	4,129,055	254,044	4,383,099	2,403,374	0.55
34	N. Carolina	2,086,649	307,589	2,394,238	1,631,163	0.68
35	North Dakota	195,838	22,291	218,129	174,852	0.80
36	Ohio	3,352,175	199,918	3,552,093	2,351,209	0.66
37	Oklahoma	870,793	100,595	971,388	744,337	0.77
38	Oregon	869,370	136,648	1,006,018	713,577	0.71
39	Pennsylvania	3,499,151	219,098	3,718,249	2,281,127	0.61
40	Rhode Island	163,241	29,524	192,765	130,555	0.68
41	S. Carolina	1,114,052	146,304	1,260,356	785,937	0.62
42	South Dakota	261,074	25,810	286,884	190,700	0.66
43	Tennessee	1,593,730	190,530	1,784,260	1,061,949	0.60
44	Texas	5,509,612	430,874	5,940,486	3,799,639	0.64
45	Utah	804,869	82,307	887,176	515,096	0.58
46	Vermont	177,611	24,159	201,770	119,775	0.59
47	Virginia	1,952,692	263,515	2,216,207	1,437,490	0.65
48	Washington	1,337,476	214,571	1,552,047	1,108,864	0.71
49	West Virginia	437,101	47,034	484,135	336,475	0.70
50	Wisconsin	1,432,504	110,680	1,543,184	1,237,279	0.80
51	Wyoming	179,812	27,352	207,164	147,947	0.71
					Mean	0.67
					Median	0.66

Sources: Calculated by author and Federal Election Commission (FEC)* (2000)

Appendix 5. Estimated Democratic Non-Migrants and Net Migrants and Related Likely Yield

		Democrats				
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Total	Albert Gore 2000 Votes*	Likely Yield
1	Alabama	1,543,404	127,946	1,671,350	692,611	0.41
2	Alaska	164,379	38,351	202,730	79,004	0.39
3	Arizona	1,367,903	336,163	1,704,066	685,341	0.40
4	Arkansas	1,101,503	94,344	1,195,847	422,768	0.35
5	California	12,373,381	671,657	13,045,038	5,861,203	0.45
6	Colorado	1,306,733	250,617	1,557,350	738,227	0.47
7	Connecticut	1,211,778	120,932	1,332,710	816,015	0.61
8	Delaware	275,546	46,190	321,736	180,068	0.56
9	Wash, D.C.	263,933	61,299	325,232	171,923	0.53
10	Florida	4,993,572	811,491	5,805,063	2,912,253	0.50
11	Georgia	2,631,249	415,756	3,047,005	1,116,230	0.37
12	Hawaii	552,577	57,348	609,925	205,286	0.34
13	Idaho	224,029	67,464	291,493	138,637	0.48
14	Illinois	4,918,568	285,615	5,204,183	2,589,026	0.50
15	Indiana	1,885,403	183,154	2,068,557	901,980	0.44
16	Iowa	1,063,634	86,748	1,150,382	638,517	0.56
17	Kansas	635,928	107,817	743,745	399,276	0.54
18	Kentucky	1,432,555	121,985	1,554,540	638,898	0.41
19	Louisiana	1,764,252	103,473	1,867,725	792,344	0.42
20	Maine	472,534	46,678	519,212	319,951	0.62
21	Maryland	2,144,692	241,518	2,386,210	1,145,782	0.48
22	Massachusetts	2,809,199	209,834	3,019,033	1,616,487	0.54
23	Michigan	3,543,923	198,933	3,742,856	2,170,418	0.58
24	Minnesota	1,768,509	147,788	1,916,297	1,168,266	0.61
25	Mississippi	909,903	91,234	1,001,137	404,614	0.40
26	Missouri	1,909,277	187,691	2,096,968	1,111,138	0.53
27	Montana	232,812	42,411	275,223	137,126	0.50
28	Nebraska	415,693	59,717	475,410	231,780	0.49
29	Nevada	549,922	199,115	749,037	279,978	0.37
30	New Hampshire	351,110	73,102	424,212	266,348	0.63
31	New Jersey	2,872,312	248,431	3,120,743	1,788,850	0.57
32	New Mexico	524,725	83,470	608,195	286,783	0.47
33	New York	7,452,088	349,918	7,802,006	4,107,697	0.53
34	North Carolina	2,633,239	386,869	3,020,108	1,257,692	0.42
35	North Dakota	205,433	24,930	230,363	95,284	0.41
36	Ohio	3,907,680	242,645	4,150,325	2,186,190	0.53
37	Oklahoma	1,164,355	122,926	1,287,281	474,276	0.37
38	Oregon	1,128,784	169,948	1,298,732	720,342	0.55
39	Pennsylvania	4,429,671	287,262	4,716,933	2,485,967	0.53
40	Rhode Island	487,320	47,381	534,701	249,508	0.47
41	South Carolina	1,220,569	181,139	1,401,708	565,561	0.40
42	South Dakota	195,033	27,391	222,424	118,804	0.53
43	Tennessee	1,816,112	222,920	2,039,032	981,720	0.48
44	Texas	6,161,925	566,149	6,728,074	2,433,746	0.36
45	Utah	353,100	90,388	443,488	203,053	0.46
46	Vermont	198,881	30,231	229,112	149,022	0.65
47	Virginia	2,203,427	358,496	2,561,923	1,217,290	0.48
48	Washington	2,085,081	261,880	2,346,961	1,247,652	0.53
49	West Virginia	691,905	51,633	743,538	295,497	0.40
50	Wisconsin	2,029,967	142,501	2,172,468	1,242,987	0.57
51	Wyoming	101,509	26,380	127,889	60,481	0.47
					Mean	0.48
					Median	0.48

Sources: Calculated by author and Federal Election Commission (FEC)* (2000)

APPENDIX B

VOTERS ON THE MOVE: THE POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF MIGRATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON STATE PARTISAN COMPOSITION

Jason R. Jurjevich
David A. Plane

Abstract
U.S. Census Bureau state-level projections suggest that by 2030 Sunbelt migration could result in two-thirds of all Americans living in the South and West. What is more, 30% of all Americans could live in California, Texas, and Florida (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). Regardless of whether such high levels of continued Sunbelt migration occur or other patterns emerge, migration will continue to have electoral implications, particularly with migration's compositional effects changing the balance of party identifiers at both origins and destinations. Yet, compositional effects literature provides little substantive analysis of these effects. Data limitations and theoretical and definitional misconceptions of migration have hampered research. This research uses an innovative method to suggest what current U.S. migration trends portend for changes in Republican and Democratic partisanship. Using 2000 Presidential election exit polls by state, along with 1995-2000 migration data, this study predicts individual party identification from individual migrant characteristics. Relying on a methodological framework documented in Jurjevich (In Preparation) and a concept of 'political effectiveness' of migration, this comprehensive analytical assessment of migration streams addresses three key issues overlooked in the current literature: 1) the ability of migration to both reinforce and dilute party strength, 2) changes in partisanship at the origin and destination of migration streams through processes analogous to 'packing' and 'cracking' in electoral redistricting literature, and 3) the importance of migration selectivity. This research calls attention to and argues for research to address the highly complex nature of migration.

Introduction

Beginning with the seminal research of *The American Voter* and subsequent studies, many scholars have recognized the ability of migration to transform the political landscape, but few have explained the complex nature in which migration creates political change. James G. Gimpel clearly summarizes an otherwise complicated subject:

> The politics of place are obviously determined by the people who live there—who they are and how their interests are defined. Because people make demands of the political system in a democracy, significant political change occurs in a place when its population changes. Populations change in a myriad of ways and at various places. The pace of change is uneven across space, leading to the social, economic, and political stratification of neighborhoods, towns, and cities. Because politics and population are linked through political participation in a democratic society, population changes produce consequential, but rather uneven political changes across places (Gimpel 1999, p. 3).

Gimpel's (1999) quote highlights the nuanced nature and multi-faceted complexity of migration—the product of compositional and contextual effects. Compositional effects refer to the changing balance of party identifiers at origins and destinations provided by migration streams, while contextual effects refer to the social, psychological, and cultural impact of migrants on places, or vice versa, they leave and to which they move. In addition to migration as a whole being largely under-addressed in political research, there is also a gross imbalance in compositional and contextual effects scholarship. Since the early 1980s scholars have provided a comprehensive and rich assessment of contextual effects (e.g., Burbank 1995, McMahon et al. 1992, Brown 1988, Brown 1981), but compositional effects continue to be poorly understood, largely the result of scholars relying on oversimplified and highly undertheorized conceptions of migration. This research develops and applies a comprehensive analytical framework based on a well-established body of migration theory to provide a thorough understanding of the highly complex nature of compositional effects.

The importance of compositional effects has been heightened by the increasing mobility of the electorate. Though mobility has slightly declined since the 2000 Census, the Current Population Survey (CPS) reports that over 7.8 million Americans moved

across state lines between 2004 and 2005 and that migration streams are highly unidirectional (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). The U.S. Census Bureau also projects that by 2030, 30% of the U.S. population may reside in California, Texas, and Florida with obvious and direct electoral implications; Florida could have more electoral votes than New York and Massachusetts combined, Arizona could equal Michigan's electoral might, and North Carolina may be equal to Pennsylvania (U.S. Census Bureau 2005, Frey 2005). Yet, while these major demographic and migratory shifts continue to transform the American political landscape, political scientists and electoral geographers have provided little substantive explanation about the multi-faceted complexity of current trends and future implications.

The insufficient recognition of the importance of migration is largely because it has received little consideration in political science and electoral geography (Frendreis 1989). Most research in political science examines migration tangentially, if at all, considering it along with conversion and mobilization as catalysts for party change. Using the transformation of the American South from a largely Democratic to Republican region as the litmus test, Valentino and Sears (2005), Marchant-Shapiro and Patterson (1995), Stanley (1988), Petrocik (1987), and others found migration to be an insignificant factor. The insignificance of migration in the realignment of the American South caused many political scientists to disregard migration. In fact, Thad A. Brown noted that "migration is a demographic phenomenon that is not well known in political science," (Brown 1988, p. 146). A significant intellectual disconnect exists between political science, electoral geography, and demography. As a result, scholars often use

an oversimplified, undertheorized, and highly problematic definition of migration leading to three primary weaknesses of compositional migration research: 1) ignorance of migration selectivity and individual characteristics, 2) failure to consider migrant origins and destinations, and 3) improper use and interpretation of migration statistics.

The weaknesses of current compositional research are even represented in some of the most advanced compositional scholarship. Beginning with *The American Voter* in the 1950s, political scientists reported strong and consistent correlations between the characteristics of migrants and Republican identification. Many scholars then hypothesized that places with high rates of in-migration would have a growing Republican base (Frendreis 1989, Rice and Pepper 1987, Kenney and Rice 1985, Lyons and Durant 1980, and Campbell et al. 1960). However, using aggregate migration statistics (e.g. gross in-migration or net migration), Gimpel and Schuknecht (2001) and Frendreis (1989) found no evidence to support a hypothesis; places with higher levels of in-migration did not necessarily experience increased Republican strength. We argue that the consistent disregard of out-migration, a lack of consideration of individual migrant characteristics, failure to consider origins of in-migrants, and implicit generalizations that migrants are overwhelmingly Republican have been critical limitations for addressing the highly complex nature of compositional effects.

Using an innovative methodological framework for inferring individual party identification of migrants from individual social and economic migrant characteristics as detailed in Jurjevich (In Preparation), this study employs 1995-2000 migration flows from Census 2000 microdata by age, income, education, and states of origin and

destination, to suggest what recent domestic migration trends portend for compositional changes in Democratic and Republican partisanship for states across the U.S. A fundamentally important analytical tool developed in this paper is a political measure of migration called Political Effectiveness. The measure assesses how 'efficient' migration streams are in transforming the political landscape. It is used to identify state-to-state migration streams that are most effective in diluting (cracking) or reinforcing (packing) party strength, while simultaneously considering the political impact of migration at both migrant origins and destinations.

Literature Review

Migration Positionality and Intellectual Disconnect

Migration has received little substantive focus in political science; Frendreis (1989, p. 211) suggests, "since the potential direct effect of migration on the national balance of party loyalties is slight, when the question of national changes in party balances has been considered, the dominant focus has been on conversion and mobilization." His conclusion is based on realignment and party change research that evaluates migration by considering its relative importance, along with conversion and mobilization, as catalysts for party change (Valentino and Sears 2005, Marchant-Shapiro and Patterson 1995, Carmines and Stanley 1990, Stanley 1988, and Petrocik 1987). With the unequivocal and expedient transformation of the American South from a largely Democratic to Republican region, most political science research consistently found migration to be a relatively insignificant factor, especially compared to issue-based conversion and generational replacement in realigning the South—leading many scholars to discount the importance of migration on the overall political landscape

(Valentino and Sears 2005, Stanley 1988, and Petrocik 1987, Beck 1977). Subsequent party-change research in the Mountain West corroborates these results and suggests recent party changes are mostly the result of issue-based voting ideologies (Marchant-Shapiro and Patterson 1995).

The relative insignificance of migration compared to conversion, mobilization, and issue-based voting in the American South and Mountain West says little about migration's ability to change the political landscape, however. While national and regional changes in partisanship may be inconsequential, migration's ability to redistribute population is extremely relevant, particularly at state and local levels. Therefore, we argue that regional-scale studies, especially those using the American South as a litmus test, are not only too broad to examine compositional effects (Frendreis 1989, Lyons and Durant 1980), but in our opinion, single region analyses can represent myopic scholarship. Gimpel (1999, p. 8) notes that "most of the work in political science has focused on the movers themselves, drawing data on mobility and politics. Much less focus has been on what happens to the politics of places that movers settle in or leave behind." Therefore, while some studies concluded migration was insignificant in creating political change in the American South and subsequently discounted the likelihood for future aspects of political change, we mention that, unlike conversion and mobilization, migration is highly complex and often has indirect and delayed impacts that can take decades to affect the political landscape (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Brown 1988).

The academic breadth of migration scholarship across political science, electoral geography, and demography has precipitated a profound interdisciplinary disconnect among some scholars—and in many cases, has resulted in a rigid disciplinary entrenchment where migration is viewed as important only as a vehicle for illustrating larger academic issues or values important and relevant to a particular discipline (Agnew 1997). For example, political science scholarship has generally analyzed migration as a factor of partisan change (e.g., Petrocik 1987) and electoral geography has studied its relationship to illustrating the importance of local context (e.g., Pattie and Johnston 2000, Johnston 1987). Political geographer Ron J. Johnston has argued: "American electoral geographers should interact more with political scientists, but formally and informally, to the mutual benefit of both," (2005, p. 584).

Migration Selectivity and Origins/Destinations

A critically important factor contributing to the complexity of migration is its highly selective process according to stage of life course, age, income, and education. A voluminous geographic literature offers several theoretical frameworks for illustrating and explaining migration's highly selective nature. Sjaastad's (1962) human capital theory has been widely cited, particularly among economists, and was among the first theoretical frameworks to view migration through an economic lens. Sjaastad (1962) suggested that the decision to migrate should be viewed in terms of an individual-level investment to maximize economic preferences. Because migration has relatively high actual and tacit costs and the decision to move is predicated on a calculation that perceived benefits outweigh costs, mobility levels are highly selective for individuals

with high education and income levels (Hobbs 1942, Greenwood 1975, Yezer and Thurston 1976). Critics of Sjaastad's human capital theory argued that it is an 'economic determinist view of migration' (Lee 1966, Wolpert 1965). More recent scholarship has validated the importance of non-economic factors in an individual's propensity to migrate, including an individual's life course (e.g., McHugh et al. 1995, Clark 1992) and natural amenities (e.g., Shumway and Otterstrom 2001, Vias 1999).

The generalization that migrants are often younger, better educated, have higher incomes, and more likely to identify as Republicans compared to non-migrants, was first inferred by authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). Among individuals who improved their occupational status or achieved higher levels of education and income, Campbell et al. (1960) found that 76% of Democrats and 37% Republicans were non-movers. The authors concluded that Republicans had higher levels of mobility compared to Democrats. This led subsequent scholars to investigate whether individuals with higher levels of mobility were more likely to identify as Republicans (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Rice and Pepper 1997, Frendreis 1989, Brown 1988, and Lyons and Durant 1980). Gimpel and Schuknecht (2001), Gimpel (1999), and others found that higher levels of mobility and migration are highly correlated with Republican Party identification, but results have contradicted the sometimes accompanying hypothesis that places with high in-migration levels equal stronger Republican areas (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Frendreis 1989, Brown 1988). While migrants are more likely to identify as Republicans, the Republican selective nature of migration does not necessarily imply increasing Republican strength in areas with high levels of in-

migration for three interrelated reasons: 1) this selectivity of migration is not uniform across time and space, 2) in-migration and out-migration streams need to be concomitantly considered, and 3) the political environments of the origin and destination must be considered.

