EUDAIMONISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY: EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF EUDAIMONIA AND A EUDAIMONIST APPROACH IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/204296
Title:
EUDAIMONISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY: EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF EUDAIMONIA AND A EUDAIMONIST APPROACH IN EPISTEMOLOGY
Author:
Baril, Anne
Issue Date:
2010
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Embargo:
Dissertation Not Available (per Author's Request)
Abstract:
Eudaimonism holds that a human being's thriving, or flourishing, provides the proper standard for the structuring of her life. In this dissertation I take steps toward a eudaimonist virtue epistemology, according to which the epistemic virtues are (1) deeply entrenched, coherent dispositions to think, act, and feel, and (2) part of a holistic system of such dispositions, a system in which (a) (intuitively) epistemic traits are interrelated with, and mutually supporting with (intuitively) non-epistemic traits, and (b) the elements of this system are unified in being elements of a system of character traits that human beings need in order to flourish. I argue that eudaimonism should be understood as a view of how we ought, all-things-considered, organize our lives, not as a contemporary moral theory that gives an account of what we ought morally to do. I argue that, so understood, a eudaimonist virtue ethics avoids some of the problems it is charged with when it is understood as a contemporary normative ethical theory, including charges that it offers the wrong kind of explanation of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions, and charges that it is egoistic. Likewise, it avoids analogues to those charges that arise in epistemology, including the charge that such a view will be baldly pragmatist, telling us to believe whatever is in our best interests. Eudaimonism, on the understanding that I propose, endorses the (all-things-considered) claim that one ought to develop the epistemic virtues on the condition that such traits are traits that enable us to flourish.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Graduate College; Philosophy
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Annas, Julia E.; Horgan, Terence

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleEUDAIMONISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY: EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF EUDAIMONIA AND A EUDAIMONIST APPROACH IN EPISTEMOLOGYen_US
dc.creatorBaril, Anneen_US
dc.contributor.authorBaril, Anneen_US
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.releaseDissertation Not Available (per Author's Request)en_US
dc.description.abstractEudaimonism holds that a human being's thriving, or flourishing, provides the proper standard for the structuring of her life. In this dissertation I take steps toward a eudaimonist virtue epistemology, according to which the epistemic virtues are (1) deeply entrenched, coherent dispositions to think, act, and feel, and (2) part of a holistic system of such dispositions, a system in which (a) (intuitively) epistemic traits are interrelated with, and mutually supporting with (intuitively) non-epistemic traits, and (b) the elements of this system are unified in being elements of a system of character traits that human beings need in order to flourish. I argue that eudaimonism should be understood as a view of how we ought, all-things-considered, organize our lives, not as a contemporary moral theory that gives an account of what we ought morally to do. I argue that, so understood, a eudaimonist virtue ethics avoids some of the problems it is charged with when it is understood as a contemporary normative ethical theory, including charges that it offers the wrong kind of explanation of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions, and charges that it is egoistic. Likewise, it avoids analogues to those charges that arise in epistemology, including the charge that such a view will be baldly pragmatist, telling us to believe whatever is in our best interests. Eudaimonism, on the understanding that I propose, endorses the (all-things-considered) claim that one ought to develop the epistemic virtues on the condition that such traits are traits that enable us to flourish.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorAnnas, Julia E.en_US
dc.contributor.advisorHorgan, Terenceen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberRiggs, Wayneen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTimmons, Marken_US
dc.identifier.proquest11169en
dc.identifier.oclc752261023en
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