Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288814
Title:
Institutions, contracts, and asset market prices
Author:
James, Duncan Ross
Issue Date:
1998
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Tournament incentives have been extensively analyzed, and recommended as policy, by economists and compensation consultants alike. Analysis of tournaments typically looks at the effect of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior in non-market settings (public good provision, team tasks, etc.). In contrast, this work investigates the effect of tournament contracts for individual agents on market performance. In particular, this work investigates the effect on asset market performance of individual contracts that reward "beating the market". To this end, both theory and laboratory experiments are employed. The theoretical prediction that the rational expectations equilibrium is destroyed by the introduction of "beat the market" contracts is overwhelmingly supported by the experimental data.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Economics, General.; Economics, Finance.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Economics
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Isaac, R. Mark

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleInstitutions, contracts, and asset market pricesen_US
dc.creatorJames, Duncan Rossen_US
dc.contributor.authorJames, Duncan Rossen_US
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractTournament incentives have been extensively analyzed, and recommended as policy, by economists and compensation consultants alike. Analysis of tournaments typically looks at the effect of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior in non-market settings (public good provision, team tasks, etc.). In contrast, this work investigates the effect of tournament contracts for individual agents on market performance. In particular, this work investigates the effect on asset market performance of individual contracts that reward "beating the market". To this end, both theory and laboratory experiments are employed. The theoretical prediction that the rational expectations equilibrium is destroyed by the introduction of "beat the market" contracts is overwhelmingly supported by the experimental data.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, General.en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Finance.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorIsaac, R. Marken_US
dc.identifier.proquest9829390en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b38555670en_US
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