Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195509
Title:
Personally Tax Aggressive Managers and Firm Level Tax Avoidance
Author:
Chyz, James Anthony
Issue Date:
2010
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether managers that have a propensity for personal tax aggressiveness are associated with tax avoidance at the firm level. Motivated by Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman (2009) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009), I construct a measure of personally tax aggressive ("aggressive") managers and determine whether corporate tax avoidance activities increase in their presence. The results of my study indicate that aggressive managers are associated with firm-level tax avoidance. The neoclassical view would suggest that aggressive managers' tax expertise could benefit shareholders through lower tax payments. Since aggressive managers extract their personal tax savings from shareholders, non-tax agency costs potentially increase in their presence. This has implications for the association between aggressive managers and firm value. Using the framework established through the agency view of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008) I find that on average the presence of aggressive managers is associated with increased firm value. However, consistent with recent research, governance is an important moderating factor whereby firm value in the presence of aggressive managers tends to increase only for relatively better-governed firms.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
agency view; tax aggressiveness; tax avoidance
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Accounting; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dhaliwal, Dan S.
Committee Chair:
Dhaliwal, Dan S.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titlePersonally Tax Aggressive Managers and Firm Level Tax Avoidanceen_US
dc.creatorChyz, James Anthonyen_US
dc.contributor.authorChyz, James Anthonyen_US
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether managers that have a propensity for personal tax aggressiveness are associated with tax avoidance at the firm level. Motivated by Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman (2009) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009), I construct a measure of personally tax aggressive ("aggressive") managers and determine whether corporate tax avoidance activities increase in their presence. The results of my study indicate that aggressive managers are associated with firm-level tax avoidance. The neoclassical view would suggest that aggressive managers' tax expertise could benefit shareholders through lower tax payments. Since aggressive managers extract their personal tax savings from shareholders, non-tax agency costs potentially increase in their presence. This has implications for the association between aggressive managers and firm value. Using the framework established through the agency view of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008) I find that on average the presence of aggressive managers is associated with increased firm value. However, consistent with recent research, governance is an important moderating factor whereby firm value in the presence of aggressive managers tends to increase only for relatively better-governed firms.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectagency viewen_US
dc.subjecttax aggressivenessen_US
dc.subjecttax avoidanceen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.chairDhaliwal, Dan S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberLi, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBens, Danen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberCook, Kirstenen_US
dc.identifier.proquest10890en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659753808en_US
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