Proposed Experiment of a Voluntary Coalition Game for the Provision of Public Goods

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/244794
Title:
Proposed Experiment of a Voluntary Coalition Game for the Provision of Public Goods
Author:
Secomb, Julian John
Issue Date:
May-2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
A proposed approach to avoiding the tragedy of the commons involves a public goods scenario in which players may join a coalition whose members contribute to the public good only when it is in the best interest of the group as a whole. Theoretical analysis of this scenario predicts a constant coalition size, regardless of the number of players vying for the public good. Here, a laboratory experiment is proposed to examine the relationship between number of players and number of coalition members in a coalition game based on this scenario. Two hypotheses will be tested: (1) The number of coalition members is independent of the number of players. (2) The likelihood of the formulation of a contributing coalition is independent of the number of players. Possible outcomes and their interpretations are discussed. The results will have potential applications in devising strategies for increasing contributions to public goods in the real world.
Type:
text; Electronic Thesis
Degree Name:
B.S.B.A.
Degree Level:
bachelors
Degree Program:
Honors College; Economics
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleProposed Experiment of a Voluntary Coalition Game for the Provision of Public Goodsen_US
dc.creatorSecomb, Julian Johnen_US
dc.contributor.authorSecomb, Julian Johnen_US
dc.date.issued2012-05-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractA proposed approach to avoiding the tragedy of the commons involves a public goods scenario in which players may join a coalition whose members contribute to the public good only when it is in the best interest of the group as a whole. Theoretical analysis of this scenario predicts a constant coalition size, regardless of the number of players vying for the public good. Here, a laboratory experiment is proposed to examine the relationship between number of players and number of coalition members in a coalition game based on this scenario. Two hypotheses will be tested: (1) The number of coalition members is independent of the number of players. (2) The likelihood of the formulation of a contributing coalition is independent of the number of players. Possible outcomes and their interpretations are discussed. The results will have potential applications in devising strategies for increasing contributions to public goods in the real world.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesisen_US
thesis.degree.nameB.S.B.A.en_US
thesis.degree.levelbachelorsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHonors Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
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