Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577203
Title:
Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
Author:
Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
Issue Date:
2015
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Watershed governance is an increasingly important policy area in the United States. Understanding what design elements of institutional arrangements tend to improve the outcomes of such governance is a major theoretical challenge. When governments cooperate at the regional level to govern shared use of watersheds that cross jurisdictional boundaries, how they do so is variable. This dissertation examines an apparently successful case of watershed governance, the New York City watershed governance arrangement, to understand to what degree it is integrative and reflective of broader federal structures and processes of governance. The results support the proposition that robust regional natural resource governance in a federal bargain includes mechanisms of correcting opportunistic behaviors, responding to natural phenomena, and institutional adaptation in the face of both.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
institutions; natural resources; watershed management; Political Science; governance
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Political Science
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Schlager, Edella

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleMaintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargainen_US
dc.creatorHanlon, Jeffrey Wyatten
dc.contributor.authorHanlon, Jeffrey Wyatten
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractWatershed governance is an increasingly important policy area in the United States. Understanding what design elements of institutional arrangements tend to improve the outcomes of such governance is a major theoretical challenge. When governments cooperate at the regional level to govern shared use of watersheds that cross jurisdictional boundaries, how they do so is variable. This dissertation examines an apparently successful case of watershed governance, the New York City watershed governance arrangement, to understand to what degree it is integrative and reflective of broader federal structures and processes of governance. The results support the proposition that robust regional natural resource governance in a federal bargain includes mechanisms of correcting opportunistic behaviors, responding to natural phenomena, and institutional adaptation in the face of both.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectinstitutionsen
dc.subjectnatural resourcesen
dc.subjectwatershed managementen
dc.subjectPolitical Scienceen
dc.subjectgovernanceen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorSchlager, Edellaen
dc.contributor.committeememberSchlager, Edellaen
dc.contributor.committeememberBauer, Carlen
dc.contributor.committeememberOakerson, Ronalden
dc.contributor.committeememberSmith, Craigen
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