Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/556588
Title:
Managerial Career Concerns and Earnings Forecasts
Author:
Shaikh, Sarah
Issue Date:
2015
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Using a novel setting, I examine the relation between a CEO's career concerns and the provision of an annual earnings forecast. Specifically, I exploit staggered changes in non-compete enforcement laws in three U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in a CEO’s career concerns. Consistent with theory suggesting that career concerns increase a manager's aversion to risk, I find that a CEO is less likely to issue an earnings forecast in periods of stricter non-compete enforcement. Further, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the lower probability of forecast issuance is more pronounced for a CEO who has greater concern for his reputation, faces more risk in forecasting, and is more vulnerable to dismissal.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
forecasts; risk-taking; Accounting; career concerns
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Accounting
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dhaliwal, Dan

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleManagerial Career Concerns and Earnings Forecastsen_US
dc.creatorShaikh, Sarahen
dc.contributor.authorShaikh, Sarahen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractUsing a novel setting, I examine the relation between a CEO's career concerns and the provision of an annual earnings forecast. Specifically, I exploit staggered changes in non-compete enforcement laws in three U.S. states as a source of exogenous variation in a CEO’s career concerns. Consistent with theory suggesting that career concerns increase a manager's aversion to risk, I find that a CEO is less likely to issue an earnings forecast in periods of stricter non-compete enforcement. Further, cross-sectional analyses indicate that the lower probability of forecast issuance is more pronounced for a CEO who has greater concern for his reputation, faces more risk in forecasting, and is more vulnerable to dismissal.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectforecastsen
dc.subjectrisk-takingen
dc.subjectAccountingen
dc.subjectcareer concernsen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Danen
dc.contributor.committeememberDhaliwal, Danen
dc.contributor.committeememberEldenburg, Leslieen
dc.contributor.committeememberNeamtiu, Monicaen
dc.contributor.committeememberSunder, Jayanthien
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