Structuralism: In Defense of a Kantian Account of Perceptual Experience

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/193980
Title:
Structuralism: In Defense of a Kantian Account of Perceptual Experience
Author:
Masrour Shalmani, Farid
Issue Date:
2008
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
My dissertation develops and defends a broadly Kantian account of perceptual experience. I call this account structuralism. Put briefly, the account holds that perceptual experience has a structure that is the manifestation of its priori content. I defend this account by showing that it provides a unified framework for understanding perceptual intentionality.I develop and defend structuralism by defending three theses. The first thesis is phenomenological. According to this thesis, perceptual experience has proprietary perceptual phenomenal intentionality only if it has a unity structure. I explicate the idea of the unity structure of experience in the process of defending this thesis. The second thesis is epistemic. Put roughly, this thesis holds that perceptual experience provides reasons for perceptual beliefs only if it has a priori content. I develop an account of the a priori content of perceptual experience in the process of defending this thesis. The third thesis unifies the phenomenological and the epistemic theses. According to this thesis, the dynamical unity structure of perceptual experience is the phenomenological manifestation of its a priori content. These three these, in conjunction with some plausible ideas provide a systematic account of perceptual intentionality.
Type:
text; Electronic Dissertation
Keywords:
Perception; Intentionality; Content; Consciousness; Phenomenology; Kant
Degree Name:
PhD
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Chalmers, David J.; Horgan, Terence E.
Committee Chair:
Chalmers, David J.; Horgan, Terence E.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoENen_US
dc.titleStructuralism: In Defense of a Kantian Account of Perceptual Experienceen_US
dc.creatorMasrour Shalmani, Fariden_US
dc.contributor.authorMasrour Shalmani, Fariden_US
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractMy dissertation develops and defends a broadly Kantian account of perceptual experience. I call this account structuralism. Put briefly, the account holds that perceptual experience has a structure that is the manifestation of its priori content. I defend this account by showing that it provides a unified framework for understanding perceptual intentionality.I develop and defend structuralism by defending three theses. The first thesis is phenomenological. According to this thesis, perceptual experience has proprietary perceptual phenomenal intentionality only if it has a unity structure. I explicate the idea of the unity structure of experience in the process of defending this thesis. The second thesis is epistemic. Put roughly, this thesis holds that perceptual experience provides reasons for perceptual beliefs only if it has a priori content. I develop an account of the a priori content of perceptual experience in the process of defending this thesis. The third thesis unifies the phenomenological and the epistemic theses. According to this thesis, the dynamical unity structure of perceptual experience is the phenomenological manifestation of its a priori content. These three these, in conjunction with some plausible ideas provide a systematic account of perceptual intentionality.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeElectronic Dissertationen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectIntentionalityen_US
dc.subjectContenten_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectPhenomenologyen_US
dc.subjectKanten_US
thesis.degree.namePhDen_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorChalmers, David J.en_US
dc.contributor.advisorHorgan, Terence E.en_US
dc.contributor.chairChalmers, David J.en_US
dc.contributor.chairHorgan, Terence E.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberSmit, Houstonen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTolliver, Josephen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberKriegel, Uriahen_US
dc.identifier.proquest2919en_US
dc.identifier.oclc659749568en_US
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