Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185957
Title:
The defense activation theory of epistemic justification.
Author:
Kim, Kihyeon.
Issue Date:
1992
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
In current epistemology, there are two different conceptions of epistemic justification. According to the first genetic conception, a justified belief is a well-formed belief. According to the second defense conception, how the belief is formed is irrelevant to the epistemic justification of the belief. What is important for the justification of the belief is whether the cognitive agent has a defense of the belief in question. I construct my own defense account of epistemic justification on the basis of criticizing current defense accounts of epistemic justification. The gist of my account is that I am justified in believing that p only if my belief that p is stored in my memory with a proper causal connection with other psychological states of mine that are adequate grounds for the belief that p. This illuminates an interesting symmetry between the genetic conception of epistemic justification and the defense conception of epistemic justification: in the genetic conception, justified belief is well-formed belief, whereas in a defense conception justified belief is well-stored belief. My account is different from current defense theories of epistemic justification (those of Keith Lehrer, Laurence BonJour, and Richard Foley) in two respects. First, in my account some type of causal relation between the belief and its adequate grounds is crucial for epistemic justification, while other theories deny the relevance of any causal consideration to the justification of beliefs. Their denial is a manifestation of a dogma--the Psychologistic Assumption--deeply rooted in traditional epistemology, such that epistemic justification is wholly a function of psychological states of a cognitive agent. I show that this dogma has to be abandoned. Second, other theories require the explicit representation of the belief about the evidential relation between the belief in question and its adequate grounds. In them, this explicitly represented higher-level belief constitutes the defense of the belief in question. I show that, due to this requirement of explicitly represented higher-level beliefs, current defense accounts run into numerous insuperable problems. Meanwhile, my theory does not face these problems because it does not require higher-level beliefs.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Dissertations, Academic.; Philosophy.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Philosophy; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Goldman, Alvin

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleThe defense activation theory of epistemic justification.en_US
dc.creatorKim, Kihyeon.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKim, Kihyeon.en_US
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn current epistemology, there are two different conceptions of epistemic justification. According to the first genetic conception, a justified belief is a well-formed belief. According to the second defense conception, how the belief is formed is irrelevant to the epistemic justification of the belief. What is important for the justification of the belief is whether the cognitive agent has a defense of the belief in question. I construct my own defense account of epistemic justification on the basis of criticizing current defense accounts of epistemic justification. The gist of my account is that I am justified in believing that p only if my belief that p is stored in my memory with a proper causal connection with other psychological states of mine that are adequate grounds for the belief that p. This illuminates an interesting symmetry between the genetic conception of epistemic justification and the defense conception of epistemic justification: in the genetic conception, justified belief is well-formed belief, whereas in a defense conception justified belief is well-stored belief. My account is different from current defense theories of epistemic justification (those of Keith Lehrer, Laurence BonJour, and Richard Foley) in two respects. First, in my account some type of causal relation between the belief and its adequate grounds is crucial for epistemic justification, while other theories deny the relevance of any causal consideration to the justification of beliefs. Their denial is a manifestation of a dogma--the Psychologistic Assumption--deeply rooted in traditional epistemology, such that epistemic justification is wholly a function of psychological states of a cognitive agent. I show that this dogma has to be abandoned. Second, other theories require the explicit representation of the belief about the evidential relation between the belief in question and its adequate grounds. In them, this explicitly represented higher-level belief constitutes the defense of the belief in question. I show that, due to this requirement of explicitly represented higher-level beliefs, current defense accounts run into numerous insuperable problems. Meanwhile, my theory does not face these problems because it does not require higher-level beliefs.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectDissertations, Academic.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairGoldman, Alvinen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberLehrer, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberTolliver, Joseph Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberReich, Naomi A.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest9303300en_US
dc.identifier.oclc713066248en_US
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