Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194777
Title:
Beliefs and Emotions in Games and Decisions
Author:
Smith, Alexander Charles
Issue Date:
2009
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation studies models of belief-dependent motivations in three essays.The first essay studies the Koszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences in a laboratory experiment. The propose a model where the reference point to which consumption outcomes are compared is endogenously determined as a function of lagged, probabilistic beliefs. This paper presents an experiment designed to test some predictions of the Koszegi-Rabin model. The experimental design controls for potential confounds suggested by their theory. The experimental results support their prediction of an endowment effect but do not show the attachment effect predicted by their model.The second essay, coauthored with Martin Dufwenberg and Matt Van Essen, studies how revenge may mitigate the hold-up problem from contract theory. When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur due to hold-up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold-up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment.Revenge may be driven by anger. The third essay proposes two belief-dependent models of anger: frustrated anger and anger from blame, which correspond to differing views of the emotion in the psychology literature. Both models build upon the idea that anger occurs when outcomes differ from players expectations. They differ in that anger from blame also incorporates updated beliefs and a notion of other-responsibility. The models are compared with each other and with existing models of negative reciprocity in several examples.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Anger; Belief-Dependent Utility; Emotions; Other-regarding preferences; Psychological Games; Reference-dependent preferences
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Dufwenberg, Martin
Committee Chair:
Dufwenberg, Martin

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleBeliefs and Emotions in Games and Decisionsen_US
dc.creatorSmith, Alexander Charlesen_US
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Alexander Charlesen_US
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation studies models of belief-dependent motivations in three essays.The first essay studies the Koszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences in a laboratory experiment. The propose a model where the reference point to which consumption outcomes are compared is endogenously determined as a function of lagged, probabilistic beliefs. This paper presents an experiment designed to test some predictions of the Koszegi-Rabin model. The experimental design controls for potential confounds suggested by their theory. The experimental results support their prediction of an endowment effect but do not show the attachment effect predicted by their model.The second essay, coauthored with Martin Dufwenberg and Matt Van Essen, studies how revenge may mitigate the hold-up problem from contract theory. When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur due to hold-up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold-up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment.Revenge may be driven by anger. The third essay proposes two belief-dependent models of anger: frustrated anger and anger from blame, which correspond to differing views of the emotion in the psychology literature. Both models build upon the idea that anger occurs when outcomes differ from players expectations. They differ in that anger from blame also incorporates updated beliefs and a notion of other-responsibility. The models are compared with each other and with existing models of negative reciprocity in several examples.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectAngeren_US
dc.subjectBelief-Dependent Utilityen_US
dc.subjectEmotionsen_US
dc.subjectOther-regarding preferencesen_US
dc.subjectPsychological Gamesen_US
dc.subjectReference-dependent preferencesen_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorDufwenberg, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.chairDufwenberg, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBreman, Annaen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberConnolly, Terryen_US
dc.identifier.proquest10520en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659752249en_US
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