Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/255195
Title:
Structural Predictors of Contract Performance
Author:
Carboni, Julia L.
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Release after 03-Dec-2013
Abstract:
Government increasingly contracts out public functions to the private sector. While theory about contract performance management is abundant, there is little empirical evidence on contract performance. Additionally, the public management contract literature emphasizes management strategies to produce desired performance but largely disregards how the structure of ex post contract settings influences individual contract performance. In this dissertation, I develop theory and measures to assess how structural variables influence contract performance on quality dimensions. I focus on networked structures of exchange between contracted programs and government funders and the way exchange is situated in a larger environment. The empirical basis for my dissertation is a set of government funded residential services programs for delinquent youth. The outcome variable is a measure of program quality created by the government funder. Predictor variables include competition at the program and parent organization level and the overall presence of public and nonprofit programs in the contract network. I also examine the effects of organizational form on performance. Most programs are contracted to nonprofit and for-profit organizations with a small number of programs directly provided by government. The mixed market provides an opportunity to test existing theory about organizational form and performance. I use hierarchical linear models (HLM) and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how structural variables influence performance. In the HLM analysis, I find some support for my hypotheses about structural predictors of performance. In the QCA analysis, I find that effects of organizational form are conditional upon structural variables. It appears that nonprofit and public programs perform well under a variety of conditions while for-profit programs are more likely to perform acceptably when they are constrained by structural factors like competition. This dissertation makes theoretical, empirical and practical contributions to the field of public management. Following recent, scholarly tradition, I examine the changing role of government and its increasing use of the nonprofit and for-profit organizations to deliver government services. I incorporate structural theory into the contract management literature and demonstrate the structure of contract settings influences performance. I also develop formal measures of competition in contract settings. I also find that HLM and QCA can be complementary analytical tools and provide a richer picture of causal processes when used on the same dataset.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
contract performance; organizational form; structural embeddedness; Management; contract management; contract network
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Management
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Milward, H. Brinton; Smith, Craig R.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleStructural Predictors of Contract Performanceen_US
dc.creatorCarboni, Julia L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCarboni, Julia L.en_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseRelease after 03-Dec-2013en_US
dc.description.abstractGovernment increasingly contracts out public functions to the private sector. While theory about contract performance management is abundant, there is little empirical evidence on contract performance. Additionally, the public management contract literature emphasizes management strategies to produce desired performance but largely disregards how the structure of ex post contract settings influences individual contract performance. In this dissertation, I develop theory and measures to assess how structural variables influence contract performance on quality dimensions. I focus on networked structures of exchange between contracted programs and government funders and the way exchange is situated in a larger environment. The empirical basis for my dissertation is a set of government funded residential services programs for delinquent youth. The outcome variable is a measure of program quality created by the government funder. Predictor variables include competition at the program and parent organization level and the overall presence of public and nonprofit programs in the contract network. I also examine the effects of organizational form on performance. Most programs are contracted to nonprofit and for-profit organizations with a small number of programs directly provided by government. The mixed market provides an opportunity to test existing theory about organizational form and performance. I use hierarchical linear models (HLM) and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how structural variables influence performance. In the HLM analysis, I find some support for my hypotheses about structural predictors of performance. In the QCA analysis, I find that effects of organizational form are conditional upon structural variables. It appears that nonprofit and public programs perform well under a variety of conditions while for-profit programs are more likely to perform acceptably when they are constrained by structural factors like competition. This dissertation makes theoretical, empirical and practical contributions to the field of public management. Following recent, scholarly tradition, I examine the changing role of government and its increasing use of the nonprofit and for-profit organizations to deliver government services. I incorporate structural theory into the contract management literature and demonstrate the structure of contract settings influences performance. I also develop formal measures of competition in contract settings. I also find that HLM and QCA can be complementary analytical tools and provide a richer picture of causal processes when used on the same dataset.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectcontract performanceen_US
dc.subjectorganizational formen_US
dc.subjectstructural embeddednessen_US
dc.subjectManagementen_US
dc.subjectcontract managementen_US
dc.subjectcontract networken_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineManagementen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorMilward, H. Brintonen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSmith, Craig R.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGalaskiewicz, Josephen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMilward, H. Brintonen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSmith, Craig R.en_US
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