Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/555889
Title:
Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions
Author:
Serfling, Matthew
Issue Date:
2015
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
I explore the passage of wrongful discharge laws by U.S. state courts that allow workers to sue employers for unjust dismissal as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, and this result is strongest for subsamples of firms that experience larger increases in expected firing costs. Following the passage of these laws, firms also increase cash holdings, firms save more cash out of cash flows, and investors place a higher value on each additional dollar of cash holdings. Overall, my results indicate that employee firing costs can have an important impact on corporate financial policy decisions.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Cash holdings; Firing costs; Labor laws; Layoffs; Management; Capital structure
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Management
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Klasa, Sandy
Committee Chair:
Klasa, Sandy

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleFiring Costs and Capital Structure Decisionsen_US
dc.creatorSerfling, Matthewen
dc.contributor.authorSerfling, Matthewen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en
dc.description.abstractI explore the passage of wrongful discharge laws by U.S. state courts that allow workers to sue employers for unjust dismissal as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, and this result is strongest for subsamples of firms that experience larger increases in expected firing costs. Following the passage of these laws, firms also increase cash holdings, firms save more cash out of cash flows, and investors place a higher value on each additional dollar of cash holdings. Overall, my results indicate that employee firing costs can have an important impact on corporate financial policy decisions.en
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectCash holdingsen
dc.subjectFiring costsen
dc.subjectLabor lawsen
dc.subjectLayoffsen
dc.subjectManagementen
dc.subjectCapital structureen
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen
thesis.degree.disciplineManagementen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen
dc.contributor.advisorKlasa, Sandyen
dc.contributor.chairKlasa, Sandyen
dc.contributor.committeememberKlasa, Sandyen
dc.contributor.committeememberKahle, Kathleenen
dc.contributor.committeememberOrtiz-Molina, Hernanen
dc.contributor.committeememberWilliams, Ryanen
dc.contributor.committeememberWoutersen, Tiemenen
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