Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194531
Title:
Modality and Mind
Author:
Biggs, Stephen Thomas
Issue Date:
2007
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of two parts. Part I proposes a new approach to modality, abductive modal realism. Part II proposes a new version of physicalism, abductive physicalism. The parts relate in that abductive physicalism presupposes abductive modal realism.Abductive modal realism holds that inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction) grounds some and any justified belief about mind-independent necessity and possibility. This approach avoids the disadvantages of extant approaches to modality. Specifically, unlike extant approaches, abductive modal realism accepts real, mind-independent necessities and possibilities without employing a modal epistemology that fits these poorly. Abductive physicalism holds that we should adopt abductive modal realism, that abduction favors physicalism, and thus, that we should adopt physicalism. Although standard a posteriori physicalism accepts the latter claims, it sees appeals to abduction as exceptions to an otherwise non-abductive modal epistemology. Abductive physicalism, contrariwise, sees abduction as the arbitrator of modal disputes quite generally. This difference allows abductive physicalism to avoid problems that plague standard a posteriori physicalism.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
metaphysics; epistemology; modality; necessity; mind; consciousness
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Horgan, Terry
Committee Chair:
Horgan, Terry

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleModality and Minden_US
dc.creatorBiggs, Stephen Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorBiggs, Stephen Thomasen_US
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation consists of two parts. Part I proposes a new approach to modality, abductive modal realism. Part II proposes a new version of physicalism, abductive physicalism. The parts relate in that abductive physicalism presupposes abductive modal realism.Abductive modal realism holds that inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction) grounds some and any justified belief about mind-independent necessity and possibility. This approach avoids the disadvantages of extant approaches to modality. Specifically, unlike extant approaches, abductive modal realism accepts real, mind-independent necessities and possibilities without employing a modal epistemology that fits these poorly. Abductive physicalism holds that we should adopt abductive modal realism, that abduction favors physicalism, and thus, that we should adopt physicalism. Although standard a posteriori physicalism accepts the latter claims, it sees appeals to abduction as exceptions to an otherwise non-abductive modal epistemology. Abductive physicalism, contrariwise, sees abduction as the arbitrator of modal disputes quite generally. This difference allows abductive physicalism to avoid problems that plague standard a posteriori physicalism.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectmetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectepistemologyen_US
dc.subjectmodalityen_US
dc.subjectnecessityen_US
dc.subjectminden_US
dc.subjectconsciousnessen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorHorgan, Terryen_US
dc.contributor.chairHorgan, Terryen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberChalmers, Daveen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKrigel, Uriahen_US
dc.identifier.proquest2388en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659748278en_US
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