The political economy of the Mount Graham International Observatory facility siting conflict

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/278153
Title:
The political economy of the Mount Graham International Observatory facility siting conflict
Author:
Rhodes, Thomas Christopher, 1959-
Issue Date:
1992
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The absolutist nature of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 encourages uneven enforcement, lengthy litigation, and rent seeking in the public policy process. There are net social benefits to be captured from a cooperative approach to facility siting. The narrow utility functions involved in unilateral facility siting attempts often ignore costs shifted on to others from development. Inclusion of all affected parties in facility planning can achieve siting of the right projects in the right places at least social cost. The institutional structure of an economy is deterministic with respect to efficient policy outcomes. Political power plays a central role in natural resource conflicts, frequently affecting the role of science in policy debates. An analysis of the Mt. Graham International Observatory facility siting conflict illustrates these findings.
Type:
text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Economics, Agricultural.; Political Science, General.
Degree Name:
M.S.
Degree Level:
masters
Degree Program:
Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Wilson, Paul N.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of the Mount Graham International Observatory facility siting conflicten_US
dc.creatorRhodes, Thomas Christopher, 1959-en_US
dc.contributor.authorRhodes, Thomas Christopher, 1959-en_US
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe absolutist nature of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 encourages uneven enforcement, lengthy litigation, and rent seeking in the public policy process. There are net social benefits to be captured from a cooperative approach to facility siting. The narrow utility functions involved in unilateral facility siting attempts often ignore costs shifted on to others from development. Inclusion of all affected parties in facility planning can achieve siting of the right projects in the right places at least social cost. The institutional structure of an economy is deterministic with respect to efficient policy outcomes. Political power plays a central role in natural resource conflicts, frequently affecting the role of science in policy debates. An analysis of the Mt. Graham International Observatory facility siting conflict illustrates these findings.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeThesis-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Agricultural.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science, General.en_US
thesis.degree.nameM.S.en_US
thesis.degree.levelmastersen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorWilson, Paul N.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest1349122en_US
dc.identifier.bibrecord.b27628383en_US
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