Constrained to Cooperate: Domestic Political Capacity and Regional Order

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/223350
Title:
Constrained to Cooperate: Domestic Political Capacity and Regional Order
Author:
Rhamey, Jon Patrick Jr.
Issue Date:
2012
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Release after 29-Apr-2013
Abstract:
In this dissertation I develop a theory that seeks to account for the variation in order present across regions. I propose that the observed variation in regional order in the international system is rooted in the domestic politics of region members. Unlike other attempts at explaining regional order, I account for domestic politics in the political capacity of member states. Measured as the relative ability of states to extract resources from their domestic societies, political capacity provides a measure of institutional and cultural constraints upon the ability of states to engage in costly foreign policies, such as conflict. The more extensive these constraints, the more likely a state will engage in cooperative behavior, resulting in more extensive regional institutions or trade interdependence. I show that regions comprised of high capacity democracies, like Europe, are highly cooperative, while those comprised of high capacity autocracies, like the Middle East, are more conflictual. The more cooperative the region, the greater the degree of interdependence and institutional architecture that will emerge. Finally, because the presence of regional order is contingent upon the domestic characteristics of constituent states, I develop a novel means of identifying regions for the proper measurement and identification of regional variables of interest. Using an opportunity and willingness framework, I define regions as stable geographic spaces of interacting states behaving uniquely from the broader international system. The resulting empirical analysis is a new dataset that provides not only a necessary means of case selection for the regional level variables included in this dissertation, but a specification of regions broadly applicable to regionalist research.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
International Institutions; Political Capacity; Regionalism; Trade Interdependence; Political Science; Extraction; International Conflict
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Political Science
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Volgy, Thomas J.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleConstrained to Cooperate: Domestic Political Capacity and Regional Orderen_US
dc.creatorRhamey, Jon Patrick Jr.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRhamey, Jon Patrick Jr.en_US
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseRelease after 29-Apr-2013en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this dissertation I develop a theory that seeks to account for the variation in order present across regions. I propose that the observed variation in regional order in the international system is rooted in the domestic politics of region members. Unlike other attempts at explaining regional order, I account for domestic politics in the political capacity of member states. Measured as the relative ability of states to extract resources from their domestic societies, political capacity provides a measure of institutional and cultural constraints upon the ability of states to engage in costly foreign policies, such as conflict. The more extensive these constraints, the more likely a state will engage in cooperative behavior, resulting in more extensive regional institutions or trade interdependence. I show that regions comprised of high capacity democracies, like Europe, are highly cooperative, while those comprised of high capacity autocracies, like the Middle East, are more conflictual. The more cooperative the region, the greater the degree of interdependence and institutional architecture that will emerge. Finally, because the presence of regional order is contingent upon the domestic characteristics of constituent states, I develop a novel means of identifying regions for the proper measurement and identification of regional variables of interest. Using an opportunity and willingness framework, I define regions as stable geographic spaces of interacting states behaving uniquely from the broader international system. The resulting empirical analysis is a new dataset that provides not only a necessary means of case selection for the regional level variables included in this dissertation, but a specification of regions broadly applicable to regionalist research.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectInternational Institutionsen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Capacityen_US
dc.subjectRegionalismen_US
dc.subjectTrade Interdependenceen_US
dc.subjectPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subjectExtractionen_US
dc.subjectInternational Conflicten_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorVolgy, Thomas J.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGoertz, Garyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGhosn, Fatenen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberVolgy, Thomas J.en_US
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