Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195992
Title:
A Non-Ideal Theory of Justice
Author:
Arvan, Marcus Samuel
Issue Date:
2008
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation constructs a "non-ideal theory" of justice: a systematic theory of how to respond justly to injustice. Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John Rawls' famous original position - the Non-Ideal Original Position - as a method with which to construct such a theory. Finally, Chapter 1 uses the Non-Ideal Original Position to argue for a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a principle that requires injustices to be dealt with in whichever way will best satisfy the preferences of all relevant individuals, provided those individuals are all rational, adequately informed, broadly moral, and accept the correct "ideal theory" of fully just conditions. Chapter 2 then argues for the Principle of Application - an epistemic principle that represents the Fundamental Principle's satisfaction conditions in terms of the aims of actual or hypothetical reformist groups. Chapters 3-5 then use these two principles to argue for substantive views regarding global/international justice. Chapter 3 argues that the two principles establish a higher-order human right for all other human rights to promoted and protected in accordance with the two principles of non-ideal theory. Chapter 4 argues that the two principles defeasibly require the international community to tolerate unjust societies, provided those societies respect the most basic rights of individuals. Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the two principles imply a duty of the international community to ameliorate severe poverty, as well as a duty to implement "fair trade" practices in international economics.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
fairness; global; international; justice; liberalism; Rawls
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Christiano, Thomas

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleA Non-Ideal Theory of Justiceen_US
dc.creatorArvan, Marcus Samuelen_US
dc.contributor.authorArvan, Marcus Samuelen_US
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation constructs a "non-ideal theory" of justice: a systematic theory of how to respond justly to injustice. Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John Rawls' famous original position - the Non-Ideal Original Position - as a method with which to construct such a theory. Finally, Chapter 1 uses the Non-Ideal Original Position to argue for a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a principle that requires injustices to be dealt with in whichever way will best satisfy the preferences of all relevant individuals, provided those individuals are all rational, adequately informed, broadly moral, and accept the correct "ideal theory" of fully just conditions. Chapter 2 then argues for the Principle of Application - an epistemic principle that represents the Fundamental Principle's satisfaction conditions in terms of the aims of actual or hypothetical reformist groups. Chapters 3-5 then use these two principles to argue for substantive views regarding global/international justice. Chapter 3 argues that the two principles establish a higher-order human right for all other human rights to promoted and protected in accordance with the two principles of non-ideal theory. Chapter 4 argues that the two principles defeasibly require the international community to tolerate unjust societies, provided those societies respect the most basic rights of individuals. Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the two principles imply a duty of the international community to ameliorate severe poverty, as well as a duty to implement "fair trade" practices in international economics.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectfairnessen_US
dc.subjectglobalen_US
dc.subjectinternationalen_US
dc.subjectjusticeen_US
dc.subjectliberalismen_US
dc.subjectRawlsen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairChristiano, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGaus, Geralden_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGill, Michaelen_US
dc.identifier.proquest10003en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659749976en_US
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