Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194810
Title:
Model and Analysis of Provider-User Games
Author:
Soterwood, Jeanine Michelle
Issue Date:
2005
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation studies the competitive dynamics between two non-identical providers competing for customers seeking low-cost and quick service. Providers have generic delay functions where, asdemand received by each provider grows, so does delay in processing customers' requests. Given a pricing or capacity decision by each provider, customers determine the proportion of demand to send to each provider by minimizing generalized cost (monetary cost plus delaycost). This problem is formulated as a bilevel optimization, with providers competing at the upper level subject to the customers' decisions at the lower level. Occurrence of Nash equilibria between the providers is studied.First studied is the providers' problem of making decisions on capacities, while competing for a single customer. Conditions are derived for one provider to claim the entire market share, and for the occurrence of an equilibrium where both providers receive positivedemand. A numerical example in which no equilibrium exists is presented. Both the inelastic and elastic demand cases are studied for this scenario. In a second model, providers make pricing decisions with capacity fixed. Under some assumptions, it is shownthat a Nash equilibrium between providers always exists and a numerical example is presented. These models are then combined, in which providers make capacity decisions where prices equilibrate based on the results from the second model.Two competing customers with demand for a homogeneous product are then introduced, where providers choose prices as they compete for customers. This model is extended to an application along a highway corridor with a high-occupancy/toll (HOT) lane in parallel with a free road and transit line. A government agency chooses the transit service frequency while a private toll operator competes by choosing a toll to charge single-occupancy vehicles who wish to use the HOT lane.This scenario is also modeled as a bilevel program. For the lower level, a new dynamic equilibration process where homogeneous users make mode choice decisions based on previous generalized costs ofusing a particular mode is developed. Two numerical examples are presented showing a unique Nash equilibrium between the providers and an example in which multiple equilibria exist.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
bilevel programming; competitive logistics; resource allocation; nash equilibrium; two-player games
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Applied Mathematics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Mirchandani, Pitu B.
Committee Chair:
Mirchandani, Pitu B.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleModel and Analysis of Provider-User Gamesen_US
dc.creatorSoterwood, Jeanine Michelleen_US
dc.contributor.authorSoterwood, Jeanine Michelleen_US
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation studies the competitive dynamics between two non-identical providers competing for customers seeking low-cost and quick service. Providers have generic delay functions where, asdemand received by each provider grows, so does delay in processing customers' requests. Given a pricing or capacity decision by each provider, customers determine the proportion of demand to send to each provider by minimizing generalized cost (monetary cost plus delaycost). This problem is formulated as a bilevel optimization, with providers competing at the upper level subject to the customers' decisions at the lower level. Occurrence of Nash equilibria between the providers is studied.First studied is the providers' problem of making decisions on capacities, while competing for a single customer. Conditions are derived for one provider to claim the entire market share, and for the occurrence of an equilibrium where both providers receive positivedemand. A numerical example in which no equilibrium exists is presented. Both the inelastic and elastic demand cases are studied for this scenario. In a second model, providers make pricing decisions with capacity fixed. Under some assumptions, it is shownthat a Nash equilibrium between providers always exists and a numerical example is presented. These models are then combined, in which providers make capacity decisions where prices equilibrate based on the results from the second model.Two competing customers with demand for a homogeneous product are then introduced, where providers choose prices as they compete for customers. This model is extended to an application along a highway corridor with a high-occupancy/toll (HOT) lane in parallel with a free road and transit line. A government agency chooses the transit service frequency while a private toll operator competes by choosing a toll to charge single-occupancy vehicles who wish to use the HOT lane.This scenario is also modeled as a bilevel program. For the lower level, a new dynamic equilibration process where homogeneous users make mode choice decisions based on previous generalized costs ofusing a particular mode is developed. Two numerical examples are presented showing a unique Nash equilibrium between the providers and an example in which multiple equilibria exist.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectbilevel programmingen_US
dc.subjectcompetitive logisticsen_US
dc.subjectresource allocationen_US
dc.subjectnash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjecttwo-player gamesen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineApplied Mathematicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorMirchandani, Pitu B.en_US
dc.contributor.chairMirchandani, Pitu B.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberMirchandani, Pituen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSen, Suvrajecten_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWatkins, Josephen_US
dc.identifier.proquest1213en_US
dc.identifier.oclc137354400en_US
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