Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/228113
Title:
Oppression and Victim Agency
Author:
Silvermint, Daniel Mark
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
If we want to take the agency of the oppressed seriously, we need to think about their normative situation. We need to understand what oppression does to victims, and what victims ought to do as a result. The first half of my dissertation develops a new account of oppression, one that identifies cases not by the wrongs that oppressors embody but by the burdens that victims suffer. The second half questions what kinds of moral and political actors victims can and should be. According to the prevailing "group relationship" of model of oppression, the members of a social group are oppressed when they're subordinated, marginalized, constrained, or displaced in a way that benefits the members of a different social group. In place of this prevailing view, I propose a new, effects-centered model: a person is oppressed when their autonomy or their life prospects are systematically and wrongfully burdened. I then use this account to understand the moral and political agency of the oppressed. I argue that victims have a self-regarding moral obligation to resist their oppression, grounded in considerations of objective well-being. And I develop Aristotle's account of political virtue to apply across ideal and oppressive circumstances alike, adapting it as a defense of nonviolent civil disobedience. This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research project concerned with the nature of victimhood, how injustice affects agency, and how obligations can be grounded in the absence of just institutions.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
oppression; political philosophy; self-regarding obligations; victimhood; Philosophy; agency; feminism
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Schmidtz, David

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleOppression and Victim Agencyen_US
dc.creatorSilvermint, Daniel Marken_US
dc.contributor.authorSilvermint, Daniel Marken_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractIf we want to take the agency of the oppressed seriously, we need to think about their normative situation. We need to understand what oppression does to victims, and what victims ought to do as a result. The first half of my dissertation develops a new account of oppression, one that identifies cases not by the wrongs that oppressors embody but by the burdens that victims suffer. The second half questions what kinds of moral and political actors victims can and should be. According to the prevailing "group relationship" of model of oppression, the members of a social group are oppressed when they're subordinated, marginalized, constrained, or displaced in a way that benefits the members of a different social group. In place of this prevailing view, I propose a new, effects-centered model: a person is oppressed when their autonomy or their life prospects are systematically and wrongfully burdened. I then use this account to understand the moral and political agency of the oppressed. I argue that victims have a self-regarding moral obligation to resist their oppression, grounded in considerations of objective well-being. And I develop Aristotle's account of political virtue to apply across ideal and oppressive circumstances alike, adapting it as a defense of nonviolent civil disobedience. This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research project concerned with the nature of victimhood, how injustice affects agency, and how obligations can be grounded in the absence of just institutions.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectoppressionen_US
dc.subjectpolitical philosophyen_US
dc.subjectself-regarding obligationsen_US
dc.subjectvictimhooden_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectagencyen_US
dc.subjectfeminismen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSchmidtz, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.committeememberChristiano, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberCalhoun, Cheshireen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMcKenna, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSchmidtz, Daviden_US
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