Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/301479
Title:
Naturalizing Moral Judgment
Author:
Kumar, Victor
Issue Date:
2013
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Dissertation Not Available (per Author's Request) / University of Arizona affiliates can find this item in the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Database
Abstract:
In this dissertation I develop a theory of moral judgment as a natural kind. Instead of analyzing the concept of moral judgment, I develop an empirically grounded theory of its underlying nature. In chapter one I argue that moral judgment is a hybrid state of moral belief and moral emotion. The view is supported by a dual systems model of moral cognition and accounts for the internal but defeasible relationship between moral judgment and motivation. In chapter two I argue that in moral judgment moral norms are conceptualized as social, serious, general, authority-independent and objective. The view is supported by empirical research on the moral/conventional distinction and yields an empirical explanation of the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement. In chapter three I explore whether psychopaths have the capacity for moral judgment, and thus whether they are real life "amoralists," individuals who make moral judgments but lack moral motivation. I argue that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment and that prominent internalist accounts of moral judgment have difficulty accounting for psychopaths' peculiar combination of deficits.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
moral concepts; moral judgment; natural kind; psychopaths; Philosophy; hybrid theory
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Nichols, Shaun

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleNaturalizing Moral Judgmenten_US
dc.creatorKumar, Victoren_US
dc.contributor.authorKumar, Victoren_US
dc.date.issued2013en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseDissertation Not Available (per Author's Request) / University of Arizona affiliates can find this item in the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Databaseen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I develop a theory of moral judgment as a natural kind. Instead of analyzing the concept of moral judgment, I develop an empirically grounded theory of its underlying nature. In chapter one I argue that moral judgment is a hybrid state of moral belief and moral emotion. The view is supported by a dual systems model of moral cognition and accounts for the internal but defeasible relationship between moral judgment and motivation. In chapter two I argue that in moral judgment moral norms are conceptualized as social, serious, general, authority-independent and objective. The view is supported by empirical research on the moral/conventional distinction and yields an empirical explanation of the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement. In chapter three I explore whether psychopaths have the capacity for moral judgment, and thus whether they are real life "amoralists," individuals who make moral judgments but lack moral motivation. I argue that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment and that prominent internalist accounts of moral judgment have difficulty accounting for psychopaths' peculiar combination of deficits.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectmoral conceptsen_US
dc.subjectmoral judgmenten_US
dc.subjectnatural kinden_US
dc.subjectpsychopathsen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjecthybrid theoryen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorNichols, Shaunen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTimmons, Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHorgan, Terrenceen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberNichols, Shaunen_US
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