Complying with the Arizona Groundwater Management Act: Policy implications.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186747
Title:
Complying with the Arizona Groundwater Management Act: Policy implications.
Author:
Peacock, Bruce Edward.
Issue Date:
1994
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
Groundwater overdraft in Arizona has imposed significant costs on society and has precipitated a number of social responses. One of the most significant of these responses is Arizona's Groundwater Management Act of 1980 (GMA). The GMA established a water conservation program by restricting the uses and quantities for which water may be legally employed and by prescribing the ways in which groundwater rights may be transferred. The Arizona Department of Water Resources (DWR) is charged with implementing the GMA and achieves compliance by allocating conservation enforcement and rights retirement through time. The distributive equity characteristics of these policy tools suggest that irrigated agriculture will be most affected by DWR's efforts. This study examines the major economic issues associated with GMA compliance by focusing on the various combinations of irrigation conservation enforcement and irrigation rights retirement that achieve GMA compliance, holding the level of conservation in non-irrigation uses fixed. The general result of this study is that DWR faces an inherent conflict between its two overdraft management considerations of compliance and efficiency. That is, the required use of irrigation conservation enforcement frustrates the efficient achievement of zero overdraft. A reexamination of the GMA's provisions is indicated to resolve this inconsistency and thereby promote water resources management in Arizona. Incidental to this result, the hydrologic characteristics of the regulated aquifer and the discount rate are identified as critical determinants of an optimal overdraft reduction policy.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Dissertations, Academic.; Economics.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Cory, Dennis C.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleComplying with the Arizona Groundwater Management Act: Policy implications.en_US
dc.creatorPeacock, Bruce Edward.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPeacock, Bruce Edward.en_US
dc.date.issued1994en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractGroundwater overdraft in Arizona has imposed significant costs on society and has precipitated a number of social responses. One of the most significant of these responses is Arizona's Groundwater Management Act of 1980 (GMA). The GMA established a water conservation program by restricting the uses and quantities for which water may be legally employed and by prescribing the ways in which groundwater rights may be transferred. The Arizona Department of Water Resources (DWR) is charged with implementing the GMA and achieves compliance by allocating conservation enforcement and rights retirement through time. The distributive equity characteristics of these policy tools suggest that irrigated agriculture will be most affected by DWR's efforts. This study examines the major economic issues associated with GMA compliance by focusing on the various combinations of irrigation conservation enforcement and irrigation rights retirement that achieve GMA compliance, holding the level of conservation in non-irrigation uses fixed. The general result of this study is that DWR faces an inherent conflict between its two overdraft management considerations of compliance and efficiency. That is, the required use of irrigation conservation enforcement frustrates the efficient achievement of zero overdraft. A reexamination of the GMA's provisions is indicated to resolve this inconsistency and thereby promote water resources management in Arizona. Incidental to this result, the hydrologic characteristics of the regulated aquifer and the discount rate are identified as critical determinants of an optimal overdraft reduction policy.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectDissertations, Academic.en_US
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairCory, Dennis C.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBillings, R. Bruceen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberColby, Bonnie G.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTaylor, Lester D.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest9426575en_US
dc.identifier.oclc722871582en_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.