Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289821
Title:
The economics of dual job holding
Author:
Renna, Francesco
Issue Date:
2002
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation aims at enhancing the knowledge about dual job holding. While most studies in labor economics assume that each person holds only one job, a significant part of the work force holds two jobs simultaneously. The first part of the dissertation empirically analyzes the determinants of wages for dual jobholders, with an emphasis on the contribution of the "on the job" human capital accumulation. In order to increase the number of observations, data from 1990 to 1994 have been pulled together, thus resulting in a panel. The usual problem associated with panel data, together with the need to control for the selection bias, makes the full information maximum likelihood estimation very challenging. New econometric techniques developed by Wooldridge (Journal of Econometrics, 1995) and Vella and Verbeek (Journal of Econometrics, 1999) are used to overcome this problem. We found some evidence that the motivation behind the decision to hold two jobs may play an important role in determining the market return of moonlighting. Given the results of the first study, I explore the motivations that induce workers to hold two jobs and I explicitly design a labor supply function that includes these different motivations. I identify two major motivations: I call the first motivation the "hours constraint model". The hours constraint model says that workers underemployed will seek a second job in order to fulfill the gap in their work schedule. Yet, some workers may decide to hold two jobs simply because each job has some peculiar characteristics that makes it appealing to the worker. I call this motivation the "job portfolio model". The last part of the dissertation looks at the impact of hours regulation on the decision to hold two jobs. The understanding of this relationship is important in order to address the real impact of time-sharing policies on reducing unemployment. By enforcing stricter working week standards, labor policies aim at creating new jobs by inducing employers to shift from an intensive to and extensive use of workers. However I found that reducing the working week causes some workers to be underemployed, thus increasing the number of moonlighters.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Economics, Labor.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Economics
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Oaxaca, Ronald L.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe economics of dual job holdingen_US
dc.creatorRenna, Francescoen_US
dc.contributor.authorRenna, Francescoen_US
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation aims at enhancing the knowledge about dual job holding. While most studies in labor economics assume that each person holds only one job, a significant part of the work force holds two jobs simultaneously. The first part of the dissertation empirically analyzes the determinants of wages for dual jobholders, with an emphasis on the contribution of the "on the job" human capital accumulation. In order to increase the number of observations, data from 1990 to 1994 have been pulled together, thus resulting in a panel. The usual problem associated with panel data, together with the need to control for the selection bias, makes the full information maximum likelihood estimation very challenging. New econometric techniques developed by Wooldridge (Journal of Econometrics, 1995) and Vella and Verbeek (Journal of Econometrics, 1999) are used to overcome this problem. We found some evidence that the motivation behind the decision to hold two jobs may play an important role in determining the market return of moonlighting. Given the results of the first study, I explore the motivations that induce workers to hold two jobs and I explicitly design a labor supply function that includes these different motivations. I identify two major motivations: I call the first motivation the "hours constraint model". The hours constraint model says that workers underemployed will seek a second job in order to fulfill the gap in their work schedule. Yet, some workers may decide to hold two jobs simply because each job has some peculiar characteristics that makes it appealing to the worker. I call this motivation the "job portfolio model". The last part of the dissertation looks at the impact of hours regulation on the decision to hold two jobs. The understanding of this relationship is important in order to address the real impact of time-sharing policies on reducing unemployment. By enforcing stricter working week standards, labor policies aim at creating new jobs by inducing employers to shift from an intensive to and extensive use of workers. However I found that reducing the working week causes some workers to be underemployed, thus increasing the number of moonlighters.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Labor.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorOaxaca, Ronald L.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest3060964en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b43038359en_US
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