The legacy of the Meno Paradox: Plato and Aristotle on learning and error

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289146
Title:
The legacy of the Meno Paradox: Plato and Aristotle on learning and error
Author:
Labarge, Scott M.
Issue Date:
2000
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This thesis will argue that Plato's influential philosophical puzzle known as the Meno Paradox and the related Problem of False Belief are a more serious threat to Plato's philosophical programme (and ours) than many interpreters recognize. Furthermore, Plato's most obvious candidate for a solution to these problems, the Theory of Recollection, is not sufficient to explain how the Paradox misunderstands the epistemic processes of learning which it treats. This failure of Plato's account motivates a close consideration of Aristotle's sophisticated attempt to resolve the difficulties Plato raises. I will argue that a proper understanding of Aristotle's philosophy of mind and the forms of cognition through which he thinks humans progress yields the key to a powerful and heretofore unrecognized Aristotelian solution to the Meno Paradox and the Problem of False Belief.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Philosophy.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Annas, Julia

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe legacy of the Meno Paradox: Plato and Aristotle on learning and erroren_US
dc.creatorLabarge, Scott M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLabarge, Scott M.en_US
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis will argue that Plato's influential philosophical puzzle known as the Meno Paradox and the related Problem of False Belief are a more serious threat to Plato's philosophical programme (and ours) than many interpreters recognize. Furthermore, Plato's most obvious candidate for a solution to these problems, the Theory of Recollection, is not sufficient to explain how the Paradox misunderstands the epistemic processes of learning which it treats. This failure of Plato's account motivates a close consideration of Aristotle's sophisticated attempt to resolve the difficulties Plato raises. I will argue that a proper understanding of Aristotle's philosophy of mind and the forms of cognition through which he thinks humans progress yields the key to a powerful and heretofore unrecognized Aristotelian solution to the Meno Paradox and the Problem of False Belief.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorAnnas, Juliaen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9972110en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b40640401en_US
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