While seminal migration research established near steadfast selectiveness of migration with respect to age, income, and education (Hobbs 1942, Greenwood 1975, Yezer and Thurston 1976), more recent migration research have cited increased variability of migration selectivity. For example, Zelinsky's (1971) hypothesis of the mobility transition illustrates how mobility levels increased and became less selective with social and economic advancement. Significant social, economic, and cultural advances during the past three or four decades, combined with increasing mobility and movement to rural areas largely based on natural amenities, led some to suggest that migration patterns were representative of the fourth and fifth stages of the mobility transition—specifically counterurbanization and movement for non-economic factors (Fuguitt and Beale 1996, Kontuly 1998, Frey 1987). Additionally, other studies corroborated earlier research that provided strong empirical support for linking age, stage of life, and generational membership to migration selectivity (Plane and Jurjevich 2009, Plane, Henrie, and Perry 2005, Plane and Heins 2003, Plane and Rogerson 1991). These studies also add caveats suggesting less universality and the emergence of radically different patterns of migration when size of place and other geographically variables attributes are considered. Therefore, we argue that it is increasingly problematic to assume, either theoretically or operationally, that migrants are largely

Republican and instead call for a more nuanced understanding of who is migrating by considering individual migrant characteristics.

Another important consideration for examining uneven political effects across space and time is the political environment of the origin and destination. An extensive number of studies in both political science and electoral geography (Burbank 1995, McMahon et al. 1992, Denver and Halfacree 1992, Brown 1988) found strong empirical support for the importance of the political environment at both origin and destination for understanding how the social environment structures party identification. In fact, Erikson, McIver, and Wright (1987) reported that state of residence produces at least as much variation in predicting partisanship as demographic variables. Therefore, the overall landscape of political change implied by migration is determined not just by who moves, but by the spatial patterns of migrant origins and destinations as it relates to existing electoral geographies.

Migration Statistics

E.G. Ravenstein's (1885) seminal work titled, "The Laws of Migration", asserted that for each migration stream in one direction, a counterstream in the opposite direction will likely develop potentially canceling much of the effect of the primary stream. Therefore, by operationally defining migration in terms of net migration, as Frendreis (1989) and many other studies do, or by broadly comparing migrants to non-migrants, there is an increased risk that the researcher will not accurately assess the 'political effectiveness' of the streams. Our study considers the political effects of migration both at the origin and destination by operationally borrowing the concept of demographic

effectiveness, which measures how 'effective' the total volume of migration is in redistributing population (Plane and Rogerson 1994, Shyrock and Siegel 1976, Thomas 1941). For example, college towns have high levels of in-migrants every year with incoming freshman, but those streams are demographically ineffective because there is an opposite and typically almost equal flow of graduating seniors who move out of town in search of jobs. The measure is best illustrated with the following example: if there are 10 migrants in a region during a year and all 10 were in-migrants, the effectiveness would be 10/10, or 100%. However, if four were in-migrants and six were out-migrants, the effectiveness would be -2/10, or -20% (Weeks 2005). The combination of demographic effectiveness, along with inferred party identification of the migrant and the political environment of the origin and destination, allows us to construct a 'political effectiveness' measure of migration flows that assesses compositional changes at the origin and destination by identifying migration streams that most effectively in dilute (crack) or reinforce (pack) party strength.

One of the most direct ways to illustrate the utility and robustness of the political effectiveness measure is to consider the argument made by Gimpel and Schuknecht (2001); they contend that in order for migration to register a political impact the volume of the migration stream must be sizable *and* the migrants must be politically different from residents at the destination and/or those who remain at the origin. We strongly disagree with this contention because migration can be highly effective without high volumes and without residents being politically different. The necessity to concomitantly consider individual migrant characteristics, origin/destination political

environment, and accurate migration statistics is best illustrated by the following example: A Republican interstate migration stream from a well-entrenched Republican majority position in an origin state to a toss-up position in the destination state would be more politically effective than a Republican interstate migration stream from a well-entrenched Republican majority position in an origin state to a well-entrenched Democratic position in the destination state because the former example makes the political context more competitive while the later example simply dilutes an otherwise entrenched majority opposition. Therefore, political effectiveness can radically change the origin and/or destination by making states become more competitive, stronger, or weaker for a party.

Methodology

The most pervasive obstacle to comprehensive compositional effects research has been the dearth of available migration data, which has subsequently led to improper methodological techniques. Reliable migration data containing individual party identification are largely non-existent, forcing scholars to rely on the General Social Survey (GSS), American National Election Studies (ANES), and other data sources. These studies ask respondents questions regarding migration and party affiliation, however small sample sizes and non-specific questions conflating migration with mobility limit their usefulness. The limitations of these data sources have even led some scholars to use the change in the number of congressional representatives for each state over time as a proxy for measuring the political effects of migration (Kodras and Jones 1988, Kenney and Rice 1985).

Whether compositional studies rely on GSS, ANES, or alternate data repositories, we believe that the highly imperfect nature of these data sources are partly responsible for definitional and theoretical misconceptions of migration. To substantively overcome these issues, we rely on a pioneering methodological approach for inferring individual party identification based on individual socioeconomic characteristics that is more detailed in Jurjevich (In Preparation).

The most comprehensive and current migration data available for examining compositional effects is provided by Census 2000. Approximately 4,000,000 households, representing nearly 85,000,000 Americans, reported a different county of residence in 1995 than 2000 (Ruggles et al. 2009). The comprehensive nature of census migration data is critically important since it allows for detailed analysis of origin-destination-specific streams. However, a primary drawback of decennial census data, especially for this type of research, are that they do not provide individual party identification. But Census data do contain detailed individual-level social, economic, and geographic data in its Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) sample, which presents opportunities for inferring individual party identification.

The complex social, individual, and psychological influences of individual party identification make it notoriously difficult to predict, but several studies have been moderately successful in predicting individual party identification from social, economic, and political variables. Arthur S. Goldberg's (1966) study explained nearly half of the variance in individual party identification with social, economic, demographic, political, geographic, parental socialization, and policy attitude variables.

Subsequent studies have consistently found familial party identification and individual policy attitudes as the most significant independent variables (see Cassel 1982, Declercq, Hurley, and Luttbeg 1975, Knoke and Hout 1974).

While U.S. censuses do not ask individual party identification or policy attitudes, they do provide extensive individual-level demographic characteristics and geographically specific (PUMS) microdata that may be employed. Using state-based Presidential election exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service and National Election Pool containing individual party identification and sociodemographic information, we used logistic regression analysis to evaluate the statistical strength of age, gender, income, and race as independent predictors of individual identification as a Republican or Democrat by state residence (Voter News Service Election Day Exit Polls 2000). As illustrated in Jurjevich (In Preparation), 27 of 51 models had Nagelkerke (pseudo R2 values) greater than 10% and 10 state models explained more than 20% of the variance in individual party identification. Moreover, statistically significant chi-square log likelihood values, significant increases in percentage of cases properly predicted in classification matrices, and consistent statistical significance for independent variables across state models confirm the robustness of socioeconomic variables as explanatory predictors of individual party identification and provide reasonable assurance for predicting individual party identification from individual-level sociodemographic variables from U.S. Census data.

The statistical technique best suited for predicting the binary outcome of the dependent variable, Democrat or Republican Party identification, is logistic regression.

Logistic regression is becoming an increasingly preferred statistical method for categorical research because it provides pseudo-R^2 values, logit coefficients and standardized logit coefficients correspond to b coefficient values and beta weights, respectively, and perhaps more importantly, many assumptions required in OLS regression are not applicable for logistic regression (Simonoff 2003, Le 1998, and Long 1997). With corresponding Exp (b) coefficient values for age, income, gender, and race for each state model, we calculated likely individual party identification for each migrant, according to their origin state, with the logistic probability:

$$P = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(a+bX)}}$$

Probability values range between 0 and 1, with values less than .50 indicating the person is likely a Democrat and values greater than .50 identifying the person as a likely Republican (Field 2005). The section that follows provides empirical results of estimated Republicans and Democrats moving from state to state based on 2000 U.S. Census flows.

Results

Partisanship Estimates for Net Potential Out-Migration

The logistic regression model's estimate of net Democratic and Republican interstate out-migrants, by state, is represented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the model estimates 36 of 51 observations as sources of net likely Democratic out-migration and only 15 observations with net likely Republican out-migration (Figure 2). The model's estimation of Washington, D.C., Maryland, Massachusetts, Illinois, New York, and California as places with large numbers of net Democratic out-migrants is reasonable and accurate, but estimating Alabama, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and

Kentucky as sources of Democratic out-migration seems unreliable considering voters in these states are reliably Republican in most national, state, and local elections.

While the estimated absolute numbers of net Democratic out-migrants for these traditionally Republican states are small, the model appeared to be slightly biased in overestimating Democratic migrants. In order to test our hypothesis, we used the logistic regression model to predict individual party identification for non-migrants and intrastate migrants in each state to assess the reasonableness of model estimates for state partisanship (see Appendices 1 and 2). Our results are more fully disclosed in Jurjevich (In Preparation), but confirm our hypothesis that the model has a slight bias in overestimating Democratic migrants. The principal reason for the model's Democratic bias is that inferring individual party identification from migrants of voting age population does not consider the highly selective process of voter registration. Therefore, partisan estimates represent a *potential* estimate of registered Republicans and Democrats based on individual sociodemographic characteristics and not an actual estimate of registered partisans.

Likely Yield and Net Migration Rates (NMR)

With the logistic model estimating *potential* registered partisans, we developed a statistic called 'likely yield' in order to provide a more realistic estimate of *likely* registered partisans. The numerator is calculated by adding the model's estimated non-migrant population (1995 population) to the number of in migrants (between 1995-2000), resulting in the estimated potential registered partisan population (2000 population). Next, we compared the total votes cast for each 2000 Presidential candidate to the 2000

potential registered partisan population. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the U.S. average likely vote yield in 2000 for Republicans and Democrats is .67 and .48, respectively. The disparity in the likely vote yield explains why Republicans and Democrats are often competitive in most elections. In most elections, Republican voters possess greater voter intensity, which results in higher mobilization rates among the Republican electorate. As a result, the higher vote yield among Republicans compared to Democrats negates the Democratic identification advantage.

Using the likely yield, we summarized state-to-state inflows and outflows by party to calculate the net migration rate (NMR) for likely Republicans and Democrats by state. Figure 3 demonstrates some apparent compositional effects of migration. First, with some of the largest absolute flows of out-migrants from strongly Democratic areas of the Midwest and Northeast to more Republican areas of the South and West, the unidirectional nature of regional flows is leading to an increased 'purpleness' of the electorate at both origins and destinations. While the South is most obviously gaining Democrats as a result of Sunbelt migration, conversely the departure of largely Democratic migrants also produces an effective gain for Republicans in the Northeast and Midwest. For example, model estimates for New York show a net loss of 166,270 likely Republicans compared to a net loss for likely Democrats of 459,391, which results in a total net gain of likely Republicans of 293,121 (and a corresponding Republican NMR of 9.2). Additionally, significant out-migration of traditional Republicans and for some states, modest in-flows of Democrats produces highly effective Democratic net migration rates in the interior West.

Different Ways of Achieving Gains

Analyzing the partisan NMR is effective for succinctly summarizing net gains of partisans for each state, but a principal drawback is its inability to explain the different ways in which states can achieve gains. Therefore, Figures 4 and 5 offer analytical matrices summarizing the three primary ways states can achieve net Democratic and Republican gains, respectively. As represented in Figure 4, states can achieve net gains in likely Democrats three ways: 1) more likely Democratic in-migration than likely Republican in-migration, 2) likely Democratic in-migration combined with likely Republican out-migration, and 4) more likely Republican out-migration than likely Democratic out-migration. Figure 5 shows similar patterns for states achieving net gains in likely Republicans. However, Figures 4 and 5 contain a significant downside. By summarizing aggregate-level migration flows, the matrices mask specific state-to-state migration flows and therefore, limit explanation to large regional and macro-level migration flows. We address this key limitation by examining origin-destination specific patterns at the end of the results section.

States with estimated net Democratic gains are shown in Figure 6. In category one, likely Democratic gains in Arizona, Oregon, and Nevada are attributable to largely Democratic California out-migrants. Similarly, likely gains for North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia are due to in-migrants from more Democratic areas of the Midwest and Northeast. The second category includes states with net Democratic in-migration combined with net Republican out-migration. The underlying migration patterns explaining Democratic gains in the second category are

less obvious. States with the largest number of estimated net Democrats in the second category include Virginia, Utah, Texas, Kansas, Indiana, and Idaho, which is likely the result of two factors: 1) like category one, Virginia, Utah, Texas, and Idaho are states with significant in-migrants from more traditionally Democratic states, combined with Republican out-migration from these more traditionally conservative states, and 2) Kansas and Indiana have Republican out-migration as well, but may be experiencing a 'spillover' effect of Democratic in-migrants from more Democratic urban areas of Kansas City, MO and Chicago, IL, respectively. Lastly, states in category four have net Democratic gains as a result of slightly more Republicans out-migrating than Democrats. States with small overall migration flows, including Alaska, New Mexico, and North Dakota, have the smallest estimated net Democratic gains of any state. Conversely, New Jersey and Ohio have sizable out-migration streams, but with virtually equal partisan distributions, equal partisan out-migration yields almost a net zero effect.

Compared to states with net Democratic gains, patterns underlying states with net Republican gains (Figure 7) appear more diverse and challenging to explain at the macro level. California, New York, and other traditionally Democratic states in category four have net gains in Republicans as a result of significant numbers of likely Democrats out-migrating narrowing the partisan margin in these origin states. Explaining underlying migration patterns for states in category three is slightly more difficult, but Minnesota serves as a potential example of states in this category. As a traditionally Democratic state with large volumes of out-migrants to the Sunbelt, combined with significant in-migration streams from more Republican states like North Dakota, South

Dakota, and Nebraska to the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area, Minnesota's largely Democratic electorate is becoming increasingly diluted by Republican gains as a result of both in and out migration streams. Lastly, category one states of Colorado, Kentucky, Missouri, and Washington have net Republican gains as a result of more Republican than Democratic in-migrants. The close geographic proximity of major urban areas, including Denver, Louisville, St. Louis, Kansas City, Seattle, and Spokane likely offer more employment opportunity for rural migrants from more conservative adjacent states and explain why the absolute volume of Republican migration streams is larger than Democratic streams.

Demographic Effectiveness

Analyzing absolute flows of state-to-state Republican and Democrat migration streams offers interesting insight into the complexity of compositional effects, but as Ravenstein (1885) first noted, for every stream there is a counterstream. Figure 8 shows the total demographic effectiveness of Republican and Democrat migration streams. Net partisan migration flows are highly effective for Republicans in Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and Illinois, while flows are most effective for Democrats in Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Kansas, South Dakota, and Nebraska. More importantly, Figure 8 illustrates two important points. First, large absolute gains of partisans do not equal highly effective migration streams. Conversely, small absolute gains of partisans do not necessarily yield ineffective streams. California and Massachusetts had a net gain in Republicans of 265,000 and 125,000, respectively, but in relation to the large volume of migration in and out of California, the volume of migration is not as effective as

Massachusetts. Secondly, a key limitation of this analysis is while it considers the effectiveness of migration redistributing partisans, it does not assess the political effectiveness of migration by specifically considering the redistribution of partisans from their origin to their destination. Therefore, we combine the demographic effectiveness results with a detailed origin-destination analysis to produce a political effectiveness as discussed below.

Political Effectiveness

In order to assess the political effectiveness of migration streams, first, the political competitiveness of origin and destination states must be considered. Using the total number of votes cast for each major presidential candidate in the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, we calculated an average partisan vote margin for each state. Next, we categorized the average partisan vote margin for each state according to its competitiveness— states with average partisan vote margins greater than 10% are considered 'safe', margins between 5-10% produce 'lean' states, and states with vote margins between 0-5% are 'swing' states. As illustrated in Table 3, the competitiveness of electoral politics over the past two decades are illustrated with Republicans and Democrats have 23 and 20 safe or lean states, respectively, and 8 states classified as swing states.

The political competitiveness of states is critical for underscoring the different ways electoral gains are produced through migration. Figure 9 summarizes the effectiveness of migration streams in diluting (cracking) or reinforcing (packing) party strength. For example, a Republican migrant moving from Arizona (RL) to Utah (RS) is

a highly inefficient move in terms of political effectiveness because the loss of the Republican in Arizona increases the political competitiveness of Arizona while providing no material gain for an already entrenched Republican majority in Utah. Conversely, a Republican migrant moving from Utah (RS) to Arizona (RL) would be strategic since Utah has a strong Republican majority and can afford the dilution of strength while strengthening the smaller Republican majority in Arizona. Lastly, moving from Arizona (RL) to Georgia (RL) is an electoral gamble in terms of political effectiveness since both states contain slight Republican majorities.

