Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293597
Title:
The Moral Mind: Emotion, Evolution, and the Case for Skepticism
Author:
Lopez, Theresa
Issue Date:
2013
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Recent work in empirical moral psychology has led to at least one point of consensus: intuitive, psychologically-spontaneous cognitive processes play a central and inescapable role in moral evaluation. However, among those who accept that intuitive processes play a central role there remains much debate concerning the underlying character of these intuitive processes, as well as their developmental and evolutionary origins. The two dominant approaches are represented by psychological sentimentalists, who hold that these underlying processes are essentially emotion-driven, and moral nativists, who hold that these processes are subserved by innate, tacitly-held moral principles. In the course of this dissertation I critically examine each of these prominent psychological accounts, and work to outline a novel alternative. Questions concerning the psychological processes involved in moral judgment are interesting in their own right, as well as for their potential relevance to debates in ethical theory. The observed role of intuitive processing in moral judgment challenges those traditions in psychology and philosophy according to which deliberate rational processes do or should dominate. Indeed, it is widely thought that the centrality of these intuitive processes serves to undermine the status of morality and the epistemic standing of moral beliefs. Both the sentimentalist and the nativist analyses of intuitive moral judgment have been used to ground challenges to the status of morality and moral belief. I build on my critiques of the empirical adequacy of the psychological and evolutionary claims grounding these challenges to develop ways to defeat them. When properly understood, neither of these accounts of intuitive moral psychology supports a global challenge to the epistemic standing of moral belief.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Moral Nativism; Moral Psychology; Philosophy; Cognitive Science
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Timmons, Mark

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleThe Moral Mind: Emotion, Evolution, and the Case for Skepticismen_US
dc.creatorLopez, Theresaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLopez, Theresaen_US
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractRecent work in empirical moral psychology has led to at least one point of consensus: intuitive, psychologically-spontaneous cognitive processes play a central and inescapable role in moral evaluation. However, among those who accept that intuitive processes play a central role there remains much debate concerning the underlying character of these intuitive processes, as well as their developmental and evolutionary origins. The two dominant approaches are represented by psychological sentimentalists, who hold that these underlying processes are essentially emotion-driven, and moral nativists, who hold that these processes are subserved by innate, tacitly-held moral principles. In the course of this dissertation I critically examine each of these prominent psychological accounts, and work to outline a novel alternative. Questions concerning the psychological processes involved in moral judgment are interesting in their own right, as well as for their potential relevance to debates in ethical theory. The observed role of intuitive processing in moral judgment challenges those traditions in psychology and philosophy according to which deliberate rational processes do or should dominate. Indeed, it is widely thought that the centrality of these intuitive processes serves to undermine the status of morality and the epistemic standing of moral beliefs. Both the sentimentalist and the nativist analyses of intuitive moral judgment have been used to ground challenges to the status of morality and moral belief. I build on my critiques of the empirical adequacy of the psychological and evolutionary claims grounding these challenges to develop ways to defeat them. When properly understood, neither of these accounts of intuitive moral psychology supports a global challenge to the epistemic standing of moral belief.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectMoral Nativismen_US
dc.subjectMoral Psychologyen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectCognitive Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorTimmons, Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeememberNichols, Shaunen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHorgan, Terenceen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGill, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTimmons, Marken_US
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