Relays and Marathons: The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/196141
Title:
Relays and Marathons: The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements
Author:
Intintoli, Vincent
Issue Date:
2007
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This study examines marathon successions, which I define as instances where a permanent successor is not chosen at the time of a CEO departure. Marathons have become increasingly prevalent over the last ten years and represent the majority of succession decisions surrounding forced turnovers from 1995-2005. Firms implementing marathon successions around forced turnovers have strong internal governance structures, as measured by board size, director ownership, percentage of outside directors, and dual Chairman/CEO appointments. In addition, I find little evidence supporting the argument that extending the succession process through the use of a marathon leads to increases in uncertainty and/or agency costs in the form of horizon problems. Lastly, I find positive and significant announcement returns for forced marathon successions. These results provide insight into the succession process and the role of strong internal corporate governance in evaluating and implementing succession decisions.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
CEO Turnover; Corporate Governance
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Management; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Kahle, Kathleen
Committee Chair:
Kahle, Kathleen

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleRelays and Marathons: The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcementsen_US
dc.creatorIntintoli, Vincenten_US
dc.contributor.authorIntintoli, Vincenten_US
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study examines marathon successions, which I define as instances where a permanent successor is not chosen at the time of a CEO departure. Marathons have become increasingly prevalent over the last ten years and represent the majority of succession decisions surrounding forced turnovers from 1995-2005. Firms implementing marathon successions around forced turnovers have strong internal governance structures, as measured by board size, director ownership, percentage of outside directors, and dual Chairman/CEO appointments. In addition, I find little evidence supporting the argument that extending the succession process through the use of a marathon leads to increases in uncertainty and/or agency costs in the form of horizon problems. Lastly, I find positive and significant announcement returns for forced marathon successions. These results provide insight into the succession process and the role of strong internal corporate governance in evaluating and implementing succession decisions.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectCEO Turnoveren_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineManagementen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorKahle, Kathleenen_US
dc.contributor.chairKahle, Kathleenen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberDyl, Edward A.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKlasa, Sandyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBates, Thomas W.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberOaxaca, Ronald L.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest2353en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659748233en_US
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