A significant challenge for analyzing origin-destination specific political effectiveness is the extensive volume of migration data. In order to comprehensively consider state-to-state migration flows, we produced a 51 x 51 matrix resulting in over 1,300 different combinations of demographic effectiveness values. Therefore, we limited our analysis by only considering state-to-state flows with demographic effectiveness values of 15% or higher as significant flows. Additionally, we generally only considered politically competitive origin and destination states in our analysis.

Table 4 summarizes significant politically effective streams for California out-migrants. Considering California is a solidly Democratic state, it is reasonable that out-migration streams would be largely effective for Democrats compared to Republicans in destination states. One of the most important advantages this level of analysis provides is the ability to identify the most highly politically effective moves—strategic packing and cracking. As Table 4 shows, Californians moving out of California (DS) to Republican leaning states of Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, and Montana is highly

politically effective as strategic *cracking* further dilutes an already competitive Republican advantage in destination states with Democrats from an origin stronghold. Similarly, California out-migration to Nevada is also politically effective, but is strategic *packing* as Democrats reinforce partisan strength in a competitive destination state.

Discussion and Conclusion

Migration is an exceptionally influential and highly complex agent of political change. Through compositional and contextual effects, the multi-faceted nature of migration produces uneven effects across political landscapes. Some scholars have long recognized this notion, but have largely focused on contextual effects. The consequences of this intellectual myopia have led to a dearth of compositional effects research and reliance on an oversimplified, undertheorized, and poor understanding of migration and compositional effects. Moreover, some of the most transparent, immediate, and long-lasting ramifications of migration on political landscapes are the result of compositional effects. We believe this study not only provides a thorough explanation of state-level changes in Republican and Democratic partisanship resulting from migration, but perhaps more importantly, this research offers a comprehensive analytical assessment of migration by fully detailing its complexity.

The highly selective nature of migration according to stage of life course, age, income, and education is well documented and underpins findings demonstrating higher levels of mobility among Republicans. Yet, numerous studies consistently find places with high levels of in-migration do not always experience increased Republican strength (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001, Frendreis 1989, and Brown 1988). Therefore,

while migrants are more likely to identify as Republicans, the Republican bias of migration does not lead to increased Republican strength largely because contemporary migration research has demonstrated increasing variability of migration selectivity driven by non-economic factors. These changes have resulted in less universality and radically different patterns of migration across the landscape. Because migration selectivity is not uniform across time and space, it is absolutely imperative to consider individual migrant characteristics. Even considering a slight Democratic bias in this study's logistic model, our results suggest a highly diverse social and economic migrant population yielding significant partisan heterogeneity. The implications of the results are clear—scholars must consider, theoretically and operationally, a more nuanced approach for studying the compositional effects of migration by fully accounting for individual migrant characteristics.

Analyzing migration patterns from the macro level poses some limitations, but clearly illustrates the complexity of migration in the different ways it produces partisan gains. States gaining Republicans and Democrats generally achieve partisan gains in one of three ways: 1) more in-migration than the opposition party, 2) in-migration combined with out-migration of the opposition party, and 3) less out-migration compared to the opposition party. The importance for understanding the different ways migration produces partisan gains is particularly relevant as political parties and political analysts forecast future changes in partisanship based on current dominant state-to-state flows.

A prevailing notion among many scholars is that in order for migration to engender political change, the volume of the migration stream must be sizable and migrants must be politically different from residents at the destination and/or those remaining at the origin. As this research demonstrates, migration operates under a more nuanced and complex framework. While volume of migration streams and demographic effectiveness undoubtedly share similar political patterns, migration can be highly effective *without* high volume streams. For example, states such as California, Texas, and Florida have large populations and therefore, require a significant disparity between in and out migration flows in order for migration to be politically effective. Conversely, Wyoming and states with small populations require fewer migrants in order to promote political change. As we have shown in this study, states with high levels of Democratic demographic effectiveness are less populated states with moderate in and out migration flows in the interior West while Republican demographic effectiveness is highest for states in the upper Midwest and Northeast with significant flows of out-migrants.

One of the main contributions of this research is furthering the understanding of how migration is able to both reinforce and dilute party strength through packing and cracking. By considering the political environment at migrant origins and destinations, our concept of 'political effectiveness' demonstrates this complex process. Depending on the relative partisan competitiveness at origins and destinations, migration streams can be inefficient, strategic, or electoral gambles at either packing or cracking. For example, a Democratic migration stream from a strongly Democratic state like California

to a politically competitive state like Arizona is more politically effective than a migration stream to an already Democratically entrenched state like Hawaii. The reason the former example is more politically effective is because migration moves partisans from a solid majority state (California) and dilutes a competitive Republican majority (Arizona) increasing the electoral competitiveness of Arizona. Therefore, political effectiveness considers the ability of migration to make states more or less competitive by concomitantly considering the political milieu and political effects at the origin and destination.

The findings of this research underscore the importance of future migration research—future migration research must move beyond focusing on the impact of movers and instead further the understanding of how compositional effects of migration affect the politics of place. This research significantly contributes to compositional effects literature by relying on an innovative methodological design to establish an analytical framework for assessing compositional effects. Additionally, results suggest that the diverse partisan heterogeneity of migration streams have important implications for migration theory in suggesting a potentially outdated view of migration as highly positively selective. We call on future research to address the selectivity of voter registration in order to produce reasonable estimates for changes in partisanship as a result of migration.

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Table1. Estimated Republican Non-Migrants and Net Migrants and Related Likely Yield

		Republicans				
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Total	George W. Bush 2000 Votes*	Likely Yield
1	Alabama	1,129,657	103,304	1,232,961	941,173	0.76
2	Alaska	174,502	31,895	206,397	167,398	0.81
3	Arizona	1,258,689	274,111	1,532,800	781,652	0.51
4	Arkansas	495,809	80,915	576,724	472,940	0.82
5	California	7,158,686	510,623	7,669,309	4,567,429	0.60
6	Colorado	1,080,863	238,018	1,318,881	883,748	0.67
7	Connecticut	879,289	83,879	963,168	561,094	0.58
8	Delaware	177,194	32,397	209,591	137,288	0.66
9	Wash, D.C.	27,618	35,384	63,002	18,073	0.29
10	Florida	4,246,869	631,104	4,877,973	2,912,790	0.60
11	Georgia	1,888,050	292,063	2,180,113	1,419,720	0.65
12	Hawaii	150,007	39,509	189,516	137,845	0.73
13	Idaho	481,179	63,826	545,005	336,937	0.62
14	Illinois	2,627,629	231,587	2,859,216	2,019,421	0.71
15	Indiana	1,893,036	142,771	2,035,807	1,245,836	0.61
16	Iowa	814,495	74,765	889,260	634,373	0.71
17	Kansas	961,503	91,574	1,053,077	622,332	0.59
18	Kentucky	1,049,819	109,320	1,159,139	872,492	0.75
19	Louisiana	844,457	79,545	924,002	927,871	1.00
20	Maine	349,891	37,940	387,831	286,616	0.74
21	Maryland	993,949	143,290	1,137,239	813,797	0.72
22	Massachusetts	1,166,025	157,696	1,323,721	878,502	0.66
23	Michigan	2,700,211	155,793	2,856,004	1,953,139	0.68
24	Minnesota	1,332,878	125,025	1,457,903	1,109,659	0.76
25	Mississippi	724,372	67,245	791,617	572,844	0.72
26	Missouri	1,540,326	164,463	1,704,789	1,189,924	0.70
27	Montana	298,582	39,890	338,472	240,178	0.71
28	Nebraska	636,568	53,111	689,679	433,862	0.63
29	Nevada	394,061	146,656	540,717	301,575	0.56
30	N. Hampshire	383,823	51,123	434,946	273,559	0.63
31	New Jersey	2,200,148	160,533	2,360,681	1,284,173	0.54
32	New Mexico	462,678	68,310	530,988	286,417	0.54
33	New York	4,129,055	254,044	4,383,099	2,403,374	0.55
34	N. Carolina	2,086,649	307,589	2,394,238	1,631,163	0.68
35	North Dakota	195,838	22,291	218,129	174,852	0.80
36	Ohio	3,352,175	199,918	3,552,093	2,351,209	0.66
37	Oklahoma	870,793	100,595	971,388	744,337	0.77
38	Oregon	869,370	136,648	1,006,018	713,577	0.71
39	Pennsylvania	3,499,151	219,098	3,718,249	2,281,127	0.61
40	Rhode Island	163,241	29,524	192,765	130,555	0.68
41	S. Carolina	1,114,052	146,304	1,260,356	785,937	0.62
42	South Dakota	261,074	25,810	286,884	190,700	0.66
43	Tennessee	1,593,730	190,530	1,784,260	1,061,949	0.60
44	Texas	5,509,612	430,874	5,940,486	3,799,639	0.64
45	Utah	804,869	82,307	887,176	515,096	0.58
46	Vermont	177,611	24,159	201,770	119,775	0.59
47	Virginia	1,952,692	263,515	2,216,207	1,437,490	0.65
48	Washington	1,337,476	214,571	1,552,047	1,108,864	0.71
49	West Virginia	437,101	47,034	484,135	336,475	0.70
50	Wisconsin	1,432,504	110,680	1,543,184	1,237,279	0.80
51	Wyoming	179,812	27,352	207,164	147,947	0.71
					Mean	0.67
					Median	0.66

Sources: Calculated by author and Federal Election Commission (FEC)* (2000)

Table 2. Estimated Democratic Non-Migrants and Net Migrants and Related Likely Yield

		Democrats				
		Non-Migrants	In-Migrants	Total	Albert Gore 2000 Votes*	Likely Yield
1	Alabama	1,543,404	127,946	1,671,350	692,611	0.41
2	Alaska	164,379	38,351	202,730	79,004	0.39
3	Arizona	1,367,903	336,163	1,704,066	685,341	0.40
4	Arkansas	1,101,503	94,344	1,195,847	422,768	0.35
5	California	12,373,381	671,657	13,045,038	5,861,203	0.45
6	Colorado	1,306,733	250,617	1,557,350	738,227	0.47
7	Connecticut	1,211,778	120,932	1,332,710	816,015	0.61
8	Delaware	275,546	46,190	321,736	180,068	0.56
9	Wash, D.C.	263,933	61,299	325,232	171,923	0.53
10	Florida	4,993,572	811,491	5,805,063	2,912,253	0.50
11	Georgia	2,631,249	415,756	3,047,005	1,116,230	0.37
12	Hawaii	552,577	57,348	609,925	205,286	0.34
13	Idaho	224,029	67,464	291,493	138,637	0.48
14	Illinois	4,918,568	285,615	5,204,183	2,589,026	0.50
15	Indiana	1,885,403	183,154	2,068,557	901,980	0.44
16	Iowa	1,063,634	86,748	1,150,382	638,517	0.56
17	Kansas	635,928	107,817	743,745	399,276	0.54
18	Kentucky	1,432,555	121,985	1,554,540	638,898	0.41
19	Louisiana	1,764,252	103,473	1,867,725	792,344	0.42
20	Maine	472,534	46,678	519,212	319,951	0.62
21	Maryland	2,144,692	241,518	2,386,210	1,145,782	0.48
22	Massachusetts	2,809,199	209,834	3,019,033	1,616,487	0.54
23	Michigan	3,543,923	198,933	3,742,856	2,170,418	0.58
24	Minnesota	1,768,509	147,788	1,916,297	1,168,266	0.61
25	Mississippi	909,903	91,234	1,001,137	404,614	0.40
26	Missouri	1,909,277	187,691	2,096,968	1,111,138	0.53
27	Montana	232,812	42,411	275,223	137,126	0.50
28	Nebraska	415,693	59,717	475,410	231,780	0.49
29	Nevada	549,922	199,115	749,037	279,978	0.37
30	New Hampshire	351,110	73,102	424,212	266,348	0.63
31	New Jersey	2,872,312	248,431	3,120,743	1,788,850	0.57
32	New Mexico	524,725	83,470	608,195	286,783	0.47
33	New York	7,452,088	349,918	7,802,006	4,107,697	0.53
34	North Carolina	2,633,239	386,869	3,020,108	1,257,692	0.42
35	North Dakota	205,433	24,930	230,363	95,284	0.41
36	Ohio	3,907,680	242,645	4,150,325	2,186,190	0.53
37	Oklahoma	1,164,355	122,926	1,287,281	474,276	0.37
38	Oregon	1,128,784	169,948	1,298,732	720,342	0.55
39	Pennsylvania	4,429,671	287,262	4,716,933	2,485,967	0.53
40	Rhode Island	487,320	47,381	534,701	249,508	0.47
41	South Carolina	1,220,569	181,139	1,401,708	565,561	0.40
42	South Dakota	195,033	27,391	222,424	118,804	0.53
43	Tennessee	1,816,112	222,920	2,039,032	981,720	0.48
44	Texas	6,161,925	566,149	6,728,074	2,433,746	0.36
45	Utah	353,100	90,388	443,488	203,053	0.46
46	Vermont	198,881	30,231	229,112	149,022	0.65
47	Virginia	2,203,427	358,496	2,561,923	1,217,290	0.48
48	Washington	2,085,081	261,880	2,346,961	1,247,652	0.53
49	West Virginia	691,905	51,633	743,538	295,497	0.40
50	Wisconsin	2,029,967	142,501	2,172,468	1,242,987	0.57
51	Wyoming	101,509	26,380	127,889	60,481	0.47
					Mean	0.48
					Median	0.48

Sources: Calculated by author and Federal Election Commission (FEC)* (2000)

Table 3. Average Presidential Vote Margin by State (1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008)

		Average Republican Margin (%)	Average Democratic Margin (%)	Republican (Democratic) Margin	Classification
1	Alabama	57.3	40.1	17.3	RS
2	Alaska	57.5	33.6	23.9	RS
3	Arizona	51.0	45.2	5.8	RL
4	Arkansas	50.3	45.8	4.5	RL
5	California	40.3	55.0	-14.7	DS
6	Colorado	48.2	46.9	1.4	SWING
7	Connecticut	38.8	55.9	-17.1	DS
8	Delaware	40.3	55.5	-15.2	DS
9	Wash, D.C.	8.5	88.0	-79.5	DS
10	Florida	47.9	48.7	-0.9	SWING
11	Georgia	53.0	44.3	8.7	RL
12	Hawaii	35.2	59.6	-24.4	DS
13	Idaho	62.3	31.9	30.4	RS
14	Illinois	40.2	56.4	-16.2	DS
15	Indiana	53.2	42.9	10.2	RS
16	Iowa	45.6	50.5	-4.9	SWING
17	Kansas	57.7	37.9	19.8	RS
18	Kentucky	54.6	42.0	12.6	RS
19	Louisiana	51.9	44.8	7.2	RL
20	Maine	39.9	53.0	-13.1	DS
21	Maryland	39.5	57.2	-17.7	DS
22	Massachusetts	33.3	61.3	-27.9	DS
23	Michigan	43.3	52.9	-9.6	DL
24	Minnesota	43.0	51.0	-8.1	DL
25	Mississippi	55.6	41.9	13.7	RS
26	Missouri	48.6	47.5	1.1	SWING
27	Montana	52.8	40.1	12.7	RS
28	Nebraska	59.6	35.6	24.0	RS
29	Nevada	46.4	48.2	-1.8	SWING
30	New Hampshire	45.2	50.1	-4.9	SWING
31	New Jersey	41.0	55.0	-14.0	DS
32	New Mexico	45.3	50.8	-5.4	DL
33	New York	35.5	60.2	-24.7	DS
34	North Carolina	52.5	45.1	7.4	RL
35	North Dakota	55.9	38.3	17.6	RS
36	Ohio	47.2	48.5	-1.3	SWING
37	Oklahoma	59.9	36.9	23.0	RS
38	Oregon	43.3	50.6	-7.3	DL
39	Pennsylvania	44.7	51.3	-6.5	DL
40	Rhode Island	33.1	60.7	-27.6	DS
41	South Carolina	54.6	42.7	12.0	RS
42	South Dakota	55.0	40.9	14.0	RS
43	Tennessee	52.6	44.9	7.7	RL
44	Texas	56.1	40.9	15.2	RS
45	Utah	63.8	30.0	33.8	RS
46	Vermont	35.3	57.7	-22.5	DS
47	Virginia	49.9	46.9	3.0	SWING
48	Washington	42.0	52.6	-10.6	DS
49	West Virginia	50.1	45.7	4.4	RL
50	Wisconsin	44.4	50.6	-6.2	DL
51	Wyoming	62.8	31.5	31.3	RS
	>10%	Safe			
	5-10%	Lean			
	0-5%	Swing			

