Preventing Climate Change: Game Theory in International Climate Politics

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/297705
Title:
Preventing Climate Change: Game Theory in International Climate Politics
Author:
Lucas, Natalie Rose
Issue Date:
2013
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Climate change is a focus of policy debate throughout the world, including international forums a such as United Nations. Despite the great attention given to climate change, little in the way of collective international policy has been forthcoming. This thesis provides a game theoretic analysis of the current lack of international policy. No effective policy is apt to emerge unless everyone comes together to make drastic reforms to policies that affect climate change across the world. This thesis goes into detail as to why, internationally, we are stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium (as in the "stag hunt" game) in climate change negotiations. It then offers several conclusions as to how the game can be solved in order for this problem to have resolutions.
Type:
text; Electronic Thesis
Degree Name:
B.A.
Degree Level:
bachelors
Degree Program:
Honors College; Philosophy, Politics, Economics, & Law
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Gaus, Gerald

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titlePreventing Climate Change: Game Theory in International Climate Politicsen_US
dc.creatorLucas, Natalie Roseen_US
dc.contributor.authorLucas, Natalie Roseen_US
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractClimate change is a focus of policy debate throughout the world, including international forums a such as United Nations. Despite the great attention given to climate change, little in the way of collective international policy has been forthcoming. This thesis provides a game theoretic analysis of the current lack of international policy. No effective policy is apt to emerge unless everyone comes together to make drastic reforms to policies that affect climate change across the world. This thesis goes into detail as to why, internationally, we are stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium (as in the "stag hunt" game) in climate change negotiations. It then offers several conclusions as to how the game can be solved in order for this problem to have resolutions.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen_US
thesis.degree.nameB.A.en_US
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy, Politics, Economics, & Lawen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorGaus, Gerald-
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