Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/298730
Title:
The separateness of persons
Author:
Zwonlinski, Matt
Issue Date:
2003
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
One of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the separateness of persons is somehow normatively momentous. A proper respect for separateness is supposed to lead us not only to reject aggregative theories such as utilitarianism, but to embrace some particular positive theory about the sorts of obligations and claims we have amongst each other. Typically, philosophers have focused on the way in which the separateness of persons is important to matters of distribution. Given the intuitively unjust distributions often sanctioned by utilitarianism, such a focus makes sense. Much of the contribution of my dissertation, however, is to argue that separateness is relevant not just as a fact about persons as beneficiaries, but perhaps even more fundamentally, as agents. Chapter one explores the connection between respect for the separateness of persons and liberal theory, with reference to the cases of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Chapter two defends the reasonableness of respect for separateness against the metaphysical critique of Derek Parfit. Chapters three and four spell out the main idea of respect for separateness as agents. Chapter five examines applies this analysis to free markets, and argues that while separateness provides some grounds for criticizing markets, it also provides some interesting, non-efficiency based grounds for praising them.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Philosophy
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Schmidtz, David

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe separateness of personsen_US
dc.creatorZwonlinski, Matten_US
dc.contributor.authorZwonlinski, Matten_US
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractOne of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the separateness of persons is somehow normatively momentous. A proper respect for separateness is supposed to lead us not only to reject aggregative theories such as utilitarianism, but to embrace some particular positive theory about the sorts of obligations and claims we have amongst each other. Typically, philosophers have focused on the way in which the separateness of persons is important to matters of distribution. Given the intuitively unjust distributions often sanctioned by utilitarianism, such a focus makes sense. Much of the contribution of my dissertation, however, is to argue that separateness is relevant not just as a fact about persons as beneficiaries, but perhaps even more fundamentally, as agents. Chapter one explores the connection between respect for the separateness of persons and liberal theory, with reference to the cases of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Chapter two defends the reasonableness of respect for separateness against the metaphysical critique of Derek Parfit. Chapters three and four spell out the main idea of respect for separateness as agents. Chapter five examines applies this analysis to free markets, and argues that while separateness provides some grounds for criticizing markets, it also provides some interesting, non-efficiency based grounds for praising them.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSchmidtz, Daviden_US
dc.identifier.proquest3107059en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b44667474en_US
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