Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186691
Title:
The nonprofit firm in a market setting.
Author:
Franciosi, Robert Julius.
Issue Date:
1994
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation analyzes the nonprofit sector using a framework developed by economists to analyze for-profit industries. Its central hypotheses are that nonprofit 'firms' are run by self-interested individuals and compete for donations in a 'market'. It develops a model that demonstrates that nonprofit contracts are not necessary to solve the principal-agent problem that stems from a good being financed by unconditional lump-sum donations. The effects of nonprofit contracts in the model are ambiguous and might very well be harmful. The model is tested using both field data from California and laboratory experiments. The tests broadly support the model.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Nonprofit organizations -- Marketing.; Fund raising -- United States.; Nonprofit organizations -- Finance.; Competition.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Isaac, R. Mark

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleThe nonprofit firm in a market setting.en_US
dc.creatorFranciosi, Robert Julius.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFranciosi, Robert Julius.en_US
dc.date.issued1994en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation analyzes the nonprofit sector using a framework developed by economists to analyze for-profit industries. Its central hypotheses are that nonprofit 'firms' are run by self-interested individuals and compete for donations in a 'market'. It develops a model that demonstrates that nonprofit contracts are not necessary to solve the principal-agent problem that stems from a good being financed by unconditional lump-sum donations. The effects of nonprofit contracts in the model are ambiguous and might very well be harmful. The model is tested using both field data from California and laboratory experiments. The tests broadly support the model.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectNonprofit organizations -- Marketing.en_US
dc.subjectFund raising -- United States.en_US
dc.subjectNonprofit organizations -- Finance.en_US
dc.subjectCompetition.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairIsaac, R. Marken_US
dc.contributor.committeememberReynolds, Stanleyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberBlock, Michaelen_US
dc.identifier.proquest9426322en_US
dc.identifier.oclc703274092en_US
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