COMPUTER THOUGHT: PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND META-KNOWLEDGE (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SEMANTICS, PSYCHOLOGY, ALGORITHMS).

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188116
Title:
COMPUTER THOUGHT: PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND META-KNOWLEDGE (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SEMANTICS, PSYCHOLOGY, ALGORITHMS).
Author:
DIETRICH, ERIC STANLEY.
Issue Date:
1985
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Though artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belief and desire in computational terms, they have consistently misunderstood the notions of computation and computational semantics. Hence, their theories of such attitudes are frequently inadequate. A computational theory of propositional attitudes (belief and desire) is presented here. It is argued that the theory of propositional attitudes put forth by philosophers and psychologists entails that propositional attitudes are a kind of abstract data type. This refined computational view of propositional attitudes bridges the gap between artificial intelligence, philosophy and psychology. Lastly, it is argued that this theory of propositional attitudes has consequences for meta-processing and consciousness in computers.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Metacognition.; Knowledge, Theory of.; Philosophy and social sciences.; Computers.; Thought and thinking.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleCOMPUTER THOUGHT: PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND META-KNOWLEDGE (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SEMANTICS, PSYCHOLOGY, ALGORITHMS).en_US
dc.creatorDIETRICH, ERIC STANLEY.en_US
dc.contributor.authorDIETRICH, ERIC STANLEY.en_US
dc.date.issued1985en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThough artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belief and desire in computational terms, they have consistently misunderstood the notions of computation and computational semantics. Hence, their theories of such attitudes are frequently inadequate. A computational theory of propositional attitudes (belief and desire) is presented here. It is argued that the theory of propositional attitudes put forth by philosophers and psychologists entails that propositional attitudes are a kind of abstract data type. This refined computational view of propositional attitudes bridges the gap between artificial intelligence, philosophy and psychology. Lastly, it is argued that this theory of propositional attitudes has consequences for meta-processing and consciousness in computers.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectMetacognition.en_US
dc.subjectKnowledge, Theory of.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy and social sciences.en_US
dc.subjectComputers.en_US
dc.subjectThought and thinking.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.proquest8603337en_US
dc.identifier.oclc696802361en_US
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