Agency theory extensions: The impacts of board demography in banks and independent colleges

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/282615
Title:
Agency theory extensions: The impacts of board demography in banks and independent colleges
Author:
Olson, David Eric
Issue Date:
1998
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation is a compilation of three studies that seek to extend the reaches of agency theory. In the first study, data on California banks from 1979-1987 were used to test the effect that board strength has on the acquisition and subsequent write-off of problem loans. As expected stronger boards incurred fewer loan delinquencies and loan losses. Board strength was also associated with smaller increases in loan write-offs when management turned over but larger increases when board members turned over. This suggests that board members are susceptible to escalating their level of commitment in the same way that managers are, implying that board members are also self-serving. Using the same data set, the second study examined the relationship between management ownership in banks and corporate performance and risk-taking. In support of the agency argument, increased management ownership led to higher levels of ROA and loan losses in the banks. The function was diminishing but monotonic. Using data gathered from private colleges and universities, the third study focused attention on agency in the not-for-profit sector by examining the relationship between board of director and presidential demography and school performance as measured by institutional revenue and gifts. The results provide mixed support and direction for the extension of agency models to the not-for-profit sector. Board strength, as measured by tenure and functional background, and presidential tenure, predicted better performance. These findings suggest that while boards play a significant role in performance of not-for-profits, their focus is on facilitating access to resources from the external environment rather than in monitoring management.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Business Administration, Management.; Economics, Finance.; Education, Administration.; Business Administration, Banking.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Industrial Management
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Koput, Kenneth W.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleAgency theory extensions: The impacts of board demography in banks and independent collegesen_US
dc.creatorOlson, David Ericen_US
dc.contributor.authorOlson, David Ericen_US
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is a compilation of three studies that seek to extend the reaches of agency theory. In the first study, data on California banks from 1979-1987 were used to test the effect that board strength has on the acquisition and subsequent write-off of problem loans. As expected stronger boards incurred fewer loan delinquencies and loan losses. Board strength was also associated with smaller increases in loan write-offs when management turned over but larger increases when board members turned over. This suggests that board members are susceptible to escalating their level of commitment in the same way that managers are, implying that board members are also self-serving. Using the same data set, the second study examined the relationship between management ownership in banks and corporate performance and risk-taking. In support of the agency argument, increased management ownership led to higher levels of ROA and loan losses in the banks. The function was diminishing but monotonic. Using data gathered from private colleges and universities, the third study focused attention on agency in the not-for-profit sector by examining the relationship between board of director and presidential demography and school performance as measured by institutional revenue and gifts. The results provide mixed support and direction for the extension of agency models to the not-for-profit sector. Board strength, as measured by tenure and functional background, and presidential tenure, predicted better performance. These findings suggest that while boards play a significant role in performance of not-for-profits, their focus is on facilitating access to resources from the external environment rather than in monitoring management.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectBusiness Administration, Management.en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Finance.en_US
dc.subjectEducation, Administration.en_US
dc.subjectBusiness Administration, Banking.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineIndustrial Managementen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorKoput, Kenneth W.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest9829351en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b38552796en_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.