Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/265817
Title:
Database Forensics in the Service of Information Accountability
Author:
Pavlou, Kyriacos Eleftheriou
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Regulations and societal expectations have recently emphasized the need to mediate access to valuable databases, even by insiders. At one end of a spectrum is the approach of restricting access to information; at the other is information accountability. The focus of this work is on effecting information accountability of data stored in relational databases. One way to ensure appropriate use and thus end-to-end accountability of such information is through continuous assurance technology, via tamper detection in databases built upon cryptographic hashing. We show how to achieve information accountability by developing and refining the necessary approaches and ideas to support accountability in high-performance databases. These concepts include the design of a reference architecture for information accountability and several of its variants, the development of a sequence of successively more sophisticated forensic analysis algorithms and their forensic cost model, and a systematic formulation of forensic analysis for determining when the tampering occurred and what data were tampered with. We derive a lower bound for the forensic cost and prove that some of the algorithms are optimal under certain circumstances. We introduce a comprehensive taxonomy of the types of possible corruption events, along with an associated forensic analysis protocol that consolidates all extant forensic algorithms and the corresponding type(s) of corruption events they detect. Finally, we show how our information accountability solution can be used for databases residing in the cloud. In order to evaluate our ideas we design and implement an integrated tamper detection and forensic analysis system named DRAGOON. This work shows that information accountability is a viable alternative to information restriction for ensuring the correct storage, use, and maintenance of high-performance relational databases.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
forensic analysis algorithms; information accountability; relational databases; security; Computer Science; cloud computing; database forensics
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Computer Science
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Snodgrass, Richard T.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleDatabase Forensics in the Service of Information Accountabilityen_US
dc.creatorPavlou, Kyriacos Eleftheriouen_US
dc.contributor.authorPavlou, Kyriacos Eleftheriouen_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractRegulations and societal expectations have recently emphasized the need to mediate access to valuable databases, even by insiders. At one end of a spectrum is the approach of restricting access to information; at the other is information accountability. The focus of this work is on effecting information accountability of data stored in relational databases. One way to ensure appropriate use and thus end-to-end accountability of such information is through continuous assurance technology, via tamper detection in databases built upon cryptographic hashing. We show how to achieve information accountability by developing and refining the necessary approaches and ideas to support accountability in high-performance databases. These concepts include the design of a reference architecture for information accountability and several of its variants, the development of a sequence of successively more sophisticated forensic analysis algorithms and their forensic cost model, and a systematic formulation of forensic analysis for determining when the tampering occurred and what data were tampered with. We derive a lower bound for the forensic cost and prove that some of the algorithms are optimal under certain circumstances. We introduce a comprehensive taxonomy of the types of possible corruption events, along with an associated forensic analysis protocol that consolidates all extant forensic algorithms and the corresponding type(s) of corruption events they detect. Finally, we show how our information accountability solution can be used for databases residing in the cloud. In order to evaluate our ideas we design and implement an integrated tamper detection and forensic analysis system named DRAGOON. This work shows that information accountability is a viable alternative to information restriction for ensuring the correct storage, use, and maintenance of high-performance relational databases.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectforensic analysis algorithmsen_US
dc.subjectinformation accountabilityen_US
dc.subjectrelational databasesen_US
dc.subjectsecurityen_US
dc.subjectComputer Scienceen_US
dc.subjectcloud computingen_US
dc.subjectdatabase forensicsen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineComputer Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSnodgrass, Richard T.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberDowney, Peter J.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMerchant, Niraven_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWatkins, Joseph C.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWinslett, Marianneen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSnodgrass, Richard T.en_US
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