Governance Reputation and the Market Reaction to the Auditor Switch and Retention Decision

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194479
Title:
Governance Reputation and the Market Reaction to the Auditor Switch and Retention Decision
Author:
Rodgers, Theodore
Issue Date:
2006
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the informational role of audit client (i.e. firm) reputation in the auditor switching and retention decision. I perform an experimental examination of an analytical model, prescribing the optimal choices made by firms in the decision to retain or switch auditors without considering firm reputation. Using an experimental markets approach, I provide evidence of the market reaction to a firm's switch/retention decision under two alternative treatments. In the first (baseline) treatment, an explicit test of the analytical model, firms do not incur reputation effects when making the decision to switch or retain auditors. In the second treatment, firms consider market perceptions of opportunistic auditor switching and retention and the potential effects on the firm's reputation.The choice of auditor switching and retention is a significant component of the firm's corporate governance structure. I precisely measures reputation formation and its impact on this specific governance decision by the inclusion of prior period auditor switch/retention decisions made by firms in reputation treatment conditions. Prior archival research has demonstrated a link between auditor quality and earnings quality. These studies suggest that the retention of a high-quality auditor, or dismissal of a poor-quality auditor, can signal high quality earnings to the market. The converse is also suggested; retention of a poor-quality auditor, or dismissal of a high-quality auditor, can signal poor earnings quality. The decision to retain or switch auditors is made annually by firms who have superior information over their auditors and investors. In the short run, the decision to retain or switch auditors offers a temporary signal which the market may not clearly price. However, including the firm's track record of auditor switching and retention decisions among auditors of differing quality allows for the development of a positive or negative reputation on this portion of corporate governance.The results presented provide evidence of the model's descriptive validity for the firm's optimal choices and related market reaction to the auditor switching decision for a finite time horizon. Additionally, the study examines the market reaction to a firm's reputation on the auditor switching and retention decision.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Corporate Governance; Auditing; Auditor Changes; Reputation; Experimental Markets
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Management; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Schatzberg, Jeffrey W
Committee Chair:
Schatzberg, Jeffrey W

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleGovernance Reputation and the Market Reaction to the Auditor Switch and Retention Decisionen_US
dc.creatorRodgers, Theodoreen_US
dc.contributor.authorRodgers, Theodoreen_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this dissertation is to examine the informational role of audit client (i.e. firm) reputation in the auditor switching and retention decision. I perform an experimental examination of an analytical model, prescribing the optimal choices made by firms in the decision to retain or switch auditors without considering firm reputation. Using an experimental markets approach, I provide evidence of the market reaction to a firm's switch/retention decision under two alternative treatments. In the first (baseline) treatment, an explicit test of the analytical model, firms do not incur reputation effects when making the decision to switch or retain auditors. In the second treatment, firms consider market perceptions of opportunistic auditor switching and retention and the potential effects on the firm's reputation.The choice of auditor switching and retention is a significant component of the firm's corporate governance structure. I precisely measures reputation formation and its impact on this specific governance decision by the inclusion of prior period auditor switch/retention decisions made by firms in reputation treatment conditions. Prior archival research has demonstrated a link between auditor quality and earnings quality. These studies suggest that the retention of a high-quality auditor, or dismissal of a poor-quality auditor, can signal high quality earnings to the market. The converse is also suggested; retention of a poor-quality auditor, or dismissal of a high-quality auditor, can signal poor earnings quality. The decision to retain or switch auditors is made annually by firms who have superior information over their auditors and investors. In the short run, the decision to retain or switch auditors offers a temporary signal which the market may not clearly price. However, including the firm's track record of auditor switching and retention decisions among auditors of differing quality allows for the development of a positive or negative reputation on this portion of corporate governance.The results presented provide evidence of the model's descriptive validity for the firm's optimal choices and related market reaction to the auditor switching decision for a finite time horizon. Additionally, the study examines the market reaction to a firm's reputation on the auditor switching and retention decision.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectAuditingen_US
dc.subjectAuditor Changesen_US
dc.subjectReputationen_US
dc.subjectExperimental Marketsen_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineManagementen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSchatzberg, Jeffrey Wen_US
dc.contributor.chairSchatzberg, Jeffrey Wen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberFelix, William L.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberDufwenberg, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberWaller, William S.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest1815en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659747572en_US
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