Source: Federal Election Commission (FEC) (1996-2008)

Table 4. Political Effectiveness of California Out-Migrants

California to:	Competitiveness Categorization	Demographic Effectiveness	Political Effectiveness Classification
Alaska	RS	-18.0	
Arizona	RL	-16.2	Strategic Cracking
DC	DS	33.9	
Georgia	RL	-17.6	Strategic Cracking
Hawaii	DS	17.9	
Idaho	RS	-26.7	
Indiana	RL	-15.7	Strategic Cracking
Kansas	RS	-24.2	
Montana	RL	-19.3	Strategic Cracking
Nebraska	RS	-25.5	
Nevada	DL	-15.8	Strategic Packing
North Dakota	RS	-18.5	
South Carolina	RS	-19.6	
South Dakota	RS	-24.4	
Texas	RS	-15.3	
Utah	RS	-32.1	
Wyoming	RS	-28.1	

Democratic Demographic Effectiveness
Republican Demographic Effectiveness

Source: Calculated by authors

Figure 1. States with Net Potential Democratic Out-Migration



Figure 2. States with Net Potential Republican Out-Migration



Figure 3. Partisan Net Migration Rate (NMR) w/ Yield



Figure 4. States with Democratic Gains

States with Democratic Gains			
		Net Republican Migration	
		In	Out
Net Democrat Migration	In	(1)	(2)
	Out		(4)

Figure 5. States with Democratic Gains

States with Republican Gains			
		Net Republican Migration	
		In	Out
Net Democrat Migration	In	(1)	
	Out	(3)	(4)

Figure 6. States with Democratic Gains

States with Democratic Gains			
		Net Republican Migration	
		In	Out
Net Democrat Migration	In	(1) AZ DE FL GA MS NV NC OR SC TN	(2) AL ID IN KS ME MT NE NH OK PA SD TX UT VT VA WY
	Out		(4) AK MD NJ NM ND OH

Figure 7: States with Republican Gains

States with Republican Gains			
		Net Republican Migration	
		In	Out
Net Democrat Migration	In	(1) CO KY MO WA	
	Out	(3) AR DC MA MN RI	(4) CA CT IL IA LA MI NY WV WI

Figure 8: Partisan Demographic Effectiveness



Figure 9: Packing and Cracking Matrix

Packing and Cracking Matrix

		Destination			
		Republican Safe (RS)	Republican Lean (RL)	Democratic Lean (DL)	Democratic Safe (DS)
Origin	Republican Safe (RS)		Strategic	Strategic	
	Republican Lean (RL)	Inefficient	Electoral Gamble	Electoral Gamble	Inefficient
	Democratic Lean (DL)	Inefficient	Electoral Gamble	Electoral Gamble	Inefficient
	Democratic Safe (DS)		Strategic	Strategic	

Cracking
Packing

Appendix 1. States with Majority Potential Democratic Identification



Appendix 2. States with Majority Potential Republican Identification



APPENDIX C

ARIZONA UNITED OR DIVIDED? POLITICAL STRATEGIES USED BY GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES IN ARIZONA'S SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROPOSITIONS 107 AND 102

Jason R. Jurjevich

Abstract
Same-sex marriage remains a preeminent issue in the culture war battle at the ballot box. Since Hawaii's temporary legalization of same-sex marriage in 1993, thirty-seven states have passed laws or constitutional amendments defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman. With eight of nine states passing same-sex marriage bans in 2006, Arizona's 2006 narrow defeat of Proposition 107 drew widespread national attention, as Arizona became the first U.S. state to defeat a same-sex marriage proposition. Yet, two years later, Arizona voters overwhelming passed Proposition 102, a similarly worded proposition restricting same-sex marriage. Because public opinion and vote choice are largely shaped through partisan cues, issue framing, messaging, and other discursive campaign tools (Smith 2005), this research echoes other political geographers who argue for interrogating the underlying context of the political environment in order to provide a situated and comprehensive framework for understanding political geography. Through a comparative analysis of Propositions 107 and 102, this research relies on semi-structured interviews with gay rights advocates from across Arizona and archival analysis of political media to examine the interrelationship of political strategies used by gay rights advocates in both campaigns to determine if and how political strategies changed between the rejection of Proposition 107 and the passage of Proposition 102.

Introduction

Political conflict over employment and housing non-discrimination protections, legal statutes for 'crimes against nature', and same-sex marriage have elevated gay rights as one of the most important cultural issues in the American political landscape today (Hull 2001, Wolfe 1999). Currently, a majority of states have banned same-sex marriage and/or domestic partnerships either through state legislation (37 states) or constitutional amendments (29 states) (NGLTF 2009). The increasing prevalence of voters determining the legality of anti-discrimination protection, domestic partner

provisions, and same-sex marriage through ballot propositions is critically important because voters are increasingly serving as arbiters of civil rights for gay and lesbian Americans.

The passage of constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage and/or domestic partnership in 29 states has been achieved through overwhelming voter support. In 2004, 13 of 13 states approved constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage by an average 79-21% margin, and in 2006, 8 of 9 states passed constitutional marriage amendments by an average 64-36% margin (Eagan and Sherrill 2006). Considering the broad and unequivocal opposition to same-sex marriage and domestic partnership across the U.S., Arizona voters' 2006 defeat of Proposition 107 (attempted to ban both same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships) sent shockwaves across the U.S. political landscape as Arizona became the first state to defeat such an amendment. However, just two years later in 2008, Arizona voters reversed themselves and passed Proposition 102 (banning only same-sex marriage) by over 12%. Relying on these two propositions as case studies, this research provides important insight for understanding the nuances of political campaigns (particularly same-sex marriage campaigns) by specifically addressing the interrelationship and underlying context of political strategies used by gay rights advocates.

Underlying the 52-48% rejection of Proposition 107 and 56-44% passage of Proposition 102 are significant socio-demographic and geographic differences in voting patterns. Table 1 provides official election results by county and socio-demographic exit poll data for Propositions 107 and 102. Exit poll data suggest notable differences

between age and educational attainment categories *and* across election periods, while county-level election results demonstrate a clear and ubiquitous geographical variability across Arizona counties. While explaining geographic and socio-demographic variability in voting patterns through macro quantitative (cartographic and statistical) analyses provides broad insight into the political, social, and demographic dimensions of voting patterns [e.g. Shelley (2002), Webster (2002), O'Reilly and Webster (1998)], it generally neglects the underlying *processes* that shape political behavior. Therefore, contemporary political geographers [e.g. O'Loughlin (2003), Shin (1997), Agnew (1996)] argue that traditional electoral geography fails to consider the 'spatial situatedness of human action' and argue for a contextual approach, which considers how discursive social, economic, political processes affect political behavior and more importantly, how processes play out differently across political space. This is particularly important for Propositions 107 and 102 because beyond vote totals lies a patchwork of highly non-uniform, nuanced, and disparate political strategies across Arizona. Therefore, this research approaches the topographical variability of political phenomena through a qualitative approach by specifically examining the underlying context and basis of campaign strategies used by Arizona gay rights advocates in 2006 and 2008.

The importance of this research is couched in the fact that because public opinion is not a naturally determined variable and is shaped through discursive political cues, media framing, and political messaging of political campaigns, it is imperative to examine the geographic context of political strategies and assess how local context influences political strategy and local voting constituencies (Smith 2005, Donovan,

Wenzel, and Bowler 2000). Additionally, this research provides a more comprehensive understanding of 'on-the-ground' political processes by examining the dialectical relationship between public opinion/vote choice and political strategies.

One of the primary reasons gay rights advocates were able to defeat Proposition 107 was because its authors of the proposition, the Center for Arizona Policy (CAP), broadly structured the proposed amendment not only to restrict same-sex marriage, but to also prevent Arizona from sanctioning both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partnerships. By incorporating both same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships into the language of Proposition 107, CAP allowed Arizona Together (AT), the largest gay rights campaign organization opposing Proposition 107, to execute a unique and unconventional political strategy emphasizing the potential loss of domestic partner benefits for heterosexual couples and avoiding framing the proposition as a civil and gay rights issue (Geis 2006).

While many political observers credit the unorthodox political strategy as the underlying reason for the defeat of Proposition 107, many gay rights advocates were sharply divided over the political strategy of the AT campaign. Citing opposition to AT political strategies, gay rights advocates primarily based in Tucson, formed a separate organization called No on Proposition 107 in 2006 (Burbank 2007). In an April 2007 article, Kent Burbank, former Executive Director of Wingspan, a Gay Lesbian Bisexual Transgendered (GLBT) community organization in Tucson, AZ, articulated concerns of many gay rights advocates, who were concerned with the organizational structure of the AT campaign and strongly disagreed with AT campaign messaging focusing on

heterosexual couples. "Many Arizonans, and I count myself among them, felt that this tactic was not only harmful in the long run, but could potentially backfire," (Burbank 2007, p. 3). Unlike the broad language of Proposition 107, Proposition 102 specifically targeted same-sex marriage and subsequently prevented Arizona Together from reinstituting their 2006 message targeted towards elderly heterosexual partners.

As both Proposition 107 and 102 illustrate, divergent political strategies were executed across political space and election periods and likely produced varied effects on local voting constituencies across Arizona. Using a comparative case study of Propositions 107 and 102, this research explores the underlying context of political strategies in order to consider the basis for differences in strategies and examine how strategies differ across the state's geography. Specifically, this research analyzes the context of political strategies in terms of message framing and strategy operationalization to determine: 1) if the 2006 campaign against Proposition 107 influenced political strategies for opposing Proposition 102 in 2008 and 2) if so, how were political strategies similar or different for gay rights advocates' successful defeat of Proposition 107 compared to the unsuccessful campaign against Proposition 102? Insight gleaned from this research speaks broadly to both gay rights and political strategy literatures because it provides a situated framework for understanding political movements. Additionally, the study contributes to the geographic literature by demonstrating and underscoring the importance of local environment for examining electoral geography.

Literature Review

Citizenship and Marriage

The primary way the state provides individuals in an intimate and committed relationship with legal and political rights, social acceptance, and public validation is through civil marriage. One of the most significant landmark legal cases regarding civil marriage is *Loving v. Virgina* (1967), where the state of Virginia defended its law excluding racial miscegenation by arguing that it 'furthered a rational state interest' and therefore, was not a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Brandzel 2005). In finding the anti-miscegenation law unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion declaring that marriage is a Constitutional right and that 'marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man' and a 'fundamental freedom' (Dupuis 2002). By virtue of the U.S. government sanctioning more than 1,049 rights and obligations for married individuals and with significant political, legal, social, and cultural implications, the state has a long history of strictly defining, policing, and 'safeguarding' marriage (Phy-Olsen 2006, Brandzel 2005, Richardson 1998).

History of the Courts

The earliest venue for challenging the exclusionary nature of marriage was through the courts. In 1971, Richard John Baker and James Michael McConnell, two gay student activists at the University of Minnesota, applied for, and were subsequently denied a marriage license by Gerald Nelson, clerk for the U.S. District Court in Hennepin County (Dupuis 2002). The significance of *Baker v. Nelson* (1971 and 1972) is

that Baker and McConnell were the first to provide a substantive Constitutional defense that paved the way for further legal protestation

[1] by arguing that excluding same-sex couples from state sanctioned marriage was a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Dupuis 2002). Not until 1991, with unassuming origins similar to preceding cases, three same-sex Hawaiian couples applied for and were subsequently denied marriage licenses. The three same-sex couples filed a legal suit (*Baehr v. Lewin* 1993) on the basis of gender discrimination. The case was initially dismissed by a lower circuit court. The plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision to the Hawaii Supreme Court, which vacated the circuit court dismissal and unequivocally ruled that the state's denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples constituted gender discrimination and violated the equal rights amendment of the Hawaiian Constitution[2]. This decision provided same-sex couples with their first landmark legal victory (Phy-Olsen 2006, Hull 2001).

In addition to the fact that the *Baehr v. Lewin* (1993) case is often regarded as the genesis of the contemporary gay rights movement because it prompted additional challenges[3] to civil marriage laws, it also generated considerable outrage among many

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[1] Following *Baker v. Nelson* (1972), *Jones v. Hallahan* (1973), *Singer v. Hara* (1974), *Adams v. Howerton* (1982), and *DeSanto v. Barnsley* (1984) challenged marriage laws using legal defenses predicated on violation of the equal protection clause, but courts continued to rule that unlike age, gender, race, and other federally protected categories, sexual orientation was not a protected classification, especially with respect to marriage.

[2] The case returned to court under *Baehr v. Miike* (1996) and U.S. circuit court Judge Kevin Chang ruled that the state unconvincingly established a reason for denying same-sex couples the right to marry and that same-sex couples had a fundamental right to civil marriage (Goldberg-Hiller 2004).

[3] Several cases, including: *Baker v. State* (1999), *Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health* (2003), *Lewis v. Harris* (2006), and *Varnum v. Brien* (2009) are examples of successful legal challenges using the Baehr template to articulate a lucid argument for providing all citizens with access same-sex marriage rights or domestic partner recognition in Vermont, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Iowa, respectively.

religious conservatives who believed that same-sex marriage was likely to become legally sanctioned unless proactive ('defensive') legislation or constitutional provisions were enacted. As a result, one of the first major effects following *Baehr v. Lewin* (1993) was the sponsorship and passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996 (Grindstaff 2003). DOMA has two important clauses with direct implications for same-sex marriage: 1) no state is forced to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states and 2) the federal government, including all agencies, defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman (Phy-Olsen 2006, Dupuis 2002). Until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of DOMA, its status as federal law grants states the right to determine the legality of same-sex marriage.

State Propositions

Figure 1 illustrates that in the aftermath of the *Baehr* decision in 1993, 37 states passed either state laws or constitutional amendments restricting same-sex marriage and forms of domestic partnership. Currently, 41 states have statutes or constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage and 25 states restrict same-sex marriage and other forms of domestic partnership (NGLTF 2009). Figure 1 also demonstrates that state political leaders largely passed legislative statues restricting same-sex marriage or domestic partnerships during the mid to late 1990s as a swift and immediate response to the *Baehr* decision. With gays and lesbians increasingly challenging the constitutionality of state statues, conservative political leaders rallied support for passing constitutional amendments during the early 2000s to 'protect the sanctity of marriage'. Voter support for constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships

has been overwhelming. The average margin of victory for constitutional amendments was 71-29% and 64-36% in 2004, and 2006, respectively (Egan and Sherrill 2006). Table 2 summarizes the number and percentage of votes for and against same-sex marriage bans across individual states, with propositions passing by an average 63-37% vote margin (CNN 2008 and NGLTF 2006).

Following the temporary legalization of same-sex marriage in Hawaii in 1996, the 1998 election marked the beginning of voters determining the constitutionality of same-sex marriage through proposed state constitutional amendments. Hawaii's Amendment Two (1998) is documented in the literature as the first significant chasm between courts and voters since Hawaiian voters overwhelmingly approved a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in 1998 by a 70-30% margin (Goldberg-Hiller 2004). Of particular interest to this research, however, are the underlying political strategies of the primary statewide gay advocacy organization organized against Amendment Two, called Protect Our Constitution (POC). POC assembled a broad coalition, including the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), League of Women Voters, Japanese American Citizens League, the American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii, and various religious groups (Haider-Markel 2000). As a result of a diverse coalition, the campaign had to manage widely divergent opinions regarding political strategies. In order to establish an underlying foundation for the campaign's political strategies, POC leadership unified its members by developing consensus that polling results gauging voter opinion would provide structure for designing, implementing, and transmitting the campaign message (Hull 2001).

According to polling and focus group research conducted by POC, Hawaiian voters felt homosexuals should have equal rights to heterosexuals, but the 'gay lifestyle' and same-sex marriage were highly unacceptable. These results underscored the importance of articulating a message that addressed 'minority rights' and avoided mentioning 'gay rights'. As a result, POC distanced itself from gay and lesbian civil rights and framed the campaign message by focusing on the disenfranchisement of Japanese American citizens in internment camps during World War II (Goldberg-Hiller 2004, Hull 2001). The carefully crafted messaging strategy backfired as the pro-Amendment Two organization argued that POC intended to confuse voters with its convoluted message (Hull 2001). Additionally, POC was severely criticized from its own gay and lesbian campaign volunteers who argued the group distanced itself from gay and lesbian civil rights issues (Hull 2001). A Hawaiian lesbian summarizes her problems with the POC campaign: "I have a hard time explaining it to some friends and family. What does the internment camp have to do with marriage? I was uptight trying to explain it because…it was very heady and conceptually elegant, but not very simple." (Goldberg-Hiller 2004, p. 200).

