Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/301689
Title:
Tragic Irony: Socrates in Hegel's History of Philosophy
Author:
Farr, Patrick Matthew
Issue Date:
2013
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The following thesis outlines Hegel’s interpretation of Socrates in order to prove that as a negative dialectician, Socrates constitutes both a world historic personality who met a fate (Schicksal) which was tragic and practiced a philosophy which was tragically ironic. In this undertaking, Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy takes central importance which defines tragedy as two equally justified opposing forces which clash and destroy one another. This Theory of Tragedy is extended to show that through Socrates’ absolutely free will he brought himself to a tragic clash with the Athenian Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), the Sophists’ arbitrary will, and the phenomenological will of uneducated Athenians. This clash is described in terms of a Hegelian Tragedy within which both Socrates and Athens were right and just in their actions against one another, but in the end were destroyed through those actions. His Method and Dialectic is then argued represent a negative dialectic which through the negation of negativity becomes positive as a midwifery of the consciousness. Next, because his Method and Dialectic begin in negativity and end in positivity, Socratic Elenchus is argued to not be representative of what has been termed “the Socratic Irony,” but instead only the negative moment of the Socratic Method. Finally, the Socratic Irony which Hegel argues is representative of both Socratic Philosophy and world history is defined as a Tragic Irony which sublates the finite consciousness of the phenomenological will, and the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), and the infinite arbitrary will of the Sophists in order to become a trans-subjective absolutely free will which becomes infinite itself like the Sophists’ will through reflection on the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit).
Type:
text; Electronic Thesis
Keywords:
free will; Hegelian Tragedy; negative dialectic; Socratic Irony; Tragic Irony; Philosophy; Daemonion
Degree Name:
M.A.
Degree Level:
masters
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Kamtekar, Rachana

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleTragic Irony: Socrates in Hegel's History of Philosophyen_US
dc.creatorFarr, Patrick Matthewen_US
dc.contributor.authorFarr, Patrick Matthewen_US
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe following thesis outlines Hegel’s interpretation of Socrates in order to prove that as a negative dialectician, Socrates constitutes both a world historic personality who met a fate (Schicksal) which was tragic and practiced a philosophy which was tragically ironic. In this undertaking, Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy takes central importance which defines tragedy as two equally justified opposing forces which clash and destroy one another. This Theory of Tragedy is extended to show that through Socrates’ absolutely free will he brought himself to a tragic clash with the Athenian Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), the Sophists’ arbitrary will, and the phenomenological will of uneducated Athenians. This clash is described in terms of a Hegelian Tragedy within which both Socrates and Athens were right and just in their actions against one another, but in the end were destroyed through those actions. His Method and Dialectic is then argued represent a negative dialectic which through the negation of negativity becomes positive as a midwifery of the consciousness. Next, because his Method and Dialectic begin in negativity and end in positivity, Socratic Elenchus is argued to not be representative of what has been termed “the Socratic Irony,” but instead only the negative moment of the Socratic Method. Finally, the Socratic Irony which Hegel argues is representative of both Socratic Philosophy and world history is defined as a Tragic Irony which sublates the finite consciousness of the phenomenological will, and the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit), and the infinite arbitrary will of the Sophists in order to become a trans-subjective absolutely free will which becomes infinite itself like the Sophists’ will through reflection on the Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit).en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen_US
dc.subjectfree willen_US
dc.subjectHegelian Tragedyen_US
dc.subjectnegative dialecticen_US
dc.subjectSocratic Ironyen_US
dc.subjectTragic Ironyen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectDaemonionen_US
thesis.degree.nameM.A.en_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorKamtekar, Rachanaen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberAnas, Juliaen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberChristiano, Tomen_US
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