Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/322984
Title:
Structure and Objects: A Defense of Structural Realism
Author:
Glick, David A.
Issue Date:
2014
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
What stance should we take toward our best scientific theories? Traditionally, there have been two answers: realism and antirealism. Structural realism is an attempt to find middle-ground between these two views. Rather than accept everything our best theories seem to say about the world, the structural realist endorses only what those theories tell us about the structure of the world. I argue that switching the focus to structure allows the realist to better deal with problems of theory-change, and to better make sense of contemporary physics. I go on to offer a specific version of structural realism based on an understanding of structures as networks of relations between objects that are nothing more than places in structures. My view allows that there are objects and relations, but reverses the usual order of dependence: objects depend on relations rather than the other way around.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Philosophy; Structural Realism
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Healey, Richard

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleStructure and Objects: A Defense of Structural Realismen_US
dc.creatorGlick, David A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGlick, David A.en_US
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractWhat stance should we take toward our best scientific theories? Traditionally, there have been two answers: realism and antirealism. Structural realism is an attempt to find middle-ground between these two views. Rather than accept everything our best theories seem to say about the world, the structural realist endorses only what those theories tell us about the structure of the world. I argue that switching the focus to structure allows the realist to better deal with problems of theory-change, and to better make sense of contemporary physics. I go on to offer a specific version of structural realism based on an understanding of structures as networks of relations between objects that are nothing more than places in structures. My view allows that there are objects and relations, but reverses the usual order of dependence: objects depend on relations rather than the other way around.en_US
dc.typetexten
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectStructural Realismen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorHealey, Richarden_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHealey, Richarden_US
dc.contributor.committeememberIsmael, Jenannen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHorgan, Terryen_US
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