The preceding quote underscores a pervasive inconsistency among gay activists that is largely unexamined in the scholarly literature. While supporters of same-sex marriage are generally unified in their desire to defeat same-sex marriage bans, they often disagree over appropriate political strategies. For example, in Hawaii, supporters of same-sex marriage vehemently disagreed on appropriate message framing, which resulted in a clash over competing discourses (Hull 2001). Using 'elite' and 'non-elite'

binaries to distinguish between campaign leaders and rank-and-file participants, respectively, Hull (2001) found 'elite' actors (and subsequently, most campaigns) framed same-sex marriage with a broad, more generally accepted, and a slightly more conservative discourse of 'civil rights'. Alternatively, 'non-elite' actors fought for messages of 'tolerance and acceptance'. These competing political strategies highlight a fragmentation within the gay community based on competing political philosophies that appears to be rooted in philosophical differences that date back to the genesis of the gay civil rights movement.

Assimilation and Liberation Philosophies

> Like social movements of women or Afro-Americans, the gay and lesbian movement is no unitary phenomenon, but rather a collection of diverse social groups, competing schools of thought, and evolving debates over fundamental questions of who homosexually interested people are and what the objectives of the movement should be (Adam 1995, p. 145).

'Competing schools of thought' within the gay civil rights movement dates back to Harry Hay's founding of the Mattachine Society in 1950 and the social activism initiated by the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) during the Stonewall era of the late 1960s and 1970s. Both organizations are critically important in establishing, organizing, and building the modern gay rights movement through two fundamentally different theoretical frameworks that are still relevant today—assimilationist and liberationist ideologies.

Considering the extensive history of the gay civil rights movement and theoretical ideologies, for purposes of this research the focus is on the political strategies employed by both ideologies to achieve their political objectives. Rimmerman (2000, p.

54) succinctly describes, characterizes, and emphasizes the distinct political strategies used by assimilationists and liberationists:

> In recent years, the lesbian and gay movement (assimilationism) has embraced a narrow form of identity politics that is rooted in a top-down, hierarchical approach that embraces the language and framework of liberal democratic institutions, interest group liberalism, and pluralist democracy. In doing so, there have been increasing conflicts among those who consider themselves assimilationists, who typically embrace 'insider' political strategies, and liberationists, who are often associated with 'outsider' and grassroots political strategies.

Employing broad messaging targeted to the broad voting electorate and pursuing 'insider' political strategies, often characterized as 'top-down' and 'hierarchical', allows assimilationists to achieve their larger political objective, which involves changing the social identity of the gay movement by making it more conservative, mainstream, and building a 'communal middle-class character' in order to achieve social, political, and legal assimilation (Epstein 1999, p. 43). Alternatively, liberationists tend to employ 'activist', 'grassroots', and 'outsider' political strategies, including demonstrations, protests, boycotts, and engaging in public displays of affection, as a way to destabilize heteronormativity and reject the mainstream political processes used by assimilationists[4] (Adam 2003, Bell and Binnie 2000, p. 40).

The recapitulation of political strategies used by assimilationists and liberationists is critically important because understanding whether/how ideological orientation influences political strategies is an important consideration. Rimmerman's (2000) characterization of political strategies for assimilationists and liberationists,

[4] Liberationists are highly skeptical of assimilation into society because they argue that "access to the system becomes far more important than the actual treatment of gays and lesbians within the system," (Rimmerman 2000, p. 51) and that the boundaries of acceptance "can be expanded and contracted at political whim" (Bell and Binnie 2000, p. 39).

combined with Hull's (2001) use of 'elite' and 'non-elite' binaries to explain differences in political strategies between campaign leaders and rank-and-file volunteers, respectively, form an important basis for postulating reasons for divergent political strategies employed by gay rights advocates in Propositions 107 and 102. Specifically, this research relies on the literature to posit that the AT campaign pursued a hierarchical or top-down method organizational structure and broad-based messaging appealing to the larger voting electorate as a result of assimilationist or 'elite' ideologies. Alternatively, the Tucson-based No on Proposition 107 (102) campaigns largely pursued a grassroots organizational structure and activist strategies that developed messaging to advance gay civil rights issues because of liberationist and 'non-elite' ideologies.

Situatedness within Electoral and Political Geography

Same-sex marriage and gay rights propositions have been ubiquitous across state political landscapes since the 1980s and scholars have generally examined the topic through three main axes: 1) documenting the trend as it occurred throughout the U.S. and the world [e.g. Smith (2005), Lewis (2005), and Adam (2003)]; 2) quantitatively assessing political, demographic, and social variables underlying voting outcomes [e.g. Chapman et al. (2007), Smith et al. (2006), Soule (2004), Barclay and Fisher (2003), O'Reilly and Webster (1998), and Ormond and Cole (1996)]; and 3) qualitatively analyzing political strategies used by opponents of same-sex marriage bans to understand how discourses of race, class, and sexuality are constructed in elections [e.g. Brown et al. (2005), Hull (2001), and Levin (1997)].

While the salience of gay rights has generated considerable interest among political scientists and electoral geographers, much of the research is traditional electoral scholarship—relying on quantitative regression models and traditional electoral cleavages to examine political, social, and demographic dimensions of same-sex marriage issues [e.g. Mellow and Trubowitz (2005), Heppen (2003), Shelley (2002), Webster (2002), O'Reilly and Webster (1998), Ormond and Cole (1996) and Webster (1989)]. For example, O'Reilly and Webster (1998) highlight three findings relating to three anti-gay rights referenda in Oregon (1988, 1992, and 1994): 1) support for referenda was higher in rural areas, 2) 'traditionalist' counties supported referenda more often than 'modernist' counties, and 3) mean voter support was higher among Republicans. These findings confirm what electoral geographers and political scientists already know and provide little that is new regarding the underlying context of the vote. As a result, Michael Shin (1997, p. 138) [see also Johnston (2005)] and other contemporary electoral scholars have heavily criticized traditional electoral geography by suggesting that:

> Electoral geography needs to move beyond the identification of variable or dimensions that help explain geographical patterns on a map. Evaluating and identifying the *processes* behind the construction and shaping of political attitudes, and how and why such processes vary over space and time, will contribute much more to the future development of electoral geography than simple correlates of compositional categories and votes.

The quote by Shin (1997) echoes Agnew (1996) and other contemporary electoral scholars' [Johnston (2005), O'Loughlin (2003)] call for a contextual approach. A contextual approach examines how discursive social, economic, political processes affect

political behavior and perhaps more importantly, how processes play out differently across political space (Agnew 1996). Additionally, a contextual approach often provides a more thorough understanding of how local environments affect voting patterns and also provides a situated framework for understanding political movements (Brown et al. 2005, O'Loughlin 2003, Shin 1997, Agnew 1996, Johnston et al. 1990). A contextual approach is even more critical for this type of research because studies have shown that campaigns play a critical role by shaping public opinion (and subsequently vote choice) through discursive political cues, media framing, and political messaging (Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000).

Methodology

Semi-Structured Interviews and Archival Analysis

Political campaigns often rely on a diverse collection of political strategies to influence public opinion and convince voters to vote in the campaign's interest. Research by Burbank (2007), Geis (2006), and others suggest most of the debate over political strategy in Arizona involved disparate perspectives surrounding organizational practice and messaging. Specifically, organizational practice for Arizona campaigns differed materially along the following axes: different stakeholder groups, hierarchical versus grassroots organizational structures, and the relationship between political philosophy and established goals. And in terms of messaging, both Tucson and Phoenix campaigns utilized considerably different messaging—notably between election periods (2006 and 2008). Therefore, this research examines the underlying context of political strategies through organizational practice and messaging: first, political strategy includes the discursive power of messaging and framing used to influence public

opinion and convince voters to vote in the campaign's interest; and secondly, political strategy also involves the organizational practice of the campaign and how the campaign operationalizes its strategy both to deliver its message and win the campaign.

In order to examine organizational practice and messaging, I rely on data from 30 semi-structured interviews of gay and lesbian campaign leaders and operatives involved with Arizona Together and No on Propositions 107/102 in 2006 and 2008. A core group of 14 campaign leaders were first selected as participants based on direct knowledge of the campaigns and through snowball sampling, 16 additional individuals participated based on recommendations from campaign leaders.

Using semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions, participants were asked questions regarding organizational affiliation, campaign role, and impressions regarding organizational practice and messaging. Semi-structured interviews are most appropriate to avoid the introduction of pre-determined categorizations and simultaneously allow the researcher to investigate complex issues and collect information regarding personal opinions and experience in the political campaign (Dunn 2005). Figure 2 provides the basic questions asked in each interview.

Interview data were analyzed and coded according to differences identified through preliminary research, as well as the findings of Burbank (2007) and Geis (2006) and other campaigns [see Eagan and Sherill (2005), Adam (2003), and Hull (2001)]. With organizational practice and messaging being the primary factors underlying much of the debate over political strategy, interview data were coded separately for each axis. A key advantage of presenting results in this way is that it allows for examining the

interrelationship between the two factors and provides added comparative detail of each factor between election periods and across geography. Specifically, the facets of organizational practice were coded across two categories: 1) established goals and political perspective and 2) organizational structure. Similarly, the underlying context of messaging was examined through two categories: 1) the use of polling research to measure public opinion and messaging, 2) constructing and framing the message.

Another methodological technique for examining message framing and operationalized political strategy involves textual analysis (Lutz and Collins 1993). By examining political media, including: policy briefs, press statements, campaign plans, advertisements, political speeches, and other campaign literature, textual analysis allows for understanding how political messaging and organizational practice was similar or different across election periods and gay rights organizations (Cope 2005, Tonkiss 1998). Additionally, data from archival documents serve another important function; they serve as a way to substantiate data provided by interview participants (Fairclough 2003). Together, semi-structured interviews and textual analysis of campaign documents are important empirical methods for examining differences in political strategies and answering the call for increased attention to context by Shin (1997) and other political geographers.

Results

Following the November 2004 election when 13 of 13 states passing constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, the Center for Arizona Policy (CAP), an official state policy council for Dr. James Dobson's evangelical organization

Focus on the Family, began collecting signatures for a 2006 ballot initiative to approve a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in Arizona. In 2008, however, Proposition 102 was approved in a fundamentally different way. Under Arizona law, the State House of Representatives and State Senate can approve a ballot proposition through a simple majority vote. With Republicans controlling both legislative houses, CAP was able to secure approval in June 2008. Consequently, while gay rights advocates had almost two years to organize against Proposition 107 in 2006, CAP's delayed legislative strategy in 2008 severely undermined the campaign by providing slightly more than 4 months to organize.

In addition to conservatives using fundamentally different methods to approve propositions for the ballot, the language of the propositions was equally critical in determining campaign strategies used by gay rights advocates. With Proposition 107 in 2006, CAP used broad language so to prevent the state from sanctioning same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships. Alternatively, with Proposition 102 in 2008, CAP refined the language of the proposition to only restrict same-sex marriage. As demonstrated in the results below, the timing and language of each proposition played a critically important role in determining political strategy.

Strategy Operationalization—Established Goals and Political Perspective

Founded as a non-permanent organization by openly gay former Arizona State Representative Steve May (R-Phoenix) in December 2004, Arizona Together (AT) served as the state's exclusive opposition to Proposition 107. After establishing AT in late 2004, May appointed relatively unknown freshman and openly gay Arizona State

Representative Kyrsten Sinema (D-Phoenix) as Chairperson of AT. Beginning in early 2005, May and Sinema invited volunteers from across Arizona to attend organizational planning meetings to design the campaign's infrastructure. One of the earliest and most important goals involved forming a statewide campaign steering committee comprised of gay rights advocates. In order to ensure representation from across the state, volunteers were invited from Phoenix, Tucson, Yuma, Prescott, and Flagstaff. Largely reflective of the state's population, the majority of steering committee members were from Phoenix and Tucson. Committee members from Phoenix were generally AT campaign leaders or fundraising volunteers while the majority Tucson committee members were affiliated with Wingspan—a gay and lesbian community center providing social services to residents of Tucson.

On May 17, 2005, the AT campaign steering committee held an organizational meeting in Casa Grande, AZ to establish comprehensive organizational principles and develop a strategic plan for the campaign. According to May and Sinema, they recognized the Casa Grande meeting as one of the most important events of the 2006 campaign. The meeting had two primary objectives: 1) establish agreed-upon principles and goals that would serve as a codified doctrine for the duration of the campaign and 2) institute a democratic process for making decisions according to consensus among steering committee members. The combined effect of achieving these objectives would create a 'built in system of accountability' when the campaign presented individuals with difficult strategic decisions (—Author's field notes, 2009).

Figure 2 details semi-structured questions asked of interview participants. Interview data demonstrated widely divergent perspectives regarding established goals and agreed-upon principles of the campaign, particularly beginning with the Casa Grande meeting, which were largely based on geography—specifically between Phoenix and Tucson activists. Interview participants directly affiliated with AT *and* based in Phoenix consistently cited three fundamental tenets that were voted and agreed upon by the steering committee at the Casa Grande meeting: 1) the sole objective of the campaign was to defeat Proposition 107; 2) campaign decisions were only to be determined according to polling research; and 3) the campaign would maintain 'discipline' by strictly adhering to agreed upon principles determined by consensus voting. A leader of AT recounted agreed-upon principles from the Casa Grande meeting:

> In the meeting in Casa Grande, we used a consensus-style decision making process…and we voted on three things: 1) we took time to define what we meant by 'win' because as you know, many campaigns define 'win' as something other than a numerical win. This group specifically defined win as 'we get more votes on than the other guy on election day'; And, 2) we agreed to run a professional campaign…which meant we would raise enough money to hire experts to run the campaign for us, so that means that we would hire folks to do the polling, we would hire professional media people to tell us what to say and when to say it and what to look like when we did it; And, 3) we would be very disciplined, which means that we would, and we specifically defined 'disciplined' as saying that we would make all of our decisions based on data, so if the polling said, 'don't say 'X', say 'Y', we would all do that, even if we personally didn't like it or didn't agree with it. —('Betty', personal interview, 2009)

Evidence from archival analysis of campaign documents supports 'Betty's' claim. There were no AT planning strategy campaign documents that detailed other campaign goals beyond achieving more votes than the opposition. Conversely, Figure 3 details

'secondary internal and external' goals established by Tucson volunteers in the month preceding the founding of No on Proposition 107 (June 2006). The top portion of Figure 3 states, "Although we plan to defeat the amendment, we have all agreed that we need to enunciate 'secondary goals' for the campaign. This way, we can claim victory regardless of the vote." Additionally, the discursive language of the goals, including: building a progressive coalition, increase activism, build an 'awareness campaign', empower GLBT youth, and fostering a climate of 'dignity and inclusiveness' substantiates Tucsonans pursuance of social movement-related goals in addition to defeating Proposition 107.

Interviews with several Tucson activists suggest demonstrably different perspectives, particularly regarding how the campaign defined 'win' and appropriate strategies to achieve a 'win'. Several Tucsonans argued that the strategy executed by the AT campaign, described as 'win at all costs', was never agreed upon by the steering committee. Instead, they contend the steering committee agreed on a 'win-forward strategy'[5] that would provide the campaign with a path to defeating Proposition 107 in a way that would not further fragment the state's gay community. For example, a gay rights advocate from Tucson recalls a discussion regarding the 'win-forward' strategy:

> At that point, they were involved and their recollections of the meeting and our recollections are very different. This was the beginning of what we said was going to get a democratic process and they kept coming back and I remember them saying, 'Well, we agreed at that meeting that it was

[5] The 'win-forward strategy' is a modification of the original 'lose-forward strategy', developed by civil rights attorney and Executive Director of the Freedom to Marry organization, Evan Wolfson. Wolfson developed the strategy as a response to demoralizing losses suffered by same-sex marriage advocates in 2004 when 13 of 13 states passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage (—Author's field notes, 2009). Wolfson's strategy proposed that gay rights advocates redefine victory; instead of defining victory as defeating a proposed amendment, recognize the likelihood of a campaign loss and alternatively define victory in terms of strengthening community organizations, improving leadership, or advancing voter education of GLBT issues.

