Trading For Votes: Domestic and International Institutions and Their Influence on Trade Disputes Under the GATT and WTO

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195667
Title:
Trading For Votes: Domestic and International Institutions and Their Influence on Trade Disputes Under the GATT and WTO
Author:
Dixon, Gregory
Issue Date:
2007
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This project explores the impact of international and domestic institutions on the decisions of political leaders. A theory of two-level institutional incentives is developed that seeks to explain how institutional context at the domestic and international levels affects the incentives, and thus the behavior of political leaders when making decisions related to trade policy. This theory argues that the institutional context in which political leaders make policy decisions has a significant effect on their decision-making. Further, the institutional context must include both domestic and international institutions. Building on previous work on the impact of institutions at both the domestic and international levels, this project seeks to test the theory of institutional incentives in the context of trade disputes under the GATT and WTO.A series of empirical tests are conducted using a dataset of GATT disputes combined with a new dataset of disputes under the WTO. These tests demonstrate strong support for the theories set forth in this project that domestic and international institutions combine to affect the behavior of political leaders. Domestic institutions affect the impact of international institutions and vice versa. This project extends previous work in two-level institutional incentives by demonstrating that institutional change at both levels has significant effects on the behavior of political leaders.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
WTO; institutions; dispute settlement
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Political Science; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dixon, William
Committee Chair:
Dixon, William

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleTrading For Votes: Domestic and International Institutions and Their Influence on Trade Disputes Under the GATT and WTOen_US
dc.creatorDixon, Gregoryen_US
dc.contributor.authorDixon, Gregoryen_US
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis project explores the impact of international and domestic institutions on the decisions of political leaders. A theory of two-level institutional incentives is developed that seeks to explain how institutional context at the domestic and international levels affects the incentives, and thus the behavior of political leaders when making decisions related to trade policy. This theory argues that the institutional context in which political leaders make policy decisions has a significant effect on their decision-making. Further, the institutional context must include both domestic and international institutions. Building on previous work on the impact of institutions at both the domestic and international levels, this project seeks to test the theory of institutional incentives in the context of trade disputes under the GATT and WTO.A series of empirical tests are conducted using a dataset of GATT disputes combined with a new dataset of disputes under the WTO. These tests demonstrate strong support for the theories set forth in this project that domestic and international institutions combine to affect the behavior of political leaders. Domestic institutions affect the impact of international institutions and vice versa. This project extends previous work in two-level institutional incentives by demonstrating that institutional change at both levels has significant effects on the behavior of political leaders.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectWTOen_US
dc.subjectinstitutionsen_US
dc.subjectdispute settlementen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDixon, Williamen_US
dc.contributor.chairDixon, Williamen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGoertz, Garyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberVolgy, Tomen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberPowers, Kathyen_US
dc.identifier.proquest2340en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659748216en_US
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