The social structure of political behavior: Action, interaction and congressional cosponsorship

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/290367
Title:
The social structure of political behavior: Action, interaction and congressional cosponsorship
Author:
Cook, James Matthew
Issue Date:
2000
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The twin objectives of this dissertation, understanding political behavior as a social phenomenon and assessing the relative impacts of action and interaction on behavior, are realized through the empirical study of cosponsorship in the United States Congress. Cosponsorship, the formal support of a bill, is commonly said to be a rational action by a member of Congress designed to further electoral goals. However, it is also possible that cosponsorship is the arational result of social interaction. Processes based on the principles of action and interaction may occur within the Congress or with reference to entities outside the Congress. Combinations of principle and environment provide a simple theoretical framework from which a number of hypotheses are generated. To test these hypotheses, a random sample of 100 bills from the House of Representatives during the 105th Congress is generated. Information regarding leadership, reciprocity, congressional districts, campaign contributions, media coverage, election results, organizational memberships, member demography and bill cosponsorship is recorded for each combination of sampled bill, member of the House, and week the Congress was in session. Comparisons and relations between members are represented in matrix form. A combined network effects-discrete time approximation approach converts these matrices into individual-level predictions of a congressperson's likelihood of cosponsorship over time. Alternatively, QAP analysis regresses relations on relations to make cross-sectional predictions about any two members' cosponsorship overlap. Results illuminate the importance of interaction to political behavior.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Sociology, Theory and Methods.; Political Science, General.; Sociology, Social Structure and Development.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Sociology
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
McPherson, J. Miller

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe social structure of political behavior: Action, interaction and congressional cosponsorshipen_US
dc.creatorCook, James Matthewen_US
dc.contributor.authorCook, James Matthewen_US
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe twin objectives of this dissertation, understanding political behavior as a social phenomenon and assessing the relative impacts of action and interaction on behavior, are realized through the empirical study of cosponsorship in the United States Congress. Cosponsorship, the formal support of a bill, is commonly said to be a rational action by a member of Congress designed to further electoral goals. However, it is also possible that cosponsorship is the arational result of social interaction. Processes based on the principles of action and interaction may occur within the Congress or with reference to entities outside the Congress. Combinations of principle and environment provide a simple theoretical framework from which a number of hypotheses are generated. To test these hypotheses, a random sample of 100 bills from the House of Representatives during the 105th Congress is generated. Information regarding leadership, reciprocity, congressional districts, campaign contributions, media coverage, election results, organizational memberships, member demography and bill cosponsorship is recorded for each combination of sampled bill, member of the House, and week the Congress was in session. Comparisons and relations between members are represented in matrix form. A combined network effects-discrete time approximation approach converts these matrices into individual-level predictions of a congressperson's likelihood of cosponsorship over time. Alternatively, QAP analysis regresses relations on relations to make cross-sectional predictions about any two members' cosponsorship overlap. Results illuminate the importance of interaction to political behavior.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectSociology, Theory and Methods.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science, General.en_US
dc.subjectSociology, Social Structure and Development.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSociologyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorMcPherson, J. Milleren_US
dc.identifier.proquest3002524en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b41426782en_US
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