> a win it no matter what strategy.' And we were like, 'Well, yeah, we talked about that we were gonna win it, but it wasn't at any cost'. (—'Charles', personal interview, 2009)

Alternatively, a campaign leader from Phoenix responds differently when asked about the 'win-forward strategy': "That's false. Absolutely not. The decision was to win and that is it. This whole 'win-forward', that is, that's changing history by people who fucked things up in the campaign. It was to win." (—'Benjamin', personal interview, 2009)

Results indicate that dissension over campaign goals and strategy is largely a consequence of highly diverse stakeholders with contrasting political perspectives and varied levels of knowledge regarding political campaigns. Most of the AT campaign leadership and Phoenix advocates were politicians, experienced political consultants, and well-established professionals who viewed the AT campaign as a temporary organization formed with a primary goal of defeating Proposition 107. Alternatively, most stakeholders from Tucson were volunteer community activists affiliated with Wingspan and possessed extensive knowledge of grassroots political strategies, but generally unfamiliar with the nuances of political campaigns. Unlike many AT advocates from Phoenix, Tucson activists generally had long-term goals beyond defeating Proposition 107 including implementing strategies that would allow for pursuing GLBT social justice issues. A GLBT community leader and a Tucson activist address the fundamental differences between Phoenix and Tucson stakeholders, respectively:

> On the one hand you are talking to organizations who are invested in the long-term effects of political campaigns, so paying it forward is of

> interest, winning a campaign—I think they understand fundamentally. But then you have political strategists on the other side of the table who are just in it for that single campaign and any future impact that the campaign may have is not on their radar screen, at all. They only have one impact in mind—that's to win the campaign and that's what they're there to do. But when you bring other people to the table who have a vested interest in winning the campaign, they also bring with them a more long-term strategy in terms of the outcomes and impacts of that campaign. (—'Helen', personal interview, 2009)

> When we're working, we want to think not only in terms of the campaign in front of us, but also a longer range view about, 'how can we use this campaign to do things that we think are important and positive things for the community. (—'Pamela', personal interview, 2009)

And AT campaign professionals further illustrate the fundamental differences in political perspective between the two stakeholder groups:

> A campaign organization is a temporary entity; it goes away thirty days after the election, after all the bills are paid, whereas some of the stakeholder groups clearly were permanent in their nature and had a long-term agenda. Laudable, understandable. We had a campaign to win. We weren't trying to build a movement. To me a campaign should be part of a movement, but it can't be the movement. (—'Brian', personal interview, 2009)

> The Tucson folks were doing what I think is very healthy in terms of a long-term vision for equality, which is: 'look, let's just focus on our end result, what do we want? In the long-term, we want equality. Now, how are we going to get there? We are going to take steps to educate the community, we understand that in the short-term we may have to suffer some losses, but we're looking down the road.' That is an important and valuable part of all activist movements—we have to have those people, we need them. Then there's another part about the short-term election and these people are like, 'I want to fucking win, and I want to win because winning is great and losing sucks.' These folks believe a short-term win helps advance the long-term goal, but their job is to achieve a short-term win and that's what they want to do. (—'Betty', personal interview, 2009)

Divergence in agreed-upon principles and campaign objectives between stakeholder groups culminated with AT Tucson volunteers pursuing alternative

campaign strategies (Figure 3) for what was a fundamentally different campaign. For leaders of the AT campaign, pursuing strategies and messaging outside of the principles established at the Casa Grande meeting represented something more imminent—a conceivable and realistic threat for undermining the AT campaign. The messaging feud reached its peak after the Casa Grande meeting, when several Tucson volunteers sent an e-mail on behalf of the AT campaign to a Southern Arizona coalition listserv that among other things, included information about 'gay marriage' and used messaging outside of the agreed-upon principles established at the Casa Grande meeting. After receiving the e-mail as a member of the listserv, AT Chairperson Kyrsten Sinema consulted with campaign attorneys and issued a legal cease and desist order for 7 Tucson volunteers for transmitting unauthorized messaging on behalf of the campaign (—Author's field notes, 2009). With several months of the cease and desist order, Tucson volunteers responded by forming a separate organization called No on Proposition 107. The following section provides a detailed examination of the differences in organizational structure between Arizona Together and No on Proposition 107/102.

Strategy Operationalization—Organizational Structure

Unlike most traditional political campaigns, the highly diverse group of stakeholders affiliated with the AT campaign made it difficult to establish consensus regarding agreed-upon principles and campaign objectives. Based on interview data, AT campaign leadership anticipated some cynicism, debate, and disagreement among stakeholders—largely according to a Phoenix-Tucson schism. Broadly and especially in terms of politics, Phoenix and Tucson have a deep and complex adversarial relationship

that has resulted in considerable distrust and skepticism, particularly among Tucsonans. Despite the attempt by AT campaign leadership to diffuse these issues by facilitating a democratic decision-making process at planning meetings in order to establish trust and promote ownership in the campaign, some Tucson activists argued (both in 2006 and 2008) that a more progressive political constituency in Southern Arizona required tailored grassroots strategies and others argued it justified creating a separate campaign. This antagonistic relationship proved especially problematic and was the material obstacle for AT in terms of running a unified statewide campaign.

The argument for grassroots strategies in Southern Arizona was based on a prevailing criticism among Tucson activists; many accused the AT campaign of being 'hierarchical' with decision making power concentrated in the hands of Kyrsten Sinema and Steve May. Participants from Tucson provided the following descriptions as context for characterizing the AT campaign as hierarchical: 'one-time campaign', 'one issue', 'top-down', 'my way or the highway organization', 'Maricopa centric', and 'very small with Kyrsten Sinema and Steve May making all of the decisions' (—Author's field notes, 2009). A Tucson activist and a GLBT community leader provide their impressions of the AT organizational structure, respectively:

> I think our intention was that the statewide organizing would be done in a democratic kind of way with input from everyone and decision making from everyone and what ended up happening, unfortunately, was that the folks in Phoenix really, I think, saw their, saw that organization, AT, as being kind of a top-down, I guess kind of typical campaign organization where there was a couple of people at the top making the decisions and then kind of troops. (—'Pamela', personal interview, 2009)

> Once AT took over, they created a decision-making process that excluded all of those partners. We were, we were informed if you will of, 'here's

> what's happening with the campaign, we still need to raise more money.' There was no consultation or advice or decision-making, there was no room for input. (—'Helen', personal interview, 2009)

The primary factor underlying the formation of No on Proposition 107 (2006) and a continued separate campaign in 2008 (No on Proposition 102) was not widespread contempt towards the AT campaign for its 'hierarchal' and 'exclusive' organizational structure. Instead, many Tucson activists called for, and characterized No on Proposition 107/102, as grassroots organizations more 'appropriately structured' for Southern Arizona. Specific organizational strategies cited by Tucson activists as 'grassroots' include: 'much more on the ground', 'more decentralized', 'calls for general meetings and community input', 'phone banking', 'walking door-to-door', and 'back to old-school tactics' (—Author's field notes, 2009).

> We tried down here to do what we thought was appropriate for a campaign in Tucson, which was very grassroots and doing a lot of reaching out to allies, and building alliances, and you know, knew that we weren't going to raise a ton of money. We understood that Phoenix sort of saw organizing differently in terms of raising a lot of money and running TV primarily. We also felt it was important for us to do what we felt was the right thing to do here, in Tucson, and we ended up with a real clash about that. (—'Pamela', personal interview, 2009)

Leaders and volunteers of the AT campaign defended the organizational structure as necessary for executing a disciplined campaign strategy. One of the leaders of the AT campaign boasts about the AT campaign organizational model:

> We're delighted the way the campaign ran. It's a model for what we like to do. So to those that were on the outside, yeah, they could all say it's hierarchical and close to the chest and exclusive and closed doors and all that kind of stuff. Or you can be professional about it. (—'Brian', personal interview, 2009)

The constant criticism by many Tucson activists led to resentment and animosity by many AT volunteers, particularly in the wake of what was thought of as 'agreed-upon' principles and goals established at the Casa Grande meeting:

> After May, we were campaigning and the difference is, 'hey guys, we made a decision already, shut the fuck up and get in line, this is what we're doing, this is where we're going, you already agreed to do it and we're going that way, there's no second guessing this, you want to second guess it, then just go home'. This is our mission and we can't just sit around like a bunch of nattering-nay-bobs and just have a conversation again and just drink tea and think that makes a difference. It doesn't. (—'Benjamin', personal interview, 2009)

Messaging—Polling Research for Public Opinion and Messaging

Polling research played a critically important role for establishing legitimacy and support for the AT campaign. In January 2005, the AT campaign hired Celinda Lake, a nationally recognized pollster who had extensive familiarity with same-sex marriage propositions in Western states. In a memo dated February 15, 2005, Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates released polling results[6] providing findings critical to campaign strategy. First, Arizona voters strongly supported an amendment defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman by 60-30% with 10% undecided. However, when asked about 'expanded' amendments also banning relationships other than marriage, only 48% of Arizona voters supported such a proposition. Secondly, the polling also demonstrated weak support among the Arizona electorate for same-sex marriage (20%) and most voters held strongly negative attitudes towards same-sex marriage (Lake,

[6] A survey of 500 registered voters, age 18 and older, who voted in the 2004 election and were almost certain of voting in the 2006 election. Margin of error is +/- 4.4%.

Snell, Perry, and Associates 2005). An additional poll[7] funded by AT found similar results with 60% of Arizona voters opposing initiatives that included domestic partnerships in the ban (Wright 2005). Polling data clearly demonstrated a realistic possibility for defeating Proposition 107 through specific messaging frames.

Polling research from the 2006 campaign was explicitly clear in formulating an articulate and persuadable macro message. According to focus groups and polling research conducted in early 2005, Arizona voters were particularly concerned that Proposition 107 would weaken heterosexual domestic partnerships, affect private companies' ability to recruit and retain talent, and jeopardize hospital visitation and emergency medical decision rights currently afforded to unmarried couples (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2005). Combined with polling results underscoring voters' strong negative reactions to same-sex marriage, both Celinda Lake and Riester (AT campaign political consultants) were clear in asserting that AT's campaign message needed to be consistent, disciplined, and "delivered with frequency to break through voters' overriding opposition to gay marriage" (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2005, p. 2).

Two years later in 2008, CAP used narrower language with Proposition 102 to focus exclusively on banning same-sex marriage. The first poll gauging voter attitudes towards Proposition 102 was polling[8] conducted by Celinda Lake in August 2008. Polling results showed that the AT campaign was in a stronger position in August 2008 compared to the same period in 2006. In August 2006, Arizona voters supported a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage by a 57-33% margin compared to

[7] A survey of 600 registered voters, age 18 and older, with a consistent voting history. The poll is weighted for party registration per Congressional district. Margin of error is not available.

[8] Details of the 2008 polling were requested, but not made available by the AT campaign.

48-38% in August 2008 (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2008). Consultants and political operatives attributed the diminished support for the marriage amendment to public relations, education, and messaging from the 2006 campaign. While most volunteers were skeptical about their chances, polling results provided some volunteers with a renewed sense of optimism about defeating Proposition 102.

Conversely, the straightforward language used in Proposition 102 defined the election as a referendum on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in Arizona. As polling research demonstrated, same-sex marriage was a much more difficult to defeat. Even more problematic was that polling research found few messages convincing voters to oppose the proposition. One of the few themes that voters supported was 'trust'. Research demonstrated messaging needed to be based on emotion and the most effective message involved framing Proposition 102 as the equivalent of Proposition 107 in order to develop the idea that voters meant 'No' when they voted against the proposition in 2006 (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2008).

Messaging—Constructing and Framing the Message

Polling research clearly demonstrated that voters were concerned about the loss of rights for heterosexual domestic partners under Proposition 107. Consequently, the AT campaign broadly framed Proposition 107 as an issue of *rights* by specifically asking voters, 'why take away…?'. And with Arizona voters troubled by the potential effect on elderly heterosexual domestic partners, the AT campaign featured an unmarried elderly couple named Al and Maxine to highlight the potential loss of health insurance, hospital visitation, and emergency medical decision rights. Archival analysis of AT campaign

documents illustrates specific campaign talking points relating to this messaging: 'do not talk about marriage', 'do talk about taking away local control', 'do talk about taking away benefits', 'focus on the fact that heterosexual domestic partners will be affected', 'do talk about people who will lose hospital visitation and emergency medical decisions', and 'do talk about how the pro-marriage amendment could prohibit domestic partner insurance and pensions at private companies' (Arizona Together 2006).

The AT messaging strategy proved exceptionally effective as voters rejected Proposition 107 by 51-49% and Arizona became the first state in the U.S. to defeat a same-sex marriage proposition. Post-election research revealed that messages underscoring '*take away*' of rights were highly effective as 'voters were very reluctant to *take away* existing benefits' (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2006, p. 8). Specifically, voters voted against Proposition 107 for one of two reasons: 1) its potential to force seniors to choose between receiving current benefits or getting married and 2) unmarried couples having rights to specific legal protections (Lake, Snell, Perry, and Associates 2006). Other messages used by the AT campaign, included: framing the proposition as an issue of local control, potential competitive disadvantage for businesses, characterizing the proposition as 'it goes too far', and characterizing 'politicians as boogeymen'. While most interviewees were generally able to recall these messages, post-election polling results clearly showed they were not nearly as effective as 'take away' messaging (—Author's field notes, 2009).

The AT campaign was highly cognizant of how a more 'progressive' message used in Tucson could potentially undermine the larger AT statewide message and

therefore, was highly vigilant in enforcing message discipline. Yet, an overwhelming majority of Tucson volunteers maintained they 'did a fairly good job' of following the AT messaging strategy. A Tucson volunteer who received a cease and desist order recounts:

> We weren't supposed to be talking about gay marriage during the campaign, you know, that wasn't the messaging. […] We really stuck to the messaging 99% of the time, it was very unusual for there to be anything beyond that. We felt like we have really good message discipline. (—'Pamela', personal interview, 2009)

However, analysis of media archives and campaign literature confirms that Tucson volunteers affiliated with both AT and No on Proposition 107 used messaging not approved by the AT campaign. Figure 4 is a No on Proposition 107 media publication printed in the Arizona Daily Star and Figure 5 summarizes talking points issued by Tucson activists in March 2006 (prior to the formation of No on Proposition 107). Figures 4 and 5 both demonstrate that Tucson volunteers used messaging approved by AT, including: the 'take away' message, framing the proposition as an issue for Arizona businesses, and framing the issue as an issue for domestic partners. However, most talking points and messaging framing were at odds with AT strategy, including: 'fairness', 'justice', 'respect, 'protecting civil liberties', 'caring', and 'imposes radical social change'.

Many gay rights advocates from across the state, including Tucson, Prescott, and Flagstaff, maintained that the primary objective of Proposition 107 was to ban same-sex marriage, not domestic partnerships. And with the AT messaging strategy focusing on the effects for Al and Maxine and other elderly heterosexual couples, many argue the

strategy 'forced activists to hide behind elderly heterosexual couples' as the primary defense to Proposition 107 (—Author's field notes, 2009). Consequently, the 'de-gayed' messaging proved to be one of the most difficult issues for many volunteers because strict messaging discipline enforced by the AT campaign forced many volunteers to subvert personal identities and suppress their opposition to the message. A lesbian leader from Prescott succinctly summarized her disdain for AT messaging: "I'd rather lose being gay than win being in the closet" (—'Marion', personal interview, 2009). And a gay rights activist from Flagstaff echoes the frustration felt by many volunteers:

> It was so demoralizing. I don't think it was the actual messaging itself so much as the fact that you couldn't mention gay at all and you had to make the entire campaign look like it was about straight people. It just went over the edge to the point where people felt like, 'why should I volunteer for this when I'm not even allowed to be visible?' (—'Beatrice', personal interview, 2009)

Other gay and lesbian volunteers sympathized and agreed with problems surrounding the 'de-gayed' message, but pursued 'alternative' talking points outside of the AT messaging strategy for a slightly different reason. Many activists, including founding members of the Tucson No on Proposition 107 campaign, felt strongly about developing and instituting messaging that would 'advance the movement' by highlighting social and economic injustices affecting the gay community. A leader from the Tucson No on Proposition 107 group justifies the group's messaging strategy:

> Where we can in gay politics, we need to actually be pushing gays and lesbians or else we're never going to gain full equality if we're always getting these hollow victories behind senior citizens. (—'Elizabeth', personal interview, 2009)

AT campaign leaders were unapologetic about relying on messaging that largely excluded gays and lesbians from messaging because the decision was determined 'according to polling research'. As detailed in preceding sections, the most effective message highlighted the loss of benefits for largely heterosexual domestic partners. Additionally, findings from polling research and focus groups not only found negative voter reaction to same-sex couples, but framing the proposition through discourses of 'equality', 'civil rights', 'fairness', or 'discrimination' was highly ineffective.

