Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/579041
Title:
The Effect of the Capital Gains Tax Rate on Earnings Management
Author:
Devlin, Christopher James
Issue Date:
2015
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
I find evidence that when the capital gains tax rates fell before SOX regulations, earnings were managed up by United States based firms through both accrual and real methods. This maximizes executives take home pay. Just following SOX regulations, earnings were managed higher, which was predominately done through accrual methods. When the capital gains tax rates fell in 2013 levels of earnings management were lower, which is consistent with the idea that executives are looking to maximize their pay. How levels of institutional ownership affect earnings management is less conclusive. Earnings management is also influenced by how executives are compensated showing that managers who are primarily compensated through stock options bonuses may choose to manage earnings higher.
Type:
text; Electronic Thesis
Degree Name:
B.S.B.A.
Degree Level:
bachelors
Degree Program:
Honors College; Accounting
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Stekelberg, James

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleThe Effect of the Capital Gains Tax Rate on Earnings Managementen_US
dc.creatorDevlin, Christopher Jamesen
dc.contributor.authorDevlin, Christopher Jamesen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractI find evidence that when the capital gains tax rates fell before SOX regulations, earnings were managed up by United States based firms through both accrual and real methods. This maximizes executives take home pay. Just following SOX regulations, earnings were managed higher, which was predominately done through accrual methods. When the capital gains tax rates fell in 2013 levels of earnings management were lower, which is consistent with the idea that executives are looking to maximize their pay. How levels of institutional ownership affect earnings management is less conclusive. Earnings management is also influenced by how executives are compensated showing that managers who are primarily compensated through stock options bonuses may choose to manage earnings higher.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen
thesis.degree.nameB.S.B.A.en
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorStekelberg, Jamesen
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