Call versus continuous auctions: An experimental study of market organization.

Persistent Link:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185542
Title:
Call versus continuous auctions: An experimental study of market organization.
Author:
Van Boening, Mark Virgil.
Issue Date:
1991
Publisher:
The University of Arizona.
Rights:
Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.
Abstract:
The results from 17 new experiments and 19 previously reported experiments are compared in an investigation of call and continuous auctions. The call auction used is the computerized PLATO sealed bid/offer (SBO), uniform price auction. The continuous auction used is the PLATO double auction (DA), a computerized version of the "open outcry" double auction. The SBO call auction has temporal consolidation of market orders and has limited information about trading activity. The continuous DA auction is characterized by sequential bilateral trades, and trading information (bids, offers, and prices) is publicly displayed. The paper first explores the effect of multiple crossings per trading period in the SBO call auction. Next, a comparison of SBO and DA is made, based on market experiments using flow supply and demand schedules. The institutional comparison is then extended to experimental asset markets. The results imply the following. First, multiple calls per period increase the efficiency of the SBO call auction, relative to one call per period, but they also induce greater misrepresentation of costs and values in the first crossing each period. Buyers and sellers also withhold units from the first crossing in a further attempt to gain strategic advantage. However, neither the withholding nor the misrepresentation appears to have any substantial influence on price. Second, the SBO auction with two calls per period is as efficient as the DA auction. In markets with a random competitive equilibrium (CE) each period, the SBO auction does a better job than DA at tracking the random CE price. Thus the SBO auction is equally as efficient as the DA, and has the further attributes of lower price volatility and greater privacy. Third, in laboratory asset markets, the SBO auction exhibits price bubbles similar to those observed in DA markets. Price dynamics in the two institutions are comparable, despite the stark differences in order flow and information dissemination.
Type:
text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Keywords:
Program trading (Securities) -- Congresses; Securities industry -- Data processing -- Congresses; Stock exchanges -- Data processing -- Congresses; Commodity exchanges -- Data processing -- Congresses.
Degree Name:
Ph.D.
Degree Level:
doctoral
Degree Program:
Economics; Graduate College
Degree Grantor:
University of Arizona
Advisor:
Smith, Vernon L.

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleCall versus continuous auctions: An experimental study of market organization.en_US
dc.creatorVan Boening, Mark Virgil.en_US
dc.contributor.authorVan Boening, Mark Virgil.en_US
dc.date.issued1991en_US
dc.publisherThe University of Arizona.en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe results from 17 new experiments and 19 previously reported experiments are compared in an investigation of call and continuous auctions. The call auction used is the computerized PLATO sealed bid/offer (SBO), uniform price auction. The continuous auction used is the PLATO double auction (DA), a computerized version of the "open outcry" double auction. The SBO call auction has temporal consolidation of market orders and has limited information about trading activity. The continuous DA auction is characterized by sequential bilateral trades, and trading information (bids, offers, and prices) is publicly displayed. The paper first explores the effect of multiple crossings per trading period in the SBO call auction. Next, a comparison of SBO and DA is made, based on market experiments using flow supply and demand schedules. The institutional comparison is then extended to experimental asset markets. The results imply the following. First, multiple calls per period increase the efficiency of the SBO call auction, relative to one call per period, but they also induce greater misrepresentation of costs and values in the first crossing each period. Buyers and sellers also withhold units from the first crossing in a further attempt to gain strategic advantage. However, neither the withholding nor the misrepresentation appears to have any substantial influence on price. Second, the SBO auction with two calls per period is as efficient as the DA auction. In markets with a random competitive equilibrium (CE) each period, the SBO auction does a better job than DA at tracking the random CE price. Thus the SBO auction is equally as efficient as the DA, and has the further attributes of lower price volatility and greater privacy. Third, in laboratory asset markets, the SBO auction exhibits price bubbles similar to those observed in DA markets. Price dynamics in the two institutions are comparable, despite the stark differences in order flow and information dissemination.en_US
dc.typetexten_US
dc.typeDissertation-Reproduction (electronic)en_US
dc.subjectProgram trading (Securities) -- Congressesen_US
dc.subjectSecurities industry -- Data processing -- Congressesen_US
dc.subjectStock exchanges -- Data processing -- Congressesen_US
dc.subjectCommodity exchanges -- Data processing -- Congresses.en_US
thesis.degree.namePh.D.en_US
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineGraduate Collegeen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Arizonaen_US
dc.contributor.advisorSmith, Vernon L.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberCox, James C.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberOaxaca, Ronald L.en_US
dc.identifier.proquest9136871en_US
dc.identifier.oclc702669840en_US
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