The Rational Design of Security Institutions: Effects of Institutional Design on Institutional Performance

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/247253
Title:
The Rational Design of Security Institutions: Effects of Institutional Design on Institutional Performance
Author:
Tandon, Aakriti A.
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Based on the assumption that security institutions are designed rationally, I study the variations in design schemes and their possible effects on institutional performance. Military alliances vary with respect to their membership size, level of security obligations undertaken by the allies, incorporation of non security clauses such as economic agreements, level of institutionalization, specified duration of existence, as well as the conditions under and reasons for which they are formed. This dissertation studies the effects of above mentioned design features on the probability of security alliances expanding their scope by addressing non-security agreements such as free trade agreements and conflict management clauses. I find support for the argument that states include economic agreements within a military alliance as a means to bolster the credibility of an otherwise weak security alliance. Results indicate that allies facing high levels of external threat and low levels of intra alliance cohesion are more likely to include conflict management provisions in the alliance. Finally, I conduct a systematic study of the possible effects of variation in structural design on the durability of an alliance. I find that design features that increase the costs of breaking the alliance increase the duration of an alliance.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Institutional Design; International Institutions; Issue Linkage; Military Alliance; Political Science; Alliance Duration; Conflict Management
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Political Science
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Goertz, Gary

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleThe Rational Design of Security Institutions: Effects of Institutional Design on Institutional Performanceen_US
dc.creatorTandon, Aakriti A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTandon, Aakriti A.en_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractBased on the assumption that security institutions are designed rationally, I study the variations in design schemes and their possible effects on institutional performance. Military alliances vary with respect to their membership size, level of security obligations undertaken by the allies, incorporation of non security clauses such as economic agreements, level of institutionalization, specified duration of existence, as well as the conditions under and reasons for which they are formed. This dissertation studies the effects of above mentioned design features on the probability of security alliances expanding their scope by addressing non-security agreements such as free trade agreements and conflict management clauses. I find support for the argument that states include economic agreements within a military alliance as a means to bolster the credibility of an otherwise weak security alliance. Results indicate that allies facing high levels of external threat and low levels of intra alliance cohesion are more likely to include conflict management provisions in the alliance. Finally, I conduct a systematic study of the possible effects of variation in structural design on the durability of an alliance. I find that design features that increase the costs of breaking the alliance increase the duration of an alliance.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectInstitutional Designen_US
dc.subjectInternational Institutionsen_US
dc.subjectIssue Linkageen_US
dc.subjectMilitary Allianceen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subjectAlliance Durationen_US
dc.subjectConflict Managementen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorGoertz, Garyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberVolgy, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGhosn, Fatenen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGoertz, Garyen_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.