Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/333086
Title:
Forgiveness and Responsibility
Author:
Warmke, Brandon
Issue Date:
2014
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Release 01-Jun-2015
Abstract:
In Forgiveness and Responsibility, I investigate the nature and norms of moral forgiveness. The standard account of forgiveness claims that forgiving is (or at least requires) the overcoming of resentment. I argue, however, that there is no single way to forgive and so no non-trivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions for forgiveness. I identify the prototypical manifestation of forgiveness, using it to explain the diversity of our forgiveness practices. Prototypical manifestations of forgiveness are cases of directed forgiveness, in which one takes up a certain kind of forgiving attitude towards a wrongdoer and overtly manifests that attitude, most notably by a speech act. This speech act crucially involves the victim relinquishing certain of her rights to blame the wrongdoer, as well as releasing the wrongdoer from certain kinds of personal obligations to the victim. Other modes of forgiveness are understood as extensions of the prototype to the extent that they share either the interior, psychological features or the exterior, behavioral features of directed forgiveness. I conclude by arguing that in order to preserve certain intuitive views about the norms bearing on forgiveness, our best theories of forgiveness should hold that: (1) forgiving is prototypically under one's voluntary control; (2) wrongdoers cannot obligate their victims to forgive them; and (3) forgiving alters the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Forgiveness; Punishment; Resentment; Responsibility; Philosophy; Blame
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
McKenna, Michael

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleForgiveness and Responsibilityen_US
dc.creatorWarmke, Brandonen_US
dc.contributor.authorWarmke, Brandonen_US
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseRelease 01-Jun-2015en_US
dc.description.abstractIn Forgiveness and Responsibility, I investigate the nature and norms of moral forgiveness. The standard account of forgiveness claims that forgiving is (or at least requires) the overcoming of resentment. I argue, however, that there is no single way to forgive and so no non-trivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions for forgiveness. I identify the prototypical manifestation of forgiveness, using it to explain the diversity of our forgiveness practices. Prototypical manifestations of forgiveness are cases of directed forgiveness, in which one takes up a certain kind of forgiving attitude towards a wrongdoer and overtly manifests that attitude, most notably by a speech act. This speech act crucially involves the victim relinquishing certain of her rights to blame the wrongdoer, as well as releasing the wrongdoer from certain kinds of personal obligations to the victim. Other modes of forgiveness are understood as extensions of the prototype to the extent that they share either the interior, psychological features or the exterior, behavioral features of directed forgiveness. I conclude by arguing that in order to preserve certain intuitive views about the norms bearing on forgiveness, our best theories of forgiveness should hold that: (1) forgiving is prototypically under one's voluntary control; (2) wrongdoers cannot obligate their victims to forgive them; and (3) forgiving alters the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer.en_US
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectForgivenessen_US
dc.subjectPunishmenten_US
dc.subjectResentmenten_US
dc.subjectResponsibilityen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectBlameen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorMcKenna, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMcKenna, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTimmons, Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGill, Marken_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.