Allocating effort within a social dilemma: The effects of goal-setting, ability differences, and reward risks on contributions to the group.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186877
Title:
Allocating effort within a social dilemma: The effects of goal-setting, ability differences, and reward risks on contributions to the group.
Author:
Johnson, Pauline Rowe.
Issue Date:
1994
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This research examines the effects of two conflicting goals (e.g. a group and an individual goal) and two types of rewards (e.g. an incremental and a target reward) on group contribution when group members vary in their ability to accomplish the group task. The experimental task was set up as a social dilemma in which participants were asked to work on both a group and an individual production task. Contribution to group work could lead to higher rewards for all, but it could also result in lower rewards if others failed to contribute. Setting conflicting group and individual goals, as opposed to not assigning goals, was hypothesized to encourage greater effort for the group. Being compensated after reaching a target of production, or being above or below average in task competence was hypothesized to discourage group effort. Since the assignment of a group goal should help to coordinate group effort, it was also expected to alleviate the perceived risk of contributing to the group. Therefore setting simultaneous group and individual goals when the reward was a target or when participants were above or below average in competence was expected to encourage greater group effort than when no goals were set in these conditions. Results suggest that when rewards are obtained after reaching a target of production, setting conflicting goals encourages individuals to work harder for the group than they do when no goals are assigned. However, when rewards are incrementally obtained, individuals tend to split their efforts between group and individual objectives, regardless of whether conflicting goals are assigned. Results also suggest that goal setting encourages higher group contribution for members who believe their task competence is average compared to the rest of their group, but it has no direct effect on group contribution for members who believe their ability is either above or below the group average. Implications of these results are discussed for the selection of individuals for work teams, the assignment of goals for team effectiveness, and the importance of training to equalize competencies in a team environment.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Management and Policy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Shalley, Christina E.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleAllocating effort within a social dilemma: The effects of goal-setting, ability differences, and reward risks on contributions to the group.en_US
dc.creatorJohnson, Pauline Rowe.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJohnson, Pauline Rowe.en_US
dc.date.issued1994en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis research examines the effects of two conflicting goals (e.g. a group and an individual goal) and two types of rewards (e.g. an incremental and a target reward) on group contribution when group members vary in their ability to accomplish the group task. The experimental task was set up as a social dilemma in which participants were asked to work on both a group and an individual production task. Contribution to group work could lead to higher rewards for all, but it could also result in lower rewards if others failed to contribute. Setting conflicting group and individual goals, as opposed to not assigning goals, was hypothesized to encourage greater effort for the group. Being compensated after reaching a target of production, or being above or below average in task competence was hypothesized to discourage group effort. Since the assignment of a group goal should help to coordinate group effort, it was also expected to alleviate the perceived risk of contributing to the group. Therefore setting simultaneous group and individual goals when the reward was a target or when participants were above or below average in competence was expected to encourage greater group effort than when no goals were set in these conditions. Results suggest that when rewards are obtained after reaching a target of production, setting conflicting goals encourages individuals to work harder for the group than they do when no goals are assigned. However, when rewards are incrementally obtained, individuals tend to split their efforts between group and individual objectives, regardless of whether conflicting goals are assigned. Results also suggest that goal setting encourages higher group contribution for members who believe their task competence is average compared to the rest of their group, but it has no direct effect on group contribution for members who believe their ability is either above or below the group average. Implications of these results are discussed for the selection of individuals for work teams, the assignment of goals for team effectiveness, and the importance of training to equalize competencies in a team environment.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineManagement and Policyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairShalley, Christina E.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBeach, Lee Royen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGutek, Barbara A.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest9507008en_US
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