Corporate Accountability Reporting, Assurance, and High-Profile Misconduct

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293472
Title:
Corporate Accountability Reporting, Assurance, and High-Profile Misconduct
Author:
Christensen, Dane Mark
Issue Date:
2013
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Release after 12-Apr-2014
Abstract:
I investigate whether corporate accountability reporting and assurance help protect firm value. Specifically, I examine: 1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (bribery, kickbacks, discrimination, etc.), and 2) when high-profile misconduct does occur, does prior corporate accountability reporting reduce the negative stock price reaction. Using propensity-score matching to address self-selection, I find that on average firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which in turn influences expected punishments. Lastly, I find no evidence that external assurance of corporate accountability reports decreases the likelihood of high-profile misconduct occurring, nor does it reduce the stock price hit when high-profile misconduct occurs, consistent with concerns raised about the value of this new form of assurance.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Corporate Accountability Reporting; Corporate Social Responsibility; Misconduct; Accounting; Assurance
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Accounting
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dhaliwal, Dan S.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleCorporate Accountability Reporting, Assurance, and High-Profile Misconducten_US
dc.creatorChristensen, Dane Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorChristensen, Dane Marken_US
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseRelease after 12-Apr-2014en_US
dc.description.abstractI investigate whether corporate accountability reporting and assurance help protect firm value. Specifically, I examine: 1) whether corporate accountability reporting helps firms prevent the occurrence of high-profile misconduct (bribery, kickbacks, discrimination, etc.), and 2) when high-profile misconduct does occur, does prior corporate accountability reporting reduce the negative stock price reaction. Using propensity-score matching to address self-selection, I find that on average firms that report on their corporate accountability activities are less likely to engage in high-profile misconduct, consistent with the reporting process helping firms manage their operations better. Additionally, I find that when high-profile misconduct does occur, firms that have previously issued corporate accountability reports experience a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with corporate accountability reports influencing perceptions of managerial intent, which in turn influences expected punishments. Lastly, I find no evidence that external assurance of corporate accountability reports decreases the likelihood of high-profile misconduct occurring, nor does it reduce the stock price hit when high-profile misconduct occurs, consistent with concerns raised about the value of this new form of assurance.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Accountability Reportingen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Social Responsibilityen_US
dc.subjectMisconducten_US
dc.subjectAccountingen_US
dc.subjectAssuranceen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberFelix, William, Jr.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMichas, Paulen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTrombley, Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeememberDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
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