Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621000
Title:
Living Variously
Author:
Tierney, Hannah
Issue Date:
2016
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Traditionally, philosophers have argued that a single relation-like psychological continuity (e.g. Locke) or biological continuity (e.g. Olson)-grounds personal identity and persistence. But recent empirical work has shed light on a vast number of identity-related practical concerns, and it is unlikely that a single persistence relation could address all of these concerns. In my dissertation, I defend a pluralist view of personal identity, according to which more than one relation can ground persistence and survival. In doing so, I present a novel account of personal identity, which I call the Subscript View. According to the Subscript View, there exist several distinct survival relations, all with different persistence conditions, which can obtain independently of one another. I argue that the Subscript View is able to avoid threats to its ontology and charges of conventionalism and can accommodate a feature of our experience of persistence that no other view, pluralist or otherwise, is able to accommodate.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Philosophy
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Nichols, Shaun

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleLiving Variouslyen_US
dc.creatorTierney, Hannahen
dc.contributor.authorTierney, Hannahen
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, philosophers have argued that a single relation-like psychological continuity (e.g. Locke) or biological continuity (e.g. Olson)-grounds personal identity and persistence. But recent empirical work has shed light on a vast number of identity-related practical concerns, and it is unlikely that a single persistence relation could address all of these concerns. In my dissertation, I defend a pluralist view of personal identity, according to which more than one relation can ground persistence and survival. In doing so, I present a novel account of personal identity, which I call the Subscript View. According to the Subscript View, there exist several distinct survival relations, all with different persistence conditions, which can obtain independently of one another. I argue that the Subscript View is able to avoid threats to its ontology and charges of conventionalism and can accommodate a feature of our experience of persistence that no other view, pluralist or otherwise, is able to accommodate.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorNichols, Shaunen
dc.contributor.committeememberNichols, Shaunen
dc.contributor.committeememberMcKenna, Michaelen
dc.contributor.committeememberHorgan, Terenceen
dc.contributor.committeememberSartorio, Carolinaen
dc.contributor.committeememberGill, Michaelen
dc.contributor.committeememberShoemaker, Daviden
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