Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288978
Title:
The theoretical foundations for an environmental ethic
Author:
Simpson, Juanita Mae, 1950-
Issue Date:
1997
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
In this dissertation I have been concerned to conduct an analysis into the theoretical role played by the concept of intrinsic value as it has been invoked by various foundations for an Environmental Ethic. Within this analysis, I have distinguished between a metaphysical conception of intrinsic value, having to do with its ontological status, and a normative conception which abstracts from any questions pertaining to ontology and pertains solely to questions of normativity and moral obligation. I have noted a symmetry between certain earlier metaethical dialogues (Sidgwick and Moore) and the more recent debates concerning value's ontology in the domain of environmental value theory. I believe that the latter day Last Person thought experiment mirrors the challenge given by Sidgwick to which Moore responded with his Beautiful World analysis. Theorists have conflated a requirement for a noninstrumentalist (intrinsic) value with the requirement for a strongly objectivist ontology for value. Hence, theorists believed that what was required was a nondispositionalist, internal notion of value... a value abstracted from any evaluative stance or even any possible evaluative stance. I show that this confusion is expressed in the present dialogue of environmental ethics. After assessing the role played by the notion of intrinsic value, I inquire into a coherent form of this notion and offer a revised theoretical framework or foundation for an environmental ethic by offering a revised account of its logical status.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Philosophy.; Environmental Sciences.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Feinberg, Joel

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe theoretical foundations for an environmental ethicen_US
dc.creatorSimpson, Juanita Mae, 1950-en_US
dc.contributor.authorSimpson, Juanita Mae, 1950-en_US
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I have been concerned to conduct an analysis into the theoretical role played by the concept of intrinsic value as it has been invoked by various foundations for an Environmental Ethic. Within this analysis, I have distinguished between a metaphysical conception of intrinsic value, having to do with its ontological status, and a normative conception which abstracts from any questions pertaining to ontology and pertains solely to questions of normativity and moral obligation. I have noted a symmetry between certain earlier metaethical dialogues (Sidgwick and Moore) and the more recent debates concerning value's ontology in the domain of environmental value theory. I believe that the latter day Last Person thought experiment mirrors the challenge given by Sidgwick to which Moore responded with his Beautiful World analysis. Theorists have conflated a requirement for a noninstrumentalist (intrinsic) value with the requirement for a strongly objectivist ontology for value. Hence, theorists believed that what was required was a nondispositionalist, internal notion of value... a value abstracted from any evaluative stance or even any possible evaluative stance. I show that this confusion is expressed in the present dialogue of environmental ethics. After assessing the role played by the notion of intrinsic value, I inquire into a coherent form of this notion and offer a revised theoretical framework or foundation for an environmental ethic by offering a revised account of its logical status.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy.en_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental Sciences.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorFeinberg, Joelen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9729472en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b34802010en_US
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