For the AT campaign, messaging used by the No on Proposition 107 campaign was a direct and immediate threat to undermining messaging strategy. In fact, an AT campaign consultant noted, "We had a genuine fear that things were going to be said and done in Tucson that would become the features of direct mail pieces by the opposition" (—'Brian', personal interview, 2009). As a result, many interviewees held strong opinions regarding Tucson's use of 'justice', 'respect, and 'protecting civil liberties' to advance long range social and economic goals for the gay community. The following quotes underscore the underlying reason for differences over messaging strategy—different stakeholder groups with varied political perspectives:

> We're just going to say it and that's what I told the people from Tucson. It's like, 'it doesn't matter, just say it!' […] Your job is to win a fucking election, it's not dishonest to say, 'why take away healthcare, why take away legal protection?' […] If the leaders in Tucson were real leaders, this is what they would have done. […] They would have said, 'guys, we know you are not going to like this, and I know this kind of sucks, but here's what we need you to do, this is what we're going to say and this is how we are going to do it. And yeah, you're not going to be put in the closet, this is what it means to be smart'. (—'Benjamin', personal interview, 2009)

> If at the end of the day you need to say chocolate cookies and milk, and if that's what's going to defeat the initiative, then that's what you say. And screw any sort of larger social agenda (laughs). There's one objective and the objective is the defeat of the initiative. (—'Dave', personal interview, 2009)

Arizona gay rights advocates astonished many political observers by defeating Proposition 107 in 2006, but in 2008, Proposition 102 proved insurmountable as Arizona voters approved the proposition by 56-44%. One of the principal reasons explaining the reversal of Arizona voters is proposition language. Whereas the broad language of Proposition 107 provided an opportunity for gay rights advocates to define and frame the campaign through heterosexual domestic partners, CAP used more strict language with Proposition 102 that defined the election as a referendum on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in Arizona.

Polling research was explicitly clear regarding the difficulty of defeating Proposition 102. In addition to a majority of Arizona voters supporting a constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman, few messages were effective in convincing voters to oppose the proposition. With some confusion about differences in proposition language and voters questioning whether politicians did not listen to the voters' decision on Proposition 107 in 2006, the most effective message was 'trust'. The AT campaign sent a printed media mail advertisement that framed 'trust' with Libertarian messages of 'tell the government and politicians to stay out of our lives', 'education, healthcare, and the state budget are more important issues in this state', and 'we voted on this already—vote no again' (—Author's field notes, 2009). A Flagstaff volunteer recounts her memory of the print media:

> I just remember this card kind of thing that they mailed out and I was kind of appalled by it; I was so embarrassed by it I wouldn't even hand it out to anybody. It was a picture of this really fat business man with a cigar in his mouth and I don't remember the words on it. It was just trying to make it look like the other side was about corruption or something, but you couldn't even tell from the picture or from the basic wording what the issue was about. (—'Beatrice', personal interview, 2009)

Several AT interviewees suggested that messaging from the Tucson-based No on Proposition 102 was similar to the 'rebellious' messaging used during the 2006 campaign, including: 'gay is good', 'equality', and 'fairness' (—Author's field notes, 2009). However, archival analysis of the No on Proposition 102 communication plan and other campaign literature demonstrates virtually identical messaging between the two groups in 2008. For example, Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that No on Proposition 102 largely adapted the Libertarian framing of 'vote no again', 'politicians have bigger issues to worry about', and the 'live and let live instead of government intrusion'. Also, the No on Proposition 102 campaign abstained from directly citing same-sex marriage or gays and lesbians in their messaging—and as Figure 6 demonstrates with 'Prop. 102 fosters a climate of intolerance', if the campaign addressed gay issues, they did so tangentially.

In summary, the 2006 campaign allowed gay rights advocates to execute messaging that sidestepped the controversial issue of same-sex marriage and focus on domestic partnerships. Conversely, in 2008, the campaign proved more difficult for a number of reasons. Principally, the strict and clear language of Proposition 102 defined the campaign as a referendum on same-sex marriage and the campaign was unable to construct a compelling message to convince voters to oppose the proposition. The effectiveness of targeting elderly heterosexual domestic partners is clearly illustrated

through 2006 and 2008 voter exit polls. In 2006, voters aged 45-59 and 60 and over voted for Proposition 107 45% and 54%, respectively, while in 2008, voter support among individuals 45-64 and 65 and over climbed to 54% and 63%, respectively (CNN 2008 and CNN 2006). The approximate 10% increase in voter support for Proposition 102 among middle aged and elderly voters, who comprised 60% of voters in 2006 and 2008, not only demonstrates the effectiveness of the 2006 message, but also explains why the campaign was able to defeat Proposition 107. Additionally, the increased turnout of Republicans supporting Arizona's native son and Republican nominee for President of the United States U.S. Senator John McCain, along with increased evangelical church organization and fundraising, made defeating Proposition 102 an insurmountable challenge.

Conclusion

Gay rights issues remain one of the most important issues in the political and cultural landscape in the U.S. today. Increasingly, state ballot propositions are the primary channel through which the legality of domestic partner provisions, gay adoption, and same-sex marriage are being determined. As a result, scholars bear an intellectual onus to respond with comprehensive and timely scholarship. Following gay rights advocates' surprising defeat of Proposition 107 in 2006 making Arizona the first state to defeat a proposed amendment banning same-sex marriage and domestic partnerships, the overwhelming reversal of Arizona voters with Proposition 102 in 2008 provides more than a compelling case study—it also contains important implications for political geography and the gay rights literature, and important lessons for political strategists.

Results from Propositions 107 and 102 mirror conclusions drawn by scholars studying previous gay campaigns. In many instances, gay campaigns are often comprised of a diverse coalition of organizations with considerably different political perspectives leading to considerable disagreement over 'appropriate' strategies. However, results from this study are fundamentally different from the existing literature in suggesting that much of the dissension between gay rights advocates is attributable to political-structural factors and not ideological perspectives. While the AT campaign attempted to meld considerably different perspectives by establishing agreed-upon principles at the Casa Grande meeting, much of the dissension between the AT and No on Proposition 107/102 campaigns revolved around methods of organizational practice and discursive messaging. Specifically, divergent opinions over 'hierarchical' and 'grassroots' tactics of organizational practice, combined with differences in messaging further addressed in ensuing paragraphs, contributed to the majority of dissension between the campaigns.

While identifying and explaining differences in organizational structure and messaging are important and of interest to political strategists studying the political-structural composition of campaigns, it does not address underlying factors responsible for the dissension between the campaigns. As interview results clearly demonstrate, much of the dissension between campaigns was attributable to different stakeholder groups. Specifically, individuals from both campaigns held sharply different campaign goals that ranged from solely focusing on defeating the propositions to pursuing a longer-term social movement. And explicitly linked to goals, were considerably

different perspectives regarding campaign strategies best suited to achieve campaign goals—notably 'win-forward' versus 'win-at-all costs' strategies. Therefore, this research underscores the importance of considering the social and political character of stakeholder groups involved in the campaign.

The comparative analysis of Arizona Propositions 107 and 102 details the interrelationship of messaging strategies and provides an important summary of the political narrative between the two elections. The primary takeaway finding regarding messaging is that the 2006 AT messaging strategy framed Proposition 107 largely as a referendum on heterosexual domestic partnerships and was a highly effective strategy and largely responsible for voters rejecting the proposition, but proved irrelevant in the fight against Proposition 102 in 2008, which specifically focused on banning same-sex marriage. The messaging strategy between the two campaigns led to considerable cynicism and resentment by many Tucson gay rights advocates who question whether gays and lesbians actually achieved a 'victory' with the voters' rejection of Proposition 107 in 2006. They contend that because the AT campaign excluded gays and lesbians from messaging in 2006, the campaign failed to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the broad language of Proposition 107 and move voters forward by addressing gay civil rights issues. Therefore, these activists claim the 2006 messaging strategy was largely responsible for their defeat in 2008. Undoubtedly, the elections of Proposition 107 and 102 will continue to have long lasting effects on gay and lesbian politics in Arizona.

The importance of examining the underlying context of political strategies is further reinforced by this research. Results are apparent in supporting the idea that vote choice is not naturally determined and is instead shaped through a complex process of partisan cues, issue framing, messaging, and other discursive campaign strategies (Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000). Moreover, it reinforces the importance of the local environment in explaining how social, cultural, and political processes determine campaign strategies. For example, in exploring beyond vote totals for Propositions 107 and 102, this research demonstrates that political campaigns in Tucson, Phoenix, Prescott, and Flagstaff relied on considerably different methods of organizational practice and messaging. This is an important finding, particularly for future research, because different strategies across political space have important ramifications for examining electoral geography. Furthermore, these results further reinforce a major limitation of traditional electoral geography and many quantitative analyses, which involves the erasure of variability at small/local scales by operating at macro scales (e.g. state or region). Therefore, where traditional electoral analyses often assume uniform campaign strategies across political space, results from this study further underscore the drawbacks of such an approach since locally specific gay and lesbian constituencies in Arizona pursued considerably different campaign strategies. Therefore, this research argues that contextual analysis, combined with compositional analysis, provides a more comprehensive understanding of voting behavior not otherwise gained through compositional analysis alone.

The gay rights literature has extensively documented the prominent ideological division within the gay civil rights movement. What is particularly problematic, however, is that the literature currently relies on broad, non-descript binaries for explaining dissension in gay political campaigns. For example, Hull's (2001) research on the 1998 campaign against Amendment Two in Hawaii demonstrated that divergent messaging strategies were the result of campaign elites (campaign leaders) arguing for broad messaging while non-elites (rank-and-file volunteers) argued for 'tolerance and acceptance'. And equally problematic, Eagan and Sherrill (2005) note that assimilationists often implement 'insider' political strategies and a 'top-down hierarchical' organizational practice while liberationists embrace gay and lesbian identities while pursuing 'outsider and grassroots' political strategies. Therefore, Eagan and Sherrill (2005) assume that assimilationist and liberationist ideological divisions prominent in the gay civil rights movement are also responsible for dissension in gay political campaigns.

While these binaries served as the hypothetical basis for dissension in the Arizona context at the beginning of this research, results demonstrate that the conflict between Tucson and Phoenix was driven by stakeholder groups with considerably different goal horizons. Consequently, the implications suggest that broad binaries used by both Hull (2001) and Eagan and Sherrill (2005) may be too simplistic for explaining differences in gay activists' political strategies. Specifically, empirical results provide mixed support for Hull's (2001) elite/non-elite dichotomies. For example, while the majority of politicians, fundraisers, and other professional 'elites' largely affiliated with

the AT campaign did pursue a broad, non-threatening message, many 'non-elite' AT volunteers were in complete agreement with the leadership's messaging strategy. Conversely, some 'non-elite' Tucson volunteers completely disagreed with the 'tolerance and acceptance' message implemented by Tucson leadership. And empirical results provided virtually no support for Eagan and Sherrill's (2005) assimilationist-liberationist framework. Tucsonans pursuance of grassroots political strategies was not the result of a liberationist 'we are here and we are queer' ideology, but rather stakeholders with a vested interest in long-term goals.

In conclusion, the comparative analysis of Propositions 107 and 102 provides important insight for explaining underlying processes of campaign strategies by specifically examining the role of stakeholders, political perspective, and other factors affecting campaign strategy. And by implementing a contextual approach, this research demonstrates the dialectical relationship of political constituencies in Tucson and Phoenix determining political strategies and vice versa. As this paper illustrates, the underlying social, economic, political processes driving political strategies are tied to the local environment and therefore, cause political strategies to play out differently across political space. With different campaign strategies leading to varied effects on political constituencies, assuming a uniform political environment is increasingly problematic. Consequently, electoral/political geographers and political scientists need to increasingly consider the role of the local environment for explaining differences in voting patterns.

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Table 1. Proposition 107 (2006) and 102 (2008) Exit Poll and County-Level Results

	Proposition 107 (2006)		Proposition 102 (2008)	
Gender	Yes	No	Yes	No
Male	50%	50%	57%	43%
Female	47%	53%	55%	45%
Race and Gender				
White Men	48%	52%	57%	43%
White Women	47%	53%	52%	48%
Non-White Men	59%	41%	NA	NA
Non-White Women	45%	55%	NA	NA
Age				
18-29	39%	61%	48%	52%
30-44	51%	49%	58%	42%
45-59, 45-64 (2008)	45%	55%	54%	46%
60 and Older, 65 and Older (2008)	54%	46%	63%	37%
Education				
No High School	65%	35%	NA	NA
High School Graduate	60%	40%	66%	34%
Some College	51%	49%	58%	42%
College Graduate	48%	52%	50%	50%
Postgraduate	33%	67%	50%	50%
Counties				
Apache	8,661	8,740	18,044	5,405
Cochise	19,422	15,490	30,492	17,582
Coconino	15,139	22,279	26,845	26,264
Gila	8,526	7,775	14,443	6,884
Graham	5,221	2,369	9,406	2,352
Greenlee	1,151	885	2,024	744
LaPaz	1,921	1,772	3,524	1,785
Maricopa	421,568	449,065	741,797	595,077
Mohave	25,429	19,254	43,258	21,861
Navajo	14,194	11,246	25,317	8,460
Pima	115,915	158,721	188,942	195,148
Pinal	28,873	26,882	62,425	39,457
Santa Cruz	3,473	4,204	6,412	5,902
Yavapai	36,992	34,346	59,497	38,546
Yuma	15,004	12,470	25,929	15,286
Total Votes	721,489	775,498	1,258,355	980,753
Percentage	48.2%	51.8%	56.2%	43.8%

NA-Data not available due to insufficient sample size.

Sources: CNN (2008), AZ SOS (2008), AZ SOS (2006), and CNN (2006)

Table 2. Vote Tallies of State Anti Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Propositions

State	Name	Election Date	For % For	For # Votes	Against % Against	Against # Votes	Total Votes
Alaska	Measure 2	Nov 1998	68.1	152,965	31.9	71,631	224,596
Hawaii	Amendment 2	Nov 1998	70.8	285,384	29.2	117,827	403,211
Nebraska	Measure 416	Nov 2000	70.1	477,571	29.9	203,667	681,238
Nevada	Question 2	Nov 2002	67.2	337,197	32.8	164,573	501,770
Missouri	Amendment 2	Aug 2004	70.6	1,055,771	29.4	439,529	1,495,300
Louisiana	Amendment 1	Sep 2004	77.8	619,908	22.2	177,067	796,975
Arkansas	Amendment 3	Nov 2004	75.0	753,770	25.0	251,914	1,005,684
Georgia	Amendment 1	Nov 2004	76.2	2,454,912	23.8	768,703	3,223,615
Kentucky	Amendment 1	Nov 2004	74.6	1,222,125	25.4	417,097	1,639,222
Michigan	Proposal 2	Nov 2004	58.6	2,698,077	41.4	1,904,319	4,602,396
Mississippi	Amendment 1	Nov 2004	86.1	924,653	13.9	149,854	1,074,507
Montana	Initiative 96	Nov 2004	67.3	295,070	32.7	143,263	438,333
North Dakota	Measure 1	Nov 2004	73.2	223,572	26.8	81,716	305,288
Ohio	Issue 1	Nov 2004	61.7	3,329,335	38.3	2,065,462	5,394,797
Oklahoma	Question 711	Nov 2004	75.6	1,075,216	24.4	347,303	1,422,519
Oregon	Amendment 36	Nov 2004	56.6	1,028,546	43.4	787,556	1,816,102
Utah	Amendment 3	Nov 2004	65.9	593,297	34.1	307,488	900,785
Kansas	Amendment 1	Apr 2005	69.9	414,106	30.1	178,018	592,124
Texas	Proposition 2	Nov 2005	76.2	1,718,513	23.8	536,052	2,254,565
Alabama	Same-Sex Marriage Licenses	June 2006	81.2	734,746	18.8	170,399	905,145
Arizona*	Proposition 107	Nov 2006	48.2	683,514	51.8	733,937	1,417,451
Colorado	Amendment 43	Nov 2006	55.0	855,126	45.0	699,030	1,554,156
Idaho	H.J.R. 2	Nov 2006	63.3	282,301	36.7	163,408	445,709
South Carolina	Amendment 1	Nov 2006	78.0	830,081	22.0	234,464	1,064,545
South Dakota	Constitutional Amendment C	Nov 2006	51.7	172,237	48.3	160,756	332,993
Tennessee	Amendment 1	Nov 2006	81.3	1,414,562	18.7	325,297	1,739,859
Virginia	Ballot Question 1	Nov 2006	57.1	1,328,537	42.9	999,687	2,328,224
Wisconsin	S.J.R 53/Question 1	Nov 2006	59.4	1,260,554	40.6	861,554	2,122,108
Arizona	Proposition 102	Nov 2008	56.2	1,258,355	43.8	980,753	2,239,108
Florida	Proposition 2	Nov 2008	61.9	4,890,883	38.1	3,008,026	7,898,909
California	Proposition 8	Nov 2008	52.2	7,001,084	47.8	6,401,082	13,402,166
		TOTAL	**62.9**	**40,371,968**	**37.1**	**23,851,432**	**64,223,400**

Source: CNN (2008) and adapted from NGLTF (2006)

*Arizona is the only state to defeat a proposed same-sex marriage ban

Figure 1. Prohibition of Same-Sex Relationships



Figure 2. Interview Questions

1. What organization were you part of, if any, in working to defeat either Proposition 107 or Proposition 102 in 2006 and 2008, respectively? Were there other organizations that you were associated with?
    a. Where was the organization based in Arizona? Were there other offices across the state? If so, where?
        i. Were the majority of leaders and volunteer activists from Arizona?
        ii. How did the local political environment where the organization was based influence the goals and political strategy of the organization?
        iii. Generally, was there a common vision, underlying principle, or a unifying political view that coalesced both leaders and volunteers of your affiliated organization?
    b. What was your role (e.g. leadership or volunteer activist) in the organization?
    c. How and why did you become involved in the campaign? Compared to other issues, where would you rank marriage in terms of importance in the larger battle for gay equality? Why or why not? (Employment non-discrimination, housing protections, hate crimes statues, parenting/adoption issues, AIDS funding)
2. Were you or your organization aware of political strategies employed by gay rights advocates **in other states** organized to defeat same-sex marriage initiatives?
    a. If yes, how, if at all, did their political strategies affect the strategies employed by your campaign in Arizona?
3. Were you aware of other gay rights organizations **in Arizona** also working to defeat Propositions 107 or 102?
    a. If so, which organizations are you familiar with and did your affiliated organization work with these organizations? Why or why not?
    b. What is your personal opinion of the political strategies used by other gay rights organizations working to defeat Propositions 107 and 102?
    c. How did your organization determine its political strategy?
4. Broadly, what was the **political strategy** of your affiliated organization in working to defeat Propositions 107/102?
    a. What was the principal political message of the campaign?
        i. How was the message determined?
        ii. Was the message tested in focus groups or other political settings in order to determine its effectiveness? How did that work? Who organized them?
        iii. Was the message uniform throughout the state or was it targeted to local political constituencies? How was this determined?
        iv. Was the message tailored to different voting demographics? If so, how?

   b. How did the organization put their political strategy into operation?
      i. Which voter groups, in terms of partisans, age, gender, etc., were identified or targeted by your organization as potential 'no' voters?
      ii. What was the chief get out the vote (GOTV) strategy and how was it implemented across Arizona?
      iii. How would you characterize the process for determining the organization's political message and larger political strategy (hierarchical top-down approach versus grassroots activist inclusive approach)?

