Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186690
Title:
JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH.
Author:
COHEN, STEWART MARK.
Issue Date:
1983
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The dissertation is a study of the connection between justification and truth. It presents and critically discusses various ways of construing the connection. A dilemma is argued for to the effect that any construal of the connection is defective, while any theory of epistemic justification that ignores the connection incurs an explanatory deficit. The objective construal of the connection between epistemic justification and truth views such justification as probabilistic. A currently popular version of this view is a theory called Reliabilism. This theory is discussed in terms of both intuitive and purely logical considerations. Another way to cast out the connection between justification and truth is subjectively. It might be claimed that a subject must have beliefs about the connection between his evidence and the truth of the proposition he believes. This approach is characteristic of coderence theories. These theories are assessed with respect to their psychological reality. Since objective and doxastic construals of the connection between epistemic justification and truth fail, theories which eschew a truth connection altogether are discussed. Such an approach is characteristic of foundations theories. It is argued that these theories fail to achieve a level of generality that provides very much insight into the nature of epistemic justification. The final section of the dissertation is a detailed discussion of naturalized epistemology. The stalking horse is Fred Dretske's information-theoretic approach which relies on a very strong truth connection. The lessons of the previous chapters are applied to Dretske's theory demonstrating its inability to account for the normative aspects of epistemic justification.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Truth.; Justification (Christian theology)
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleJUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH.en_US
dc.creatorCOHEN, STEWART MARK.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCOHEN, STEWART MARK.en_US
dc.date.issued1983en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe dissertation is a study of the connection between justification and truth. It presents and critically discusses various ways of construing the connection. A dilemma is argued for to the effect that any construal of the connection is defective, while any theory of epistemic justification that ignores the connection incurs an explanatory deficit. The objective construal of the connection between epistemic justification and truth views such justification as probabilistic. A currently popular version of this view is a theory called Reliabilism. This theory is discussed in terms of both intuitive and purely logical considerations. Another way to cast out the connection between justification and truth is subjectively. It might be claimed that a subject must have beliefs about the connection between his evidence and the truth of the proposition he believes. This approach is characteristic of coderence theories. These theories are assessed with respect to their psychological reality. Since objective and doxastic construals of the connection between epistemic justification and truth fail, theories which eschew a truth connection altogether are discussed. Such an approach is characteristic of foundations theories. It is argued that these theories fail to achieve a level of generality that provides very much insight into the nature of epistemic justification. The final section of the dissertation is a detailed discussion of naturalized epistemology. The stalking horse is Fred Dretske's information-theoretic approach which relies on a very strong truth connection. The lessons of the previous chapters are applied to Dretske's theory demonstrating its inability to account for the normative aspects of epistemic justification.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectTruth.en_US
dc.subjectJustification (Christian theology)en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.identifier.proquest8322639en_US
dc.identifier.oclc689073361en_US
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