Competitive Convergence: Mechanisms, Scope Conditions, and Lessons from the Case of Indian Food Safety Reform

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/204891
Title:
Competitive Convergence: Mechanisms, Scope Conditions, and Lessons from the Case of Indian Food Safety Reform
Author:
Epstein, Jessica
Issue Date:
2011
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Embargo: Release after 08/08/2013
Abstract:
In 2006, India began formally reconstructing its national food safety policy, subsuming over seven laws and agencies into a single streamlined regulatory authority. This moment of reform offers a "most likely" test case for theories of global policy convergence. Scholars across multiple fields predict that national politics are becoming more similar over time. Those predictions are especially strong in the field of food safety policy, as the WTO now mandates that member states align with an encyclopedic policy resource called the Codex Alimentarius. The dissertation asks whether, how, and why we see both global pressures for and actual evidence of convergence in the Indian case. I ask if the details of the case map onto the prevailing account in sociology, which predicts convergence as a result of spreading political culture; the sociology of food's broad predictions of both convergence and low political autonomy vis a vis global trade mandates; or the prevailing account in political science, which sees domestic regulatory change as a result of global competitions for consumer markets. I find very limited convergence in the Indian case, mostly limited to a nascent movement toward norms of "science-based" regulation. I also find that theories of regulatory competition best explain why India has converged to the extent it has, though the case suggests new causal mechanisms whereby trade agreements and economic competition generate regulatory change.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
regulation; trade; Sociology; food safety; india
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Sociology
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Kenworthy, Lane

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleCompetitive Convergence: Mechanisms, Scope Conditions, and Lessons from the Case of Indian Food Safety Reformen_US
dc.creatorEpstein, Jessicaen_US
dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Jessicaen_US
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseEmbargo: Release after 08/08/2013en_US
dc.description.abstractIn 2006, India began formally reconstructing its national food safety policy, subsuming over seven laws and agencies into a single streamlined regulatory authority. This moment of reform offers a "most likely" test case for theories of global policy convergence. Scholars across multiple fields predict that national politics are becoming more similar over time. Those predictions are especially strong in the field of food safety policy, as the WTO now mandates that member states align with an encyclopedic policy resource called the Codex Alimentarius. The dissertation asks whether, how, and why we see both global pressures for and actual evidence of convergence in the Indian case. I ask if the details of the case map onto the prevailing account in sociology, which predicts convergence as a result of spreading political culture; the sociology of food's broad predictions of both convergence and low political autonomy vis a vis global trade mandates; or the prevailing account in political science, which sees domestic regulatory change as a result of global competitions for consumer markets. I find very limited convergence in the Indian case, mostly limited to a nascent movement toward norms of "science-based" regulation. I also find that theories of regulatory competition best explain why India has converged to the extent it has, though the case suggests new causal mechanisms whereby trade agreements and economic competition generate regulatory change.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjecttradeen_US
dc.subjectSociologyen_US
dc.subjectfood safetyen_US
dc.subjectindiaen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSociologyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorKenworthy, Laneen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGalaskiwicz, Josephen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberRagin, Charlesen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSchwatzman, Kathleenen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKenworthy, Laneen_US
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