5. How did political strategy (messaging and operationalization) differ for Proposition 107 in 2006 compared to Proposition 102 in 2008?
   a. How did the distinct wording of Propositions 107 and 102 shape the organization's response in framing the issue in convincing voters to vote no?
   b. How was Arizona able to defeat Proposition 107 in 2006, while no other U.S. state has been able to do so? How did your organization contribute to Proposition 107's defeat? How did other state organizations contribute, if at all, to Proposition 107's defeat?
   c. Did the 2006 campaign against Proposition 107 influence political strategies used by gay rights groups in Proposition 102 in 2008? If so, how were political strategies similar or different in 2006 and 2008?

Figure 3. Arizona Together Tucson Steering Committee 'Secondary Goals' [June 2006]

Although we plan to defeat the amendment, we have all agreed that we need to enunciate "secondary goals" for the campaign. This way, we can claim victory regardless of the vote.

Internal Goals:

GOAL	HOW TO KNOW IF YOU DID IT	COMMENTS
1. Strengthen Wingspan		
a. Increase number of volunteers (LGBT and straight allies)	Baseline and subsequent counts	
b. Increase financial support (individual and institutional)	Baseline and subsequent measures	
2. Develop a progressive database (individuals and groups)	Document that you did it.	Characteristics/capabilities of the database?
3. Develop a working progressive coalition in S. Arizona	Document that you did it.	What progressive coalitions currently exist? What characteristics are desired?
4. Increase registration of LGBT voters	Not sure how to measure this.	Does Wingspan capture this information from members?
5. Increase the activism and involvement of the LGBT community	Not sure how to measure this.	Suggest you write more concrete objectives that might be measurable.
6. Mentor new leaders	See comment.	Is the goal to do more mentoring, or is the goal to develop more leaders, or more effective leaders? You could measure both.
7. Mentor/empower LGBT youth to become active in politics	See comment.	Same comment as above.
8. Build strong ties with people of color	See comment.	Not sure what this really means.
9. Increase the skill set of organizers/volunteers (IT, media, VR/GOTV, strategy, fundraising, etc.)	The skills offered by each volunteer could be documented in a volunteer database. See comment.	Do you want to increase the array of skills to make sure the coalition has the requisite set needed? Or do you want each person to get better at their specific skill(s)?
10. Decrease the sense of isolation of the LGBT community	Not sure how to measure this.	It might help to think more specifically about who would feel less isolated and why. The "LGBT
		community" is too broad.
11. Increase LGBT community ties with communities of faith	See comment.	It shouldn't be too hard to write some concrete objectives that would be measurable.
12. Build personal relationships among volunteers, staff	See comment.	It shouldn't be too hard to write some concrete objectives that would be measurable.
13. Provide resources and support for LGBT, friends and family that share their stories with the public as part of an awareness campaign	See comment.	Is the goal to provide the resources and support, or is the goal that an increased number of LGBT people plus friends and family members will share their stories?

General comment: One technique for clarifying goals is to try to write them in the form of the desired state. For example, Number 7, "Mentor/empower LGBT youth to become active in politics" could become: "More LGBT youth will become active in politics." Then you can think of specific behaviors that you would like to see that would be evidence that more youth are getting active in politics (measurable objectives), and you can think of actions you & others can take to get that to happen (strategies & activities).

External Goals:

GOAL	HOW TO KNOW IF YOU DID IT	COMMENTS
1. Educate the public regarding the reality of LGBT persons/families, fostering a climate of dignity and inclusiveness for all LGBT community members.	See comment	It would help to write the goal and some objectives in the form of stating what you want the general public to believe or know about LGBT people. Then you could decide on activities that would convey these ideas and document the activities. Harder: to measure whether the target audience changed their beliefs.
2. Provider a visible LGBT presence	See comment	Say more about what this means.
3. Decrease the level of violence toward the LGBT community	Very hard to measure.	A big goal. Maybe break it down via an analysis that would show how some of the other goals might result in lower levels of specific kinds of violence.
4. Increase the number of private/public entities that provide domestic partner benefits	Very measurable. But we'd need to have a way of surveying or otherwise knowing this	Very clearly stated.

	information.	
5. Develop a progressive coalition (locally, statewide, nationally)	See above.	
6. Increase registration of LGBT voters	See above.	
7. Build strong ties with people of color	See above.	
8. Increase LGBT ties with communities of faith	See above.	
9. Reclaim co-opted values	See comment.	Not sure specifically what this means.
10. Build support for civil rights for LGBT people in the state of Arizona (employment nondiscrimination, housing/public accommodations nondiscrimination, domestic partner benefits, marriage equality)	See comment.	It would help to say specifically what "build support," or the resulting increased support would look like. It might be a list of specific goals and/or objectives, in terms of, e.g., increased support for LGBT people in employment (what would that specifically look like?), in housing, etc.

Figure 4. No on Proposition 107 Media Advertisement

Proposition 107 is Against Our Values

Proposition 107, the so-called "Protect Marriage" amendment, will be on the ballot in November as an amendment to the Arizona Constitution. This Amendment flies in the face of the values that we hold dear. Values like fairness, justice, respect for the individual, protecting our civil rights, and caring for our family, neighbors and community. Same sex marriage is already illegal in Arizona and Proposition 107 will do nothing to change that. But it will jeopardize the safety, security and economic stability of over 118,000 members of our community because:

- *It will take away* health insurance from children and families of domestic partners
- *It will take away* domestic violence protections from unmarried people
- *It will take away* hospital visitation and medical decision-making rights from unmarried couples without medical powers of attorney
- *It will force* seniors, many of whom do not remarry for fear of losing social security and pension benefits, to choose between economic security and marriage
- *It will allow* the state to dictate to cities and counties what health and other benefits they can provide to their citizens, and threaten the employee benefits of private companies that contract with the government

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, JOIN TOGETHER TO EXPRESS OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO PROPOSITION 107.

Paid for by No On 107 Cindy Jordan, Chair Roger Funk, Treasurer 1718 E. Speedway #244 Tucson, AZ 85719 www.voteno107.com

Figure 5. No on Proposition 107 Messaging 'Talking Points'

Talking Points

Arizonans may disagree about same-sex marriage, but everyone can agree that this amendment goes too far.

- The proposed amendment **does not change existing Arizona law.** Title 25 of the Arizona Revised Statutes declares that "Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited." That law has already been upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court, which means that **the practical effect of the amendment will be to strip existing rights from domestic partners, both straight and gay.**
- Arizonans take pride in our tradition of respect for individuality and privacy. The proposed amendment represents an attempt to impose radical social change on a state whose people have always "just tried to get along." **The amendment would have the government defining our families, meddling in our private lives, and taking control away from local communities.**
- This amendment is not just about the rights of same-sex couples. **It affects everyone:** young and old, straight and gay. Over 200,000 Arizonans stand to suffer from the loss of the benefits and privileges that enable them to care for their loved ones, develop lasting partnerships, and stand with one another in time of need.

What would the amendment do?

- **More than two hundred Arizona laws** provide benefits that the amendment would make unavailable to domestic partners. They include:
  - the ability to make emergency medical decisions for a partner and to visit a partner in the hospital or prison
  - health-care coverage for a partner and his or her children
  - joint adoption and foster care
  - automatic presumption of paternity
  - sick leave to care for a partner
  - bereavement leave when a partner passes away
  - crime victim's recovery benefits
  - automatic inheritance, assumption of a partner's pension, and lease transfer
  - wrongful death benefits
  - recourse against abandonment by a partner
  - insurance and tax breaks for couples
  - tax credits for low-income families
  - support with in-state college and university tuition

  - family discounts at parks and recreational facilities
  - spousal privilege (legal immunity from being forced to reveal the details of private communications with a partner)
- It is far from clear how many rights and privileges would be in jeopardy if the amendment passes. **The unforeseen consequences are in many cases troubling:** the state of Ohio, which recently passed a similar amendment, cannot now enforce domestic violence laws in unmarried households.
- The net effect of stripping these and other privileges from unmarried couples would be to prohibit hard-working Arizonans from using benefits like health-care coverage to take care of their families. The state would have to make up the gap by providing additional financial assistance, which would increase everyone's taxes.
- The damage might not be limited to government benefits. Fringe groups could sue to keep government agencies from contracting with firms whose benefits policies conflict with those of the state. We do not know whether such lawsuits would be successful, but we do know that many private-sector employers base their benefits on what the state of Arizona offers to its employees. The long-term effects could be substantial.

Who would be affected?

- In 2000, the U.S. Census found that there were 118,196 Arizona households with unmarried partners, a number which represents **one in ten Arizona couples.** More than 12,000 households included same-sex couples, but **90% of the couples who would be affected by the amendment are straight.** It is not known how many of these couples work for the state or for their cities, counties, or school districts, but the number is undoubtedly significant.
- Many seniors cannot marry for fear of losing their pensions and Social Security benefits. Again, the legal impact of the amendment is not fully known, but it is certain that Arizona's seniors are especially in need of the ability to make life-saving medical decisions for their loved ones.
- Pima County and the cities of Phoenix, Tucson, Scottsdale, and Tempe all provide domestic-partnership benefits of one kind or another. **The amendment would take away local control** by forcing these areas of the state to give up the benefits they currently provide to unmarried couples.
- **Business leaders agree that domestic-partnership benefits enhance** our state's ability to recruit and retain the most skilled employees, including many of the gifted schoolteachers and college faculty members who are educating the next generation of Arizonans. Businesses should be allowed the greatest possible flexibility to define their own benefits policies. At least thirteen of Arizona's top 20 employers and more than 40% of Fortune 500 companies offer some form of domestic-partner health benefits.

- **What about churches?** The U.S. Constitution guarantees the independence of churches from the state, and so **no religious organization can be forced against its will to approve of domestic partnerships or same-sex unions.** Because of the ironclad protections that already exist, to pass this amendment would add no substantial safeguards to religious marriage. To defeat it would take away not a single right that churches already enjoy. (Remember that the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, opposes birth control, divorce, and remarriage and yet has faced no repercussions from the government.)

What about my family?

- **Domestic partnerships and same-sex relationships in no way affect heterosexual marriage.** When interracial marriage was legalized, it did not "redefine" marriage for couples of the same race. To defeat this amendment does not send the message that marriage is outdated or unimportant; instead, it sends the message that all the ways in which Arizona's families come together deserve to be celebrated.
- The rights of Arizonans who wish to get married will not be affected. **Not a single benefit enjoyed by straight, married couples will be taken away.** When all couples enjoy the rights as well as the responsibilities that come with marriage, they can better support and nurture one another and their children.
- The American Psychological Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychiatric Association all agree that children can be raised just as lovingly and successfully in same-sex households as in opposite-sex ones. **The real harm to children comes from hateful and discriminatory rhetoric,** which has been linked to suicide and violence among teenagers.
- Won't this amendment keep society from sliding down a "slippery slope" toward polygamy and group marriage? Absolutely not. All such arrangements are currently illegal in Arizona and will remain that way regardless of the vote on this amendment. The sole effect of the amendment would be to take rights away from committed couples.

What does the amendment mean for civil rights?

- **What the proposed amendment puts before Arizonans is a civil rights issue, pure and simple.** Our fundamental American values include freedom and equality: this amendment attacks both of them. Do we really want to enshrine discrimination against a group of people whose relationships do no harm to the majority?
- **The Arizona Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, exists to protect rights rather than to take them away.** Only once has our nation's Constitution been amended to restrict freedom: the Prohibition of alcohol in the early twentieth

century. That social experiment lasted less than a decade and was by all accounts a complete failure.

- Much has been said about so-called "activist judges." In fact, for over two centuries it has been a principle in American law that the courts have the duty to overturn unconstitutional laws. **Judicial review is one of the "checks and balances" that have made the American Constitution the longest lasting system of government in the world.** The courts were the institutions that guaranteed civil rights for African-Americans and women when legislatures were unwilling to do so.
- The Founding Fathers warned against the "tyranny" of a majority who could undermine the rights of a minority of Americans. James Madison wrote: "Measures are too often decided not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." It is possible for people to make their views known without restricting the liberties of their fellow citizens.

How do most Arizonans feel about this issue?

- **<u>Most Arizonans believe that the amendment goes too far and will do unnecessary harm.</u>** Though Arizonans are of two minds about gay marriage, 63% agree that it makes no sense to change our state's constitution to restrict family life. 68% think that taking away the right of unmarried partners to visit each other in the hospital goes too far. Only three in ten Arizonans would support a constitutional amendment that would take benefits away from unmarried couples. **In a recent poll, 85% say that they don't want religious and political zealots telling them how to live.** 61% think that a radical fringe is trying to do just that. Newspapers in Phoenix, Tucson, Flagstaff, and Yuma have all editorialized against the amendment.

Who is working against this amendment?

- The Arizona Human Rights Fund, the Arizona Women's Political Caucus, the National Association of Social Workers, the Southern Arizona Center against Sexual Assault, the National Organization of Women, the Arizona Psychological Association, the Arizona Public Health Association, the Pima County/Tucson Women's Commission, YWCA, and many other local churches and associations.

To sum up: in a time of anxiety about the future, our families are one of the last refuges where Arizonans can find mutual support and the traditions that sustain us. Our families have always been as different as Arizonans themselves are—that diversity is one of our great strengths and should not be made a target for the politics of fear and divisiveness. This campaign is an opportunity for us to recommit ourselves to our state's heritage of honest living, personal freedom, and mutual respect for our neighbor

Figure 6. No on Proposition 102 Messaging Advertisement



Figure 7. No on Proposition 102 Media Advertisement

APPENDIX D
IRB Approval

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA.

Human Subjects
Protection Program

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Tel: (520) 626-6721
http://irb.arizona.edu

March 10, 2009

Jason Jurjevich, PhD Candidate
Advisor: David Plane, PhD
Geography & Regional Development
PO Box 210076

Project NO. 09-0110-00 Explaining the Underlying Context of Political Strategies Used by Gay Rights Advocates Organized to Defeat Arizona Same-Sex Marriage Propositions 107 and 102

Dear Mr. Jurjevich:

We received documents concerning your above cited project. Regulations published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [45 CFR Part 46.101(b) (2)] exempt this type of research from review by our Institutional Review Board.

Exempt status is granted with the understanding that no further changes or additions will be made to the procedures followed (copies of which we have on file) without the review and approval of the Human Subjects Committee and your College or Departmental Review Committee. Any research related physical or psychological harm to any subject must also be reported to each committee.

Thank you for informing us of your work. If you have any questions concerning the above, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth A. Boyd

Elizabeth Boyd, Ph.D.
Assistant Vice-President, Research Compliance & Policy
Office of Responsible Conduct for Research

cc: Departmental/College Review Committee
EB:mm