Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/614129
Title:
INCENTIVISED LEARNING IN THE GAME OF 21
Author:
Parsons, Andrew John
Issue Date:
2016
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The following thesis uses a game of strategy, known as The Game of 21, as a means to test the following research question: Is it possible to influence individuals’ strategic learning and comprehension through the use of varying financial incentives. A study was conducted on 42 individuals separated evenly across three unique treatments. Each treatment offered its participants a different level of financial incentive for performing well in the game. The first of these treatments acted as the control group for the study, and thus offered no financial reward for playing well. The second treatment offered a miniscule incentive of 25₵ to the winner of a randomly selected round of the game. This treatment was predicted to actually perform the worst, as the small incentive was designed to demotivate participants. The final treatment offered a substantial financial incentive of $5 to the winner of a randomly selected round of the game. This treatment was predicted to perform the best, as the large financial incentive was designed to be a powerful motivator. The results of all rounds of the game were ultimately collected and analyzed, and compared to the above predictions.
Type:
text; Electronic Thesis
Degree Name:
B.S.
Degree Level:
Bachelors
Degree Program:
Honors College; Business Economics
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dufwenberg, Martin

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleINCENTIVISED LEARNING IN THE GAME OF 21en_US
dc.creatorParsons, Andrew Johnen
dc.contributor.authorParsons, Andrew Johnen
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractThe following thesis uses a game of strategy, known as The Game of 21, as a means to test the following research question: Is it possible to influence individuals’ strategic learning and comprehension through the use of varying financial incentives. A study was conducted on 42 individuals separated evenly across three unique treatments. Each treatment offered its participants a different level of financial incentive for performing well in the game. The first of these treatments acted as the control group for the study, and thus offered no financial reward for playing well. The second treatment offered a miniscule incentive of 25₵ to the winner of a randomly selected round of the game. This treatment was predicted to actually perform the worst, as the small incentive was designed to demotivate participants. The final treatment offered a substantial financial incentive of $5 to the winner of a randomly selected round of the game. This treatment was predicted to perform the best, as the large financial incentive was designed to be a powerful motivator. The results of all rounds of the game were ultimately collected and analyzed, and compared to the above predictions.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen
thesis.degree.nameB.S.en
thesis.degree.levelBachelorsen
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineBusiness Economicsen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorDufwenberg, Martinen
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