Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185947
Title:
Quality choice games in durable goods industries.
Author:
Kim, Young Chan.
Issue Date:
1992
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
This dissertation is concerned with strategic decision processes in markets where products are both durable and differentiated in quality. Thus, a commodity is differentiated in a two dimensional space (a) its consumption time location, and (b) its quality characteristics. Consumers "self-select" a product among various differentiated products. There exists a one-to-one correspondence between a consumer group and a product with a certain quality in a certain period. A monopolist seller, a monopolist lessor, and a sequential entry duopoly seller market are studied in the framework of a two-period, two-quality model. When product diversification is feasible, the monopoly power of the seller is greatly increased. A seller adopts strategic quality introduction sequence so that the amount of competition from the second-hand market is endogenously selected by the seller. Hence, a seller is able to discriminate among consumers in both intertemporal and contemporaneous fashion. Equilibria are sensitive to the speed of technological advancement. If technology develops slowly, a seller adopts a strategic quality introduction sequence such that it introduces high quality first and low quality later, so that the creation of second-hand market is eliminated. When technology advancement is significant over time, a seller introduces low quality first and high quality later, so that a group of consumers will update the quality of the product they consume over time.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Dissertations, Academic.; Economics.; Durable goods, Consumer.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Committee Chair:
Reynolds, Stanley

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleQuality choice games in durable goods industries.en_US
dc.creatorKim, Young Chan.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKim, Young Chan.en_US
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is concerned with strategic decision processes in markets where products are both durable and differentiated in quality. Thus, a commodity is differentiated in a two dimensional space (a) its consumption time location, and (b) its quality characteristics. Consumers "self-select" a product among various differentiated products. There exists a one-to-one correspondence between a consumer group and a product with a certain quality in a certain period. A monopolist seller, a monopolist lessor, and a sequential entry duopoly seller market are studied in the framework of a two-period, two-quality model. When product diversification is feasible, the monopoly power of the seller is greatly increased. A seller adopts strategic quality introduction sequence so that the amount of competition from the second-hand market is endogenously selected by the seller. Hence, a seller is able to discriminate among consumers in both intertemporal and contemporaneous fashion. Equilibria are sensitive to the speed of technological advancement. If technology develops slowly, a seller adopts a strategic quality introduction sequence such that it introduces high quality first and low quality later, so that the creation of second-hand market is eliminated. When technology advancement is significant over time, a seller introduces low quality first and high quality later, so that a group of consumers will update the quality of the product they consume over time.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectDissertations, Academic.en_US
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.subjectDurable goods, Consumer.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.chairReynolds, Stanleyen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberZajac, Edwarden_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHoffman, Elizabethen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberIsaac, Marken_US
dc.identifier.proquest9303291en_US
dc.identifier.oclc713057599en_US
All Items in UA Campus Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.