Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195372
Title:
A Theory of Consciousness
Author:
Campbell, Douglas Ian
Issue Date:
2010
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
It is shown that there is an unconditional requirement on rational beings to adopt “reflexive” beliefs, these being beliefs with a very particular sort of self-referential structure. It is shown that whoever adopts such beliefs will thereby adopt beliefs that imply that a certain proposition, ᴪ, is true. From the fact that there is this unconditional requirement on rational being to adopt beliefs that imply ᴪ, it is concluded that ᴪ is knowable a priori. ᴪ is a proposition that says, in effect, that one’s own point of view is a point in space and time that is the point of view of some being who has reflexive beliefs. It is argued that this information that is contained in ᴪ boils down to the information that one’s point of view is located at a point in the world at which there is something that is “conscious” in a certain natural and philosophically interesting sense of that word. In other words, a theory of consciousness is defended according to which an entity is conscious if and only if it has reflexive beliefs.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Anthropic principle; a priori; Consciousness; knowledge; reflexive
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Horgan, Terence E.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleA Theory of Consciousnessen_US
dc.creatorCampbell, Douglas Ianen_US
dc.contributor.authorCampbell, Douglas Ianen_US
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractIt is shown that there is an unconditional requirement on rational beings to adopt “reflexive” beliefs, these being beliefs with a very particular sort of self-referential structure. It is shown that whoever adopts such beliefs will thereby adopt beliefs that imply that a certain proposition, ᴪ, is true. From the fact that there is this unconditional requirement on rational being to adopt beliefs that imply ᴪ, it is concluded that ᴪ is knowable a priori. ᴪ is a proposition that says, in effect, that one’s own point of view is a point in space and time that is the point of view of some being who has reflexive beliefs. It is argued that this information that is contained in ᴪ boils down to the information that one’s point of view is located at a point in the world at which there is something that is “conscious” in a certain natural and philosophically interesting sense of that word. In other words, a theory of consciousness is defended according to which an entity is conscious if and only if it has reflexive beliefs.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectAnthropic principleen_US
dc.subjecta priorien_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectknowledgeen_US
dc.subjectreflexiveen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairHorgan, Terence E.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMaloney, Christopheren_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTolliver, Josephen_US
dc.identifier.proquest11241en_US
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