Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/265373
Title:
Accepting It
Author:
Evans, Ian
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Most of us are aware of believing things we know we should not - often, we cannot help it. My dissertation comprises three papers exploring this phenomenon. In "Revealed Irrationality," I defend the possibility of believing, of one of one's beliefs, that it is irrational. "The Dispositionalist Gambit" examines a recent strategy for defending the claim that we have voluntary control over what we believe and finds it wanting. But there is a propositional attitude we have control over - what I call acceptance - and in "Acceptance" I argue that we need this attitude to explain otherwise puzzling behavior.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Philosophy
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Cohen, Stewart

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleAccepting Iten_US
dc.creatorEvans, Ianen_US
dc.contributor.authorEvans, Ianen_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractMost of us are aware of believing things we know we should not - often, we cannot help it. My dissertation comprises three papers exploring this phenomenon. In "Revealed Irrationality," I defend the possibility of believing, of one of one's beliefs, that it is irrational. "The Dispositionalist Gambit" examines a recent strategy for defending the claim that we have voluntary control over what we believe and finds it wanting. But there is a propositional attitude we have control over - what I call acceptance - and in "Acceptance" I argue that we need this attitude to explain otherwise puzzling behavior.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorCohen, Stewarten_US
dc.contributor.committeememberComesaña, Juanen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberLehrer, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMcKenna, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberCohen, Stewarten_US
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