Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194705
Title:
Experiments on Fairness and Reputation
Author:
Servatka, Maros
Issue Date:
2006
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of three essays in experimental economics. The essays investigate different aspects of reputation in fairness games in a controlled laboratory environment. It has been established in the literature of economics, sociology, and psychology that social norms together with other-regarding preferences often govern subjects' decisions in addition to strategic considerations. The dissertation examines the incentives connected with the existence of social norms that could cause deviations from standard economic model predictions. I use experiments so that I can tightly control the environment and provide rigorous tests of existing theories, stylized facts, and anecdotal evidence on the importance of reputation in economic interactions. The first essay presents findings that reputation triggers indirectly reciprocal behavior of subjects. However, reputation might only be signaling what is considered as socially appropriate behavior. This hypothesis and the results of the first essay led me to develop a set of experiments in the second essay to contrast pure reputation effects with the social influence of reputation. The third part of the dissertation, co-authored with Ninghua Du, examines reputation and efficiency wages in a labor market setting by analyzing the effects of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
experiment; fairness; reputation; decision making; labor
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Cox, James C.
Committee Chair:
Cox, James C.; Oaxaca, Ronald L.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleExperiments on Fairness and Reputationen_US
dc.creatorServatka, Marosen_US
dc.contributor.authorServatka, Marosen_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation consists of three essays in experimental economics. The essays investigate different aspects of reputation in fairness games in a controlled laboratory environment. It has been established in the literature of economics, sociology, and psychology that social norms together with other-regarding preferences often govern subjects' decisions in addition to strategic considerations. The dissertation examines the incentives connected with the existence of social norms that could cause deviations from standard economic model predictions. I use experiments so that I can tightly control the environment and provide rigorous tests of existing theories, stylized facts, and anecdotal evidence on the importance of reputation in economic interactions. The first essay presents findings that reputation triggers indirectly reciprocal behavior of subjects. However, reputation might only be signaling what is considered as socially appropriate behavior. This hypothesis and the results of the first essay led me to develop a set of experiments in the second essay to contrast pure reputation effects with the social influence of reputation. The third part of the dissertation, co-authored with Ninghua Du, examines reputation and efficiency wages in a labor market setting by analyzing the effects of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectexperimenten_US
dc.subjectfairnessen_US
dc.subjectreputationen_US
dc.subjectdecision makingen_US
dc.subjectlaboren_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorCox, James C.en_US
dc.contributor.chairCox, James C.en_US
dc.contributor.chairOaxaca, Ronald L.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberFishback, Price V.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest1809en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659